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Sustainable development is possible but at risk. The planet’s crises – rapid 
climate change, degraded ecosystems, scarcities of food, water, and energy – 
will outlast the serious economic downturn that now absorbs the attention of 
global leaders and affects people worldwide. Some crises can be reversed, but 
the damage to climate and ecosystems that contain and support all life may be 
beyond repair and contribute negatively to economic prosperity. It is impera-
tive that all countries adapt to this reality. We are all in this together.
The way that nations respond to the global recession can provide the basis for a 
new path of development that begins to ease the planet’s interlocked emergencies. 
The international community seems less concerned about the failing climate 
system than about failing financial institutions. It hesitates to speak of millions 
for adaptation to climate change, but mobilizes billions for the financial crisis. 
Faced with a global crisis, nations risk turning inward, focusing on narrow con- 
cerns, which would be a historic mistake. 
Yet the climate upon which human civilization is based is changing faster than 
imagined 20 years ago – or even 2 years ago. The change is accelerating and 
will affect future economic growth and deepen the economic gaps. 
We must respond by mitigation – decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, creat-
ing low-carbon paths of development for every nation, paths of development 
that are both a right and a necessity. 
But past emissions are already causing rapid change; so we must adapt to climate 
change – for present and future generations. Adaptation actions can spur devel-
opment and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The crises 
affect all, but they hit the poorest and most vulnerable hardest. The climate 
crisis is already claiming its victims.
Climate change also presents humankind with a historic opportunity to make 
development more sustainable, encompassing a low-carbon economy and ad-
dressing the risks posed by climate change. It offers an opportunity to create 
trust and cooperation to better manage all crises, to fashion a market built on 
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ecological truths as well as economic data, to redefine the way we measure 
growth and prosperity. It provides an opportunity for developing renewable en-
ergy for growth, providing the vulnerable with resources for adaptive capacity, 
and reducing the risk of disaster. The responses to climate change provide an 
opportunity to address the inherent inequity in the climate process and to cre-
ate equity within nations, among nations, and between generations. 
This Commission has focused primarily on adaptation as an important element 
of human development. We recognized the capacity of many peoples and fami-
lies to use their knowledge and deep experience to adapt effectively, given ap-
propriate signals and support. Our focus is on empowering the poorest people 
and countries to improve their ability to cope with an uncertain future – to 
reduce the negative effects and exploit the positive ones. Adaptation is also cru-
cial because millions of lives and livelihoods are at stake and because countries 
and regions that fail to adapt will contribute to global insecurity through, for 
example, the spread of disease, conflicts over resources, and a degradation of 
the economic system. 
Seventeen years ago the world agreed on the necessity for the rich to aid the 
poor in adapting and made it a treaty obligation in the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The evidence today is stronger, the moral 
case unequivocal, and the political importance compelling. There can be no 
global agreement without adaptation assistance, and because of the nature of 
climate impacts, there will be much less global security without it. The world 
will be a worse place for all if we do not meet this treaty obligation.
Adaptation is about forms of development in which the capacity to manage 
risk determines progress. Thus adaptation is much more than climate-proof-
ing development efforts and official development assistance (ODA). It requires 
action, additional funding, and deep cooperation between rich and poor nations 
and between rich and poor people within nations. It requires sustainable devel-
opment: meeting the needs of the present in ways that do not compromise the 
ability of future generations to meet their needs.
RESPoNSIBILITIES, CoMMITMENTS, AND LEADERSHIP
A trust gap has opened between industrial and developing countries, stalling 
essential common action. It is rooted in a failure to fully acknowledge the pol-
luter pays principle in climate negotiations and political dialogue. It results both 
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from decades of unfulfilled commitments in development and trade and from 
fears that developing countries with rapidly increasing emissions are not do-
ing enough to curb them. The trust gap can be bridged when commitments by 
industrial countries are met. Developing nations, for their part, need to ensure 
transparent management of funds and the empowerment of their communities. 
The causes and effects of climate change lie thousands of miles and centuries 
apart. Science has spoken: we now need the political will to act. In particular, 
strong and capable leadership is needed to overcome the current trust impasse 
and help us all live up to our responsibilities to current and future generations. 
This leadership will require an acknowledgement of urgency, a willingness to 
accept scientific truth, a long-term perspective, and collective actions. 
SuSTAINABLE DEvELoPMENT 
Ultimately, we need sustainable development, including a rapid move toward 
a low-carbon global economy. New green growth investment opportunities are 
necessary to respond to the urgent and growing needs for climate change ad-
aptation. 
Development that can be sustained in a world changed by climate must be enabled 
by building the adaptive capacity of people and defining appropriate technical 
adaptive measures. Adaptive capacity results from reduced poverty and human 
development. Adaptive measures require the institutional infrastructure that 
development brings. Action must be fast, scaled, focused, and integrated across 
sectoral divides:
▶ Speed: Wasting no time – climate change is happening faster than science 
predicted. 
▶ Scale: With growing numbers of people in danger, responses must match the 
scale of change.
▶ Focus: Managing risks, building the resilience of the poorest, and enhancing 
the ecosystem functions upon which they depend.
▶ Integration: Uniting environment, development, and climate change, and 
managing synergies between mitigation and adaptation.
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GovERNANCE
The creation of adaptive capacity requires that international funds move effi-
ciently to address impacts that are local. Participatory democracy, functioning 
institutions, and transparency are needed at all levels for effective adaptation. 
People at risk need democratic and political space so that they can inform them-
selves and articulate their views and concerns. They need markets that work for 
them so that they can trade and build their assets. This means that accountable 
and responsible government is more important than ever.
Adaptation is best managed through policy coherence and through coordina-
tion and cooperation among governments, civil society, and the private sector. 
The principle of subsidiarity should apply when dealing with adaptation. 
Impacts are local and contextual. The bulk of responsibility will fall on local 
and national governments, supported by international actions for appropriate 
capacities and resources. 
Social protection – particularly the direct and predictable transfers of resources 
to the poor – must become a standard feature when building the adaptive 
capacity of the most vulnerable households and individuals. It will include ef-
fective disaster risk reduction for the most vulnerable. 
Women and men have traditionally played different roles in economic activity 
and natural resources management. Women and men should have equal rights, 
making full use of their different capacities; where they are affected differ-
ently, attention must be given to the needs of the most vulnerable. 
INSTITuTIoNS
The adaptive capacity of people and communities is mediated through institu-
tions. Disseminating information, building knowledge, articulating needs, ensur-
ing accountability, exchanging goods and services, and transferring resources: 
all these are needed for adaptation and all are guided by and happen through 
institutions. In an uncertain world, adaptation cannot be effective without ef-
fective and accountable organizations and institutions. 
Families, neighborhoods, and communities and their local institutions must 
have effective links with national, regional, and international institutions, which 
help set the frameworks and provide many of the means in which and by which 
they adapt.
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Twenty-first century challenges require twenty-first century institutions. Today’s 
organizations must be able to manage public goods, bringing in the private 
sector. They must be stakeholder-driven, efficiently moving resources from 
global to local levels. They must be problem solvers, valuing ecosystems in 
dealing with climate change.
In the short term, we can use existing institutions for the deployment of finan-
cial resources and modify these institutions to better manage knowledge and 
services. In the longer term, as funding increases and agendas expand, new in-
stitutions might be needed. Application of the subsidiarity principle, mentioned 
above, will help distinguish among local, national, regional, and international 
responsibilities. 
Local level
Local institutions know their communities and should have the main responsi-
bility for identifying the poor and vulnerable and supporting them in building 
safe rural and urban settlements. These institutions should ensure that dissemi-
nation of climate information reaches the poorest and most vulnerable through 
appropriate extension services. 
National level 
Adaptation requires mechanisms cutting across governments’ sectoral forms 
of organization. National policy coordination for adaptation, disaster risk re-
duction, poverty alleviation, and human development should be led from the 
highest political and organizational level. Climate change is far too big a chal-
lenge for any single ministry because it requires coordination among multiple 
sectors. Our report offers encouraging examples. All national sectors must be 
involved in climate actions. 
All governments have a responsibility to protect their poorest and most vulner-
able citizens. Climate consequences will affect growing numbers of vulnerable 
people. Therefore governments need to be ready with the appropriate social safe- 
ty nets. In developing countries, external technical support is needed to strength-
en institutions responsible for such systems, and national and international or-
ganizations should cooperate in this effort. 
Communities in fragile states present challenges. International organizations 
and bilateral donors have a special responsibility to support and channel re-
sources to them via traditional and informal organizations. 
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In terms of climate change, national governments have to deal with multiple 
assistance agencies, all of which are trying to prove to their constituencies that 
they are taking effective action. Responding to climate change makes the prin-
ciples embedded in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra 
Agenda for Action – ownership, alignment, use of country systems, division of 
labor – therefore even more relevant. 
Governments should provide an enabling policy framework covering manage-
ment, planning, and service delivery functions for adaptation that facilitate and 
support local governments and other actors’ efforts. They should ensure that 
devolved administrative responsibilities are matched by resources and technical 
capacity.
Governments need to invest more in climate and meteorological information, 
biophysical monitoring, and early warning, integrating such data in their planning.
 
Regional level
In many cases, regional coordination will provide the best opportunities for 
dealing with these issues. Regional organizations should identify added value, 
analyze lessons learned, and ensure the provision of information on experi-
ences and ongoing activities. 
There is a need to address climate change at the level of river basins and agro-
ecological zones, making regional agencies more important. These should be- 
come more innovative in helping countries produce regional climate infor-
mation and knowledge, design common early warning systems for extreme 
weather conditions, manage shared water resources, control regional infectious 
diseases, and develop and create various agricultural and ecosystem manage-
ment systems. 
International level
The international arena provides great opportunities for major actions such 
as carbon markets and technology transfer. Yet given that adaptation is based 
mainly on local actions, international organizations must become more adept 
at reaching the local level directly and through national governments and re-
gional organizations. 
Adaptation and mitigation both require an improved knowledge network, with 
much greater investment in generating, disseminating, and exchanging know- 
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ledge. It is particularly important to build scientific knowledge and capacity 
for climate change research in low-income countries. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) should continue its four-yearly reports but 
should focus also on the rapid turnaround and dissemination of peer-reviewed 
research findings, especially to low-income countries. The World Meteorological 
Organization should be equipped to service these new requests of the IPCC. 
The IPCC should engage more actively with other existing institutions (such as 
the UN Environment Programme, the World Bank, UN specialized agencies, 
academia, civil society, and think tanks) to ensure that climate change knowl-
edge and information reach users in a timely way, particularly in low-income 
countries. 
The UNFCCC secretariat should focus on intergovernmental debate and policy 
setting, not on regulatory, financial, or operational functions. Regulatory serv-
ices, the scaling up of carbon trading, and the provision of global corporate 
guidance (as distinct from political guidance) could be entrusted to a new regu-
latory institution that would also effectively provide the least developed coun-
tries with access to the carbon markets. 
The knowledge gap for adaptation is vast, but a growing knowledge network is 
being developed. The UN should provide a focal point for UN-related climate 
change knowledge, “delivering as one” within developing countries, providing 
advice on issues from water and crop management to insurance and disaster 
risk reduction. 
The United Nations, international organizations (including civil society), and 
governments should work together to quickly and drastically scale up national, 
regional, and international systems for disaster response and preparedness. 
The new system should have a standby financial mechanism that would be trig-
gered automatically by a major event, assuring rapid response. It should facili-
tate recovery through a focus on vulnerability reduction; promote risk transfer, 
including social transfers and insurance products; and invest in staff with the 
creativity and capacity to handle surprises. It should strengthen national and 
regional capacities. 
UN agencies are not effectively coordinating their responses to climate change. 
Governments should support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General (SG) to 
strengthen coordination among UN agencies, funds, and programs. We urge 
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the SG to continue to keep climate change issues at the top of government 
and governance agendas, encouraging and maintaining political will. The SG 
should bring in stakeholders and set priorities throughout the UN system.
The Commission recognizes the leadership of the SG and urges the SG to con-
vene, in cooperation with international financial institutions, an independent 
high-level task force to articulate a vision for development that achieves the 
multiple goals of mitigation, adaptation, and meeting human needs. High on its 
agenda should be the connections between the different global crises and the 
adequacy of global public policy and global governance in dealing with them 
simultaneously.
FINANCE 
Resources are essential, but getting adaptation right is not only about money. 
Adopting a new approach to development and fixing our institutions will pro-
vide the kind of incentives needed for more adaptive actions. The transition to 
a low-carbon green economy can support the global recovery by creating new 
jobs across a wide range of industries, but it will also secure ecosystem servic-
es on which the world depends, especially the adaptive capacity of the poorest. 
In this context, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
offers a promising mechanism for simultaneously delivering mitigation, adap-
tation, and economic benefits while sustaining vital ecosystem services. 
Money is needed now, and more will be needed in the future to help developing 
countries adapt. The estimated price tag for this is probably higher than what 
is currently spent on ODA, but that is still uncertain. Hence we need a step-by-
step approach that will allow us to invest as our knowledge and understanding 
of climate change impacts and adaptation needs improve. 
Three main issues must be managed to get adaptation financing right: mobili-
zation of resources, management of resources, and allocation of resources. 
First, mobilization of resources. The Commission urges donors to honor their 
ODA commitments. This would improve the adaptive capacity of countries. 
ODA should be used now for urgent needs and to kick-start other forms of 
finance. In the long run, resources for adaptation will be a blend of ODA and 
non-ODA resources. The latter should meet the following criteria: additionality, 
adequacy, predictability, and political feasibility.
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By additional, we mean additional to the commitment of paying 0.7% of 
gross national income as ODA. The concept of additionality applies to the rais- 
ing of funds but does not prescribe how the extra funds must be spent. The 
Commission emphasizes the importance of transparency in funding and there-
fore urges the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for 
Eco-nomic Co-operation and Development to suggest an appropriate marker 
for adaptation finance that donors will use when reporting their financial con-
tributions. This will allow the tracking of additional resources for adaptation.
Second, management of resources. The Commission finds the proliferation of 
funds for adaptation problematic; it creates a coherence problem and puts pres-
sure on the management capacity of developing countries. No further vertical 
funds should be created for adaptation. 
Existing funding mechanisms should be effective, efficient, well coordinated, 
and accessible for actors at different levels. They should meet the following 
criteria: transparent and balanced governance; accountability of industrial and 
developing countries; demand-driven, with involvement of recipients during 
identification, definition, and implementation of programs; management 
devolved to the lowest level of effective governance; and independent evalua-
tion and oversight. 
Third, allocation of resources. This should take into account climate change 
vulnerability and in the early stage should make use of existing channels to 
implement high-priority items in National Adaptation Programs of Action, as 
identified by countries. The aim should be to integrate adaptation activities into 
the normal planning and budgeting processes of countries. 
A TWo-STEP APPRoACH
Because the creation of new mechanisms might delay essential action, we rec-
ommend a two-step approach to mobilizing “new and additional” funds for 
adaptation in developing countries. This stepwise approach aims to narrow the 
trust gap between industrial and developing countries. It provides immediate 
help to the poorest people as progress is made toward a long-term approach to 
adaptation funding within the context of a new agreement on climate change. 
As a first step, we urge donor countries to mobilize $1–2 billion (although not at 
the expense of current ODA-financed programs) to assist the vulnerable, low-
income countries (especially in Africa) and selected small island states (below 
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a certain gross domestic product), which are already suffering from climate 
impacts. The second step is an effective mechanism for funding adaptation that 
would be created through climate negotiations. 
ODA and other public funds are unlikely to provide the full resources required 
to finance adaptation efforts of all developing countries in the long term. There 
is a wide range of estimates of the needs. 
The main messages of our report are that adaptation will be possible and cost-
effective, that costs will rise for decades or centuries, and that costs will accel-
erate with continuing failure to mitigate.
Although more work is required to better estimate these needs, there are prom-
ising options proposed to raise funds. Some could bring between $5 billion and 
$15 billion additional funds a year – which is in the lower range of estimated 
needs.
We urge governments to adopt the mechanisms that provide additional and pre-
dictable resources and are politically feasible, equitable in terms of all donors 
and recipients, and respectful of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility. 
A BETTER CHANCE
During the course of its work, the Commission on Climate Change and De-
velopment has met governments and citizens struggling with the effects of cli-
mate change in Bolivia, Cambodia, and Mali. We offer this declaration and its 
recommendations as a contribution to the sustainable development path that 
climate change requires. We offer it for the consideration of political leaders at 
the Copenhagen climate meeting and beyond. 
All governments have responsibilities toward their most vulnerable citizens. 
All resources mobilized to mitigate and adapt to climate change must ensure 
their rights, their voice, their security. 
In 20 years the next generation will not judge us by the precise arrangements we 
make to reduce the emissions that cause global warming and help the victims 
of climate change, but rather by whether these arrangements proved effective. 
If we fail, their lives will be worse and will be more limited. If we succeed, we 
will have provided them at least a better chance.
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Preface
For many years negotiations and debates on climate change have focused on 
the need to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. We assumed that successful 
mitigation would help us avoid the harmful effects of increasing temperatures.
But mitigation has yet to begin at the required scale and space. People around 
the globe observe changes to their environment with profound consequences. 
The rainy season cannot be trusted to last long enough to recharge dry wells 
and restore soil moisture. Returning migratory birds no longer signal the right 
time for putting seeds in the ground. And violent storms and rains occur when 
and where they are least expected. Those with little margin to maintain a de-
cent life for themselves and their children, relying directly on what ecosystems 
provide, are most affected. 
In September 2007, Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt therefore in-
formed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of his government’s initia-
tive to launch an international commission on climate change and development. 
Its focus would be threefold: how to design and support adaptation to climate 
change, how to reduce the increasing risk of weather-related disasters, and how 
to strengthen the resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable communities 
and countries.
Much has changed since that day in New York. In December 2007 climate nego- 
tiators agreed on a Bali Action Plan, where adaptation is one of the pillars of 
the continued negotiation process. Scientists report that climate change is hap- 
pening more rapidly than had been predicted. And the climate crisis is not alone. 
Food, energy and water scarcities, ecosystem degradation, and a global eco-
nomic downturn are taking their simultaneous toll, especially on the poorest. 
The Commission on Climate Change and Development decided to build its 
case from the ground up. Through our meetings with citizens and governments 
in Bolivia, Cambodia, and Mali, we sought to gain an understanding of the 
threats poor people face, how they can build their adaptive capacity, and what 
is needed in the form of institutions and resources to provide the most effective 
support and the best outcomes. 
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For this to happen, a number of gaps must be bridged. There is a trust gap be-
tween rich and poor countries, gaps between institutions, and a resource gap. 
These are addressed in individual chapters of our report.
Taking adaptation actions today is a requirement for sustainable development 
tomorrow. Early action is needed to reduce future costs and irreversible eco-
logical damage. We, the Commission, are convinced that the different crises 
can only be resolved in unison. Assigning the right value to the climate and 
ecosystems, ensuring that no system is used beyond its capacity, and creating 
political space for dialogue and action – these are steps needed to deal with our 
multiple threats. The Commission is united in its belief that the climate crisis 
gives us both obligations and opportunities. It is in this spirit we offer our report. 
Gunilla Carlsson
Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation
Chairperson, Commission on Climate Change and Development
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Executive Summary
The international Commission on Climate Change and Development was 
launched in late 2007 by the Swedish government. Chaired by Swedish Minis-
ter for International Development Cooperation Gunilla Carlsson, the Commis-
sion has 13 members from countries in all regions. They represent international 
and regional organizations as well as science, civil society, and the private sector. 
The Commission examined adaptation to climate change and its links with 
development and disaster risk reduction and was asked to issue policy recom-
mendations on how the resilience of vulnerable communities and countries can 
be strengthened through official development assistance (ODA), on appropriate 
institutional and financial architecture, and on the mobilization of new finan-
cial resources.
In Chapter 1 we argue that the only solution to climate change is a rapid move 
toward a low-carbon global economy. This must be done urgently, efficiently, 
and with great determination, so that adaptation remains possible. 
The poor are overwhelmingly the present and future victims of climate change. 
Its impacts are mixed with and overlap the impacts of other syndromes such as 
rising food prices, the financial crisis, energy shortages, ecosystem degrada-
tion due to other human causes, and demographic changes. These must be 
managed in a highly coordinated manner. 
The poor need adaptive capacity, which consists mainly of assets, health, 
education, and governance. Thus in poor countries adaptation is inseparable 
from development, where the capacity to manage risk determines progress. 
Adaptation is much more than climate-proofing development efforts and ODA. 
It requires action, additional funding, and deep cooperation between rich and 
poor nations and between rich and poor people within nations. It requires sus-
tainable development: meeting the needs of the present in ways that do not com- 
promise the ability of future generations to meet their needs. 
Development must quickly reach rapidly growing numbers of people, focus on 
reducing vulnerability, and integrate adaptation, mitigation, and human devel-
opment goals. 
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Chapter 2 examines the ethics of climate change, mitigation, and adapta-
tion, including the trust gap between industrial and developing nations. In the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, wealthy nations pledged 
to help poorer nations adapt to climate hardships created for them by others. 
Unless this pledge is honored, the poorer countries will not agree to a post-2012 
global framework on climate change. Yet climate ethics are complex, as causes 
and effects are separated by thousands of miles and by generations. The issue of 
basic fairness developed in this chapter informs much of the rest of this report.
Chapter 3 focuses on the human dimension of climate change. While the ef-
fects of climate change may be vast, their brunt will be borne locally by indi-
viduals, families, villages, and neighborhoods. Discussions of climate change 
must be turned upside down, switching from a global to a local focus. National 
governments must set frameworks to ensure that adaptation measures and dis-
aster risk reduction reach all, including the most vulnerable. Historically, bad 
governance and a failure to respond to local needs have hindered development 
efforts. Those problems will frustrate adaptation if not managed. Moving to-
ward participatory democracy is essential.
Adaptation discussions tend to focus on big weather-related catastrophes. Yet 
adaptation to smaller, unreported events is at least as important. First, the in-
crease in smaller floods, landslides, and so on is increasing poverty through the 
accumulated effects. Second, households and societies that are more resilient to 
small shocks are less vulnerable to big ones. 
Adaptation strategies must increase the adaptive capacities of people, businesses, 
and ecosystems. Some development agencies and national governments are suc-
cessfully using social transfers – regular and predictable grants to poor house-
holds – as a way to improve access to services and address the underlying causes 
of inequalities in well-being. They need to be expanded and scaled up as vul-
nerability increases.
Adaptation is shaped by institutions at the local, national, and international 
levels; adaptive capacity at the local scale depends on developing capacity for 
adaptation at wider scales. The private sector is a key resource in adaptation. 
Three main institutional ingredients are necessary to improve people’s adaptive 
capacity: targeted capacity development, inclusive governance, and ownership. 
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Chapter 4 addresses the governance gap. It shows that despite the strong inter-
dependence between economy, environment, and development, governments 
continue to try to manage issues in silos as if they were separate one from 
another. Climate change, one of the greatest threats to human civilization, has 
been placed in what is often the weakest governance silo: environment. 
Local institutions know their communities and should have the main responsi-
bility for identifying the poor and vulnerable and supporting them in building 
safe rural and urban settlements. These institutions should ensure that dissemi-
nation of climate information reaches the poorest and most vulnerable through 
appropriate extension services. 
National policy coordination for adaptation, disaster risk reduction, poverty 
alleviation, and human development should be led from the highest political 
and organizational level. Climate consequences will affect growing numbers 
of vulnerable people. Therefore governments need to be ready with the appro-
priate social safety nets. 
The need to address climate change at the level of river basins and agro-eco-
logical zones makes regional agencies more important. These should become 
more innovative in helping countries produce regional climate information and 
knowledge, design common early warning systems for extreme weather condi-
tions, manage shared water resources, control regional infectious diseases, and 
develop and create various agricultural and ecosystem management systems. 
The international arena provides great opportunities for major actions such 
as carbon markets and technology transfer. Yet given that adaptation is based 
mainly on local actions, international organizations must become more adept at 
reaching the local level directly and through national governments and region-
al organizations. The commission offers a number of ways that they can do so. 
Chapter 5 deals with the mechanisms for financing adaptation. Acknowledg- 
ing the difficulties of counting the costs of adaptation at any given time, it ar-
gues that costs will only increase as society continues to delay serious efforts 
on mitigation. The report calls for new and additional resources for financing 
adaptation. It calls for greater coordination of financing mechanisms and moni-
toring of resources at the global and national levels. 
Mobilization of resources is key. Honoring ODA commitments improves the 
adaptive capacity of countries and would provide funds to help kick-start urgent 
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adaptation measures. In the long run, resources for adaptation will be a blend 
of ODA and non-ODA resources. The latter should meet the following criteria: 
additionality, adequacy, predictability, and political feasibility.
The proliferation of funds for adaptation is problematic; it creates a coherence 
problem and puts pressure on the management capacity of developing coun-
tries. No further vertical funds should be created for adaptation. Existing fund-
ing mechanisms should be effective, efficient, well coordinated, and accessible 
for actors at different levels. A step-wise approach for mobilizing financial re-
sources is envisaged.
Allocation should take into account climate change vulnerability and in the 
early stage should make use of existing channels to implement high-priority 
items in National Adaptation Programs of Action, as identified by countries. 
The aim should be to integrate adaptation activities into the normal planning 
and budgeting processes of countries.
Nine appendixes cover the issues of food security; water; natural resources, 
forests, and trees; health; energy access, climate, and development; risk and 
insurance; migration; cities and: disaster risk reduction; 
▶ Food security depends on more than how much food is grown; it depends 
on people’s access to markets (including for labor), the stability of supply, 
and quality. All are affected by climate change and must be managed.
▶ Water is mainly an issue of political power, especially for the poor. Efficient 
management is also crucial, particularly for the use of rainwater.
▶ Natural resources management depends on land tenure and user rights. Good 
management, especially of forests, can have both mitigation and adaptation 
results. 
▶ Energy is necessary for development, and energy access issues must be part 
of mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
▶ Health will be affected by changing disease patterns, requiring more empha-
sis on prevention and improved sanitation. 
▶ Insurance approaches must evolve toward new forms of transferring and 
sharing risks more effectively targeting the poor and based on climate change 
models.
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▶ Cities, especially the mega-cities of poor nations, require problem-solving 
partnerships between local governments and residents of informal commu-
nities for innovative urban land use. 
▶ Migration should be recognized as an adaptive strategy, to be managed and 
facilitated rather than restricted. 
▶ Disaster risk reduction strategies should focus on underlying risk rather than 
response and on the safety of human settlements.
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Development and climate change are the central problems of the 21st Century.
If the world fails on either, it will fail on both. Climate change undermines development.
No deal on climate change which stalls development will succeed.”
Lord NichoLas sterN
1. Adaptation: The Context for Change
The international Commission on Climate Change and 
Development was launched in late 2007 by the Swedish 
government. Chaired by Swedish Minister for International 
Development Cooperation Gunilla Carlsson, the Commis-
sion has 13 members from countries in all regions. They 
represent international and regional organizations as well 
as science, civil society, and the private sector.
The Commission examined adaptation to climate change 
and its links with development and disaster risk reduction 
and was asked to issue policy recommendations on how 
the resilience of vulnerable communities and countries can 
be strengthened through official development assistance 
(ODA), on appropriate institutional and financial architec-
ture, and on the mobilization of new financial resources.1 
The Commission’s first message is that the only response 
to climate change is a rapid move toward a low-carbon glo-
bal economy. This must be done urgently, efficiently, and 
with great determination. 
Yet mitigation – efforts to decrease the amounts of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) released into the atmosphere – 
has yet to begin at the required scale and pace. In fact, GHG 
emissions have increased steadily since the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 
1992. Thus anthropogenic emissions are already changing 
the climate and, due to their long residence in the upper 
atmosphere, will continue to do so for many decades if not 
centuries to come. Civilization will have to adapt to these 
changes. 
Policy makers and scientists have all been slow to focus 
on adaptation, largely because mitigation got much of their 
attention. In fact, many environmentalists feared that any 
focus on adaptation would take attention away from the ur-
gent need to mitigate. That has changed.
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that even if global 
society does succeed in reducing emissions, some climate 
change impacts are now unavoidable (see Box, p. 2.) and 
solutions must be found to adjust to them. 
As a result, the 2007 Bali Action Plan called for strong and 
extremely ambitious steps on adaptation, giving priority to 
urgent and immediate needs of vulnerable developing coun-
tries, including the full range of risk reduction measures. 
A stronger sense of urgency
Since the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, a number of 
scientists and scientific organizations have published papers 
suggesting that climate change is happening much faster 
than the panel suggested. The 2009 meeting of the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science heard how 
carbon emissions have been growing at 3.5% per year since 
2000, up sharply from 0.9% per year in the 1990s. 
The European Union has set a goal of not allowing the 
temperature increase to exceed 2° Celsius. Staying under 
that target would imply emission cuts of at least 80% by 
2050. Many scientists argue that an increase of 2° is too 
high and call for more drastic cuts in emissions. Positive 
feedback mechanisms such as a reduced albedo and the 
thawing of the permafrost are likely to accelerate climate 
change, and the planet appears to be moving toward dan-
gerous tipping points. 
Evidence is also growing that the absorptive capacity of 
carbon sinks such as oceans and terrestrial ecosystems is 
diminishing. Deforestation, soil erosion, overfishing, and 
bad management of freshwater resources have further re- 1 See Appendix 10 for the Commission’s full terms of reference.
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duced the capacity of Earth’s systems to respond to future 
shocks.2  
In March 2009 in Copenhagen, 2,500 researchers from 
some 80 countries presented their most recent findings. 
Their main message, according to conference organizers, 
was that: 
Recent observations confirm that, given high rates 
of observed emissions, the worst-case IPCC scenario 
trajectories (or even worse) are being realized. For 
many key parameters, the climate system is already 
moving beyond the patterns of natural variability 
within which our society and economy have devel-
oped and thrived. These parameters include global 
mean surface temperature, sea-level rise, ocean and 
ice sheet dynamics, ocean acidification, and extreme 
climatic events. There is a significant risk that many 
of the trends will accelerate, leading to an increasing 
risk of abrupt or irreversible climatic shifts.3  
Interconnected crises 
The impacts of climate change are mixed with and overlap 
the impacts of other syndromes such as rising food prices, 
the financial crisis, energy shortages, ecosystem degrada-
tion due to other human causes, and demographic changes. 
The lack of atmospheric space to safely dispose of GHG 
emissions is one of several linked scarcities now affecting 
society. Others include scarcities of affordable petroleum-
based products, affordable food, and fresh water.4 Climate 
change is accelerated by the use of carbon-based energy and 
the alteration of forests to farmland; it changes the avail-
ability of fresh water. Agriculture needs a predictable cli-
mate, water, energy sources, and fertilizer, much of which 
is petroleum-based. It is not clear how long these scarcities 
will persist or how they will continue to affect one another. 
These strong connections mean that the scarcities must 
be managed in a highly coordinated manner. The next-gen-
eration technologies, protective investments, and shifts in 
policies needed to correct economic and financial imbal-
ances can also serve the collective purpose of protecting 
our common environment from overexploitation. Failure 
on one will be failure on both. 
Focus on the poor
All nations and all people must adapt to climate change. 
This truth is demonstrated by the heat waves of 2003 in Eu-
rope and North America and by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
and other hurricanes affecting US cities. Although single 
events can rarely be attributed to climate change, they do 
show that it is the poor, even in wealthy countries, who are 
most affected by extreme weather events.
2 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: 
Synthesis (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005). 
3 “Key Messages from the Congress,” International Scientific Congress – 
Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges & Decisions, University of Co-
penhagen, 10–12 March 2009.
4 See, e.g., A. Evans, “Multilateralism for an Age of Scarcity. Building Inter-
national Capacity for Energy, Food and Climate Security,” Working Paper 
(New York: Center for International Cooperation, New York University, 
July 2008).
Different impacts for different regions
in africa, the situation is quickly becoming more serious: analysts 
project that by 2020, between 75 million and 250 million people will 
be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change, and in 
some countries yields from rainfed agriculture could be reduced by up 
to 50%. 
in asia, by the 2050s freshwater availability in central, south, east, 
and southeast asia, particularly in large river basins, is projected to 
decrease, and diarrheal diseases associated with floods and droughts 
are expected to increase in east, south, and southeast asia. 
in Latin america, productivity of some important crops is projected 
to decrease and livestock productivity to decline, with adverse conse-
quences for food security. changes in precipitation patterns and the 
disappearance of glaciers in the andes are projected to significantly 
affect water availability for human consumption, agriculture, and en-
ergy generation.
in small island states, sea-level rise is expected to threaten vital in-
frastructure, settlements, and facilities that support the livelihood of 
island communities. By mid-century, climate change is expected to 
reduce water resources in many small islands in the caribbean and 
Pacific to the point where they become insufficient to meet demand 
during low-rainfall periods.
source: intergovernmental Panel on climate change, Climate Change 
2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to 
the Fourth Assessment (Geneva: 2007).
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1. adaptation: the context for change
This report focuses on adaptation to climate change by 
poor countries and by poor people in those countries: 
▶ Because climate change threatens poverty reduction 
and the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals, 
▶ Because poor people in poor countries depend directly 
on endangered ecosystems and their services for their 
well-being,
▶ Because poor people in poor countries lack the resourc-
es to adequately defend themselves or to adapt rapidly to 
changing circumstances, and 
▶ Because their voices are not sufficiently heard in inter-
national discussions, particularly in climate change ne-
gotiations. 
Adaptation and development
What is adaptation? The UNFCCC provides a clear answer: 
“Adaptation is a process through which societies make 
themselves better able to cope with an uncertain future. 
Adapting to climate change entails taking the right meas-
ures to reduce the negative effects of climate change (or 
exploit the positive ones) by making the appropriate adjust-
ments and changes” [emphasis added].5 
Adaptation is about building adaptive capacity and carry-
ing out appropriate adaptive measures. Adaptive measures 
seek to address climate change impacts by, for example, a 
new seawall, crop insurance schemes, research on heat- and 
drought-tolerant crop varieties, agricultural diversification, 
vaccines, upgraded drainage systems, enhanced water 
use efficiency, enlarged reservoirs, or revised building 
codes. Building adaptive capacity aims to address the mul-
tiple drivers of vulnerability, including poverty. Between 
building adaptive capacity and instituting adaptive meas-
ures, there exists a continuum of adaptation activities. (See 
Figure 1.) 6
Adaptive capacity increases with human development. It 
can be summarized under four simple headings – wealth, 
health, education, and governance: 
▶ Wealth, or access to assets, provides the buffers and 
backup that take people through crises and enable them 
to recover. Assets may be financial or material, directly 
accessible or through insurance, and come from the so-
cial networks of family and kin or through government 
Addressing the drivers 
of vulnerability
Activities seek to 
reduce poverty and 
other non-climatic 
stressors that make 
people vulnerable
Building response 
capacity
Activities seek to build 
robust systems for 
problem solving
Managing climate risks
Activities seek to 
incorporate climate 
information into 
decision-making
Confronting climate 
change
Activities seek to 
address impacts 
associated exclusively 
with climate change
Vulnerability focus Impacts focus
Continuum of adaptation activities
Figure 1. 
5 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Climate  
Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing 
Countries (Bonn: 2007), p. 12.
6 R. J. T. Klein and Å. Persson, “Financing Adaptation to Climate 
Change: Issues and Priorities” (Brussels: Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2008), adapted from H. McGray, A. Hammill, and R. Bradley,  
with E. L. Schipper and J. Parry, Weathering the Storm: Options for 
Framing Adaptation and Development (Washington, DC: World Re-
sources Institute, 2007). 
source: r. J. t. Klein and Å. Persson, “Financing adaptation to climate change: issues and Priorities” 
(Brussels: centre for european Policy studies, 2008).
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social protection schemes for those with few means of 
their own.
▶ Health safeguards the productive capacity of the indi-
vidual and the integrity of families. This comes through 
clean water and effective sanitation, safe childbirth, and 
food of the right kind and amount so that children grow 
to their full potential.
▶ Education gives people access to information, knowl-
edge of their options, and the ability to make informed 
choices.
▶ Governance, or rather the fullness of the institutional 
environment, provides the means through which people, 
working with others, have access to resources, articulate 
needs, and exercise their rights.
Understanding adaptation in this way tells us that adaptive 
action must be highly context-specific. In countries and 
communities where human development indicators are low, 
priority must be given to strengthening the adaptive capac-
ity of people and institutions. If capacity is already there, 
through assets, insurance, a healthy and well-educated 
population, and formal and informal institutions that medi-
ate support and through which needs can be analyzed and 
articulated, then action will naturally emphasize climate-
specific measures – that is, measures that would not have 
been necessary if climate change were not happening. 
This report looks at the adaptive capacity of people, 
firms, and ecosystems and discusses their interactions, 
complementarities, and competition. It also looks at adap-
tive capacity across scales – local, national, international 
– and how interfaces among these scales facilitate or stand 
in the way of adaptation.
Adaptation to climate change is about forms of develop-
ment in which the capacity to manage risk determines pro-
gress. Thus adaptation is much more than climate-proofing 
development efforts and official development assistance. 
The Commission finds that it requires action, additional 
funding, and deep cooperation between rich and poor na-
tions and between rich and poor people within nations. It 
requires sustainable development: meeting the needs of the 
present in ways that do not compromise the ability of future 
generations to meet their needs. 
A new development path
The development path under climate change will involve 
rethinking and reformulation on four levels: speed, scale, 
focus, and integration. 
▶ Speed: Wasting no time – climate change is happening 
faster than science predicted. The IPCC prediction that 
in Africa between 75 million and 250 million people 
will be exposed to increased water stress by 2020 allows 
for little more than a decade of development. 
▶ Scale: Development must decrease the vulnerability of 
all of the planet’s poorest, and especially the “bottom 
billion.” Growing numbers of people are in danger; 
responses must match the scale of this change. 
▶ Focus: Development should be centered on managing 
risks, building the resilience of the poorest, and enhancing 
the ecosystem functions upon which they depend. This 
requires new focus and emphases in all sectors, includ-
ing food security, with special attention to poor people’s 
access to markets; water, with special attention to equity 
of access and the efficient use of rainwater; natural re-
sources management, with special attention to land tenure 
and user rights of the poor; energy, with special atten-
tion to a decentralized mix of renewable and low-carbon 
options for the poor; migration, with special attention to 
policies that benefit the most vulnerable regions and min-
imize transaction costs on remittances; and disaster risk 
reduction, with special attention to the most vulnerable 
groups and settlements and to rehabilitated infrastruc-
ture that contributes to reduced risk. (See appendixes for 
further discussion of these issues.) 
▶ Integration: Adaptation, mitigation, and human devel-
opment goals are closely interrelated. (See Box, p. 5) 
Mitigation measures such as afforestation, reforestation, 
and avoided deforestation are also effective adaptation, 
as they improve economic and ecosystem resilience. The 
current approach, which tries to deal with them sepa-
rately, will not only be ineffective, it will be counterpro-
ductive. The conceptof sustainable development united 
the two concerns of environment and development; our 
new development path unites environment, development, 
and climate change (adaptation and mitigation).
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1. adaptation: the context for change
Structure of the report
Our report is structured around four main parts follow-
ing this chapter. Chapter 2 examines the ethics of climate 
change, mitigation, and adaptation, including the trust gap 
between industrial and developing nations. Wealthy nations 
pledged in the UN Framework on Climate Change of 1992 
to help poorer nations adapt to climate hardships created for 
them by others. Unless this pledge is honored, those countries 
will not agree to a global framework on climate change. 
Yet climate ethics are complex, as causes and effects are 
separated by thousands of miles and by generations. The 
issue of basic fairness developed in this chapter informs 
much of the rest of this report. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the human dimension of climate 
change. While the effects of climate change may be vast, 
their brunt will be borne locally by individuals, families, 
villages, and neighborhoods. Discussions of climate change 
must be turned upside down, switching from a global to a 
local focus. National governments must set frameworks to 
ensure that adaptation measures and disaster risk reduction 
reach all, including the most vulnerable. Historically, bad 
governance and a failure to respond to local needs have 
hindered development efforts. Those problems will frus-
trate adaptation if not managed. Moving toward participa-
tory democracy is essential.
Chapter 4 addresses the governance gap. It shows that 
despite the strong interdependence between economy, en-
vironment, and development, governments continue to try 
to manage issues in silos as if they were separate one from 
another. Recognizing the limitations of individual actions, 
the report calls for an enlightened, prudent, yet proactive 
global public policy. 
Chapter 5 deals with the mechanisms for financing 
adaptation. Acknowledging the difficulties of counting the 
costs of adaptation at any given time, it argues that they 
will only rise as society continues to delay serious efforts 
on mitigation. The report calls for new and additional re-
sources for financing adaptation but also recognizes the 
importance of official development assistance to kick-start 
urgent adaptation efforts. A step-wise approach for mobi-
lizing financial resources is envisaged. It calls for greater 
coordination of financing mechanisms and monitoring of 
resources at global and national levels. 
The appendixes cover the issues of food security; water; 
Synergies between mitigation and adaptation 
Mitigation and adaptation can be mutually reinforcing. increasing the 
storage of carbon and avoiding its release from forests and soils can 
have multiple benefits. the reducing emissions from deforestation and 
Forest degradation program offers a promising mechanism for simulta-
neously delivering mitigation, adaptation, and economic benefits while 
sustaining vital ecosystem services. the basic principle is that coun-
tries and those that own and manage forests would be paid to protect 
and increase the public goods they provide. similar ideas with regard 
to carbon sinks in soils are under discussion.
such measures could be combined with adaptation efforts and pro-
duce synergies. Maintaining or increasing forest coverage, avoiding till-
age of highly organic soils, or integrating bio-char may lead to improve-
ments in water retention and soil productivity, ultimately promoting the 
resilience of ecosystems and of the communities that depend on them. 
Mitigation would go hand in hand with adaptation. a high value would 
be assigned to the sustainable management of natural resources and 
potentially also promote the implementation of the conventions on bio-
diversity and desertification.
But there are also conflicts. ample experience tells us that without 
secure rights and proper governance arrangements, the poor and land-
less risk being forced out when the value of forests and land increases. 
New opportunities will enrich some while others lose out. if safeguards 
against such risks are not put in place, new climate policy may further 
marginalize the poor and vulnerable. 
natural resources, forests, and trees; health; energy access, 
climate, and development; risk and insurance; migration; 
cities; disaster risk reduction; and the Commission’s terms 
of reference and biographies of the Commissioners. 
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For nearly eight years, Mike Miller, director of supportive 
housing for UNITY of Greater New Orleans, has worked 
with the city’s homeless population. The burly, bearded 
Miller reckons that demand for his services has increased 
60% since f loods caused by Hurricane Katrina broke 
through badly built dikes in 2005.
According to a US government survey, slightly more than 
one-third of all New Orleans buildings – houses, churches, 
medical centers, and so on – are considered officially vacant.
In early 2009, Miller is visiting James Kelly, 61, and 
Deborah Williams, 54, who have set up barebones house-
keeping on the second floor of an abandoned house in a neigh-
borhood of abandoned buildings, like many neighborhoods 
in the city. In a back room are a battered bureau, a flimsy din-
ing table, and a neatly made bed. The owner of the building 
is letting the pair live there in hopes of discouraging arson. 
It took Kelly and Williams three weeks to clear their living 
space of post-Katrina debris and lay plywood over rotting 
wood floors. There is still a large hole in the ceiling and 
the walls are stained with water and mildew, but Williams 
sweeps the floor daily. A nearby church provides them with 
water, and Kelly receives a monthly $600 disability check 
that pays for food.
“It’s actually insanity to live in a place like this,” he says. 
“But it’s better than the street, where you can get raped or 
killed.”
UNITY’s Miller also knows that abandoned buildings 
can be havens for drug dealers, drug users, and prostitutes. 
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So he restricts his searches of vacant buildings to daylight 
hours, looking for signs of habitation, like bedrolls, clothes, 
or prescription vials. He says that 9 out of every 10 build-
ings he searches show signs of people living in them. 
Kelly and Williams are just two of what Miller estimates 
may be as many as 10,000 people living in these abandoned 
structures, a large portion of them, like Kelly and Williams, 
senior citizens.
In New Orleans, lax construction codes had allowed 
houses to be built below likely flood levels, and slow-mov-
ing bureaucracy and begrudging federal aid have restricted 
many homeowners from either reclaiming or selling their 
properties.
For renters, the situation is even worse. The Louisiana 
Recovery Authority has reported that more than 82,000 
rental units were badly damaged or destroyed by Hurri-
cane Katrina, more than 44,000 of those in the greater New 
Orleans region. It reports that rental rates in metropolitan 
New Orleans have risen 52% since the hurricane, although 
coming down from a post-disaster spike caused by land-
lords looking to cash in on strong demand and very limited 
supply. 
City officials decided just before Christmas 2007 to tear 
down nearly 5,000 public housing units to make way for 
privately built housing that promised to supply a small per-
centage of below-market-rate housing at some time in the 
future. This decision was formally criticized in a UN report 
that decried “the disparate impact that this natural disaster 
continues to have on low-income African-American resi-
dents, many of whom continue to be displaced more than 
two years after the hurricane.”
The lack of affordable housing hurts the most vulner-
able, but it also contributes to maintaining a shortage of 
inexpensive labor and creates a drain on social services 
provided by both governmental and non-governmental or-
ganizations. 
UNITY has obtained more than 3,000 federally spon-
sored vouchers that low-income residents can use to help 
pay rent. But demand exceeds supply, and attention to the 
problem is generally lacking, except in extreme circum-
stances, like the formation of two homeless encampments 
close to public thoroughfares that UNITY helped to clear 
in the summer of 2007. Says Miller, “We play clean-up for 
the whole broken system.” 
A short time after his visit to James Kelly and Deborah 
Willams, Miller was able to obtain for Williams an apart-
ment specifically designed for her particular medical con-
dition. Meanwhile, Kelly lives alone in the vacant building 
the two had shared, waiting for his own chance to move 
into a real home for the first time in 10 years. 
“This is just surviving,” Kelly says. “This isn’t living. 
All I know is things are supposed to be better than this. 
We’re all trying to make the best out of a bad situation, but 
this just ain’t no way for people to live.” 
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2. The Trust Gap
Climate change is a perfect moral storm. One consequence of this is that,  
even if the difficult ethical questions could be answered, we might still find it difficult to act.  
For the storm makes us extremely vulnerable to moral corruption.
ProFessor stePheN GardiNer7
 
While climate change raises many scientific, technical, and 
economic issues, it is often described as primarily an issue 
of political will. Yet this shortcuts the fact that most na-
tions are democracies, and thus political will must depend 
on the value citizens place on defending the vulnerable and 
those who have had little to do with causing the problem, 
including future generations. 
The IPCC wrote in its 2007 report that determining what 
constitutes dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system “involves value judgments. Science can sup-
port informed decisions on this issue.”8 Thus coping with 
climate change, both mitigation and adaptation, becomes 
primarily an ethical issue. 
The simplest ethical argument runs along the following 
lines: the stronger and richer peoples and nations have been 
putting GHGs into the atmosphere; this approach to devel-
opment helped them get stronger and richer; their actions 
are harming – and will cause greater and greater harm to 
– the weaker and the poorer, who have had very little to 
do with causing the problem; the rich should take a lead 
in cleaning up what they have done and should take steps 
to protect the weak as well as future generations, who are 
blameless. 
Many argue the ethical stance quite vehemently, noting 
that all of the world’s major religions and ethical systems 
posit a duty of the stronger to help the weaker, especially 
when it is the actions of the stronger that are inadvertently 
harming the weaker. 
Other commentators maintain that such “finger point-
ing” arguments simply do not work in political negotiations 
and are in fact an impediment to those discussions. A focus 
on the vulnerable without apportioning responsibility 
might be more helpful. 
Though the ethical argument appears at first glance 
fairly straightforward, the quest for fairness in allocating 
rights to emit GHGs has achieved little success. Sugges-
tions range from all people being entitled to an equal share 
of the atmospheric commons, to a “polluter pays” approach 
that has countries paying for pollution they have generated, 
to a position accepting a state’s current rates of pollution – 
a sort of “squatter’s rights” approach. Some approaches fo-
cus on the productivity of the carbon generated and others 
on guaranteeing each nation at least a “subsistence level” of 
GHG emissions. 
The polluter pays principle
A number of these approaches, and the negotiating stances 
of the wealthier countries, tend to ignore a widely agreed 
principle that has been the basis of much international and 
national environmental law for at least the last quarter-
century. The polluter pays principle (PPP) requires that the 
costs of pollution be borne by those who cause it. 
The principle first appeared internationally in the 1972 
Recommendation by the OECD [Organisation for Econom-
ic Co-operation and Development] Council on Guiding 
Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of 
Environmental Policies, which said: “The principle to be 
used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control 
measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmen-
tal resources and to avoid distortions in international trade 
and investment is the so-called Polluter-Pays Principle.” 
7 S. Gardiner, “A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenera-
tional Ethics and the Problem of Corruption,” Environmental Values 
15 (2006), pp. 397–413.
8 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report. Summary for Policmakers (Geneva: 2007), p. 18.
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It added that the principle “means that the polluter should 
bear the expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned 
measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the 
environment is in an acceptable state.”
The PPP helps to internalize environmental externali-
ties of economic activities so that the prices of goods and 
services fully reflect the costs of production. Four different 
aspects of the principle have been described: economically, 
it promotes efficiency; legally, it promotes justice; it pro-
motes harmonization of international environmental poli-
cies; it defines how to allocate costs within a state.9  
The principle has evolved into something called the ex-
tended or strong PPP, as the OECD in the late 1980s includ-
ed in the PPP costs related to accidental pollution, which 
would presumably cover GHG emissions.
The PPP was reaffirmed in the 1992 Rio Declaration and 
is mentioned in Agenda 21 and the World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development’s Johannesburg Plan of Implemen- 
tation. It has become one of the fundamental principles of 
international environmental law, and it is explicitly men-
tioned or implicitly referred to in a number of multilateral 
environmental agreements.
The trust gap
The apparent willingness of wealthier countries to dismiss 
during the climate change negotiations a principle that they 
and their organizations have insisted on for years is one of 
several reasons that there is a “trust gap” between rich and 
poor countries that makes climate and many other negotia-
tions so difficult. 
One reason for this gap is that industrial nations have of-
ten committed to increasing their official development as-
sistance, but few have done as promised. Since 1970, leaders 
of most industrial countries have agreed many times that 
aid-giving nations should provide resources equal to 0.7% 
of their gross national income (GNI). 
Promises of more aid were made in Monterrey, Mexico, 
in 2002, when leaders pledged to increase aid to help coun-
tries meet the Millennium Development Goals. The 0.7% 
commitment has been repeated more than 50 times, but 
most industrial countries are still far from honoring their 
promises. 
In fact, the 22 main aid-giving countries gave $119.8 bil-
lion in aid in 2008, the highest figure ever. But this only 
represents 0.3% of OECD members’ combined GNI – well 
below the percentage target.10 
Another breach of trust has occurred in the area of trade. 
In November 2001, World Trade Organization member na-
tions agreed in Doha to a new round of trade negotiations 
that would benefit poor countries, allowing them a better 
chance to trade their way out of poverty. In early 2009, these 
talks remained stalled, largely due to disagreements be- 
tween some industrial nations and rapidly developing ones. 
Mistrust does not flow in only one direction. Northern 
nations tend to worry that the South wants a free ride on 
mitigation, while getting considerable help with adapta-
tion. They see rapidly developing economies such as China 
and India as able and needing to do more. They denounce 
the view, common in developing countries, that the North 
caused climate change, so the North should sharply cut its 
own GHG emissions, leaving the South to develop along a 
carbon-intensive path until it is much richer. 
Recent work has shown that the notion that developing 
nations can remain carbon-intensive cannot withstand em-
pirical scrutiny and is, in fact, dangerous for the South it-
self. The South’s cumulative carbon emissions are already 
large enough to jeopardize climatic stability and its own 
future growth, regardless of Northern emissions. By impli-
cation, a fossil-fueled South will undermine its own devel-
opment long before it reaches Northern income levels. (See 
Figure 2, p. 10.) Sustainable development will therefore 
require a shift toward clean energy in the South, beginning 
immediately, as well as rapid reduction of Northern emis-
sions.11  
Those who do not trust one another to keep to com-
mitments can rarely negotiate successfully, especially on 
something as complex as a post-Kyoto climate framework. 
9 H. C. Bugge, “The Principles of Polluter Pays in Economics and Law,” 
in E. Eide and R. van der Bergh, eds., Law and Economics of the Envi-
ronment (Oslo: Juridisk Forlag, 1996).
10 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
“Development Aid at Its Highest Level Ever in 2008,” press release 
(Paris: 30 March 2009).
11 D. Wheeler and K. Ummel, “Another Inconvenient Truth: A Carbon-
Intensive South Faces Environmental Disaster, No Matter What the 
North Does,” Working Paper 134 (Washington, DC: Center for Global 
Development, December 2007).
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Industrial and developing nations must work quickly and 
effectively to close the trust gap. Such an effort among 
the richer nations would include keeping past promises on 
increased ODA, providing efficient aid for developing coun-
tries’ adaptation to climate change, and identifying and in-
vesting in synergies between mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries – especially in land use, natural re-
sources, and forestry management. Developing nations on 
their side need to ensure transparent management of funds 
and a willingness to commit to goals and targets, based on 
their current capacity.
 
The values gap
The ethics of climate change are incredibly complex, with 
causes and effects being both thousands of miles and centu- 
ries apart. Any successful treaty must in some way establish 
a form of intergenerational equity in terms of carbon use.
Yet today’s leaders are in a difficult position. The GHGs 
affecting this generation were emitted previously. The 
GHGs emitted today will affect not this generation but 
future ones. Thus it could be argued that it is not in this 
generation’s interest to mitigate. GHG emissions will bring 
much more good than harm to those alive and making eco-
nomic and political decisions today.12
But all future generations will be in exactly the same sit-
uation as this one, facing the same hard truths. It has been 
argued that this conundrum is so difficult that it pushes 
political leaders into stressing uncertainties and claiming 
progress in negotiations when there is little to none. 
Thus success in mitigating climate change and helping 
the poor adapt to its effects will require that leaders and the 
people who vote for them make sacrifices for future gener-
ations. Yet there is much evidence that generational equity 
is not a widely held value. 
While “future generations” remain an abstract popula-
tion, the present adult generation has one very real future 
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12 Gardiner, op. cit. note 7.
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development rights Framework,” heinrich Böll stiftung Publication series on ecology, Volume 1 (2008).
2. the trust Gap
Commission on Climate Change and Development  | 11  
generation under its care: children. Society in general does 
not live up to its responsibilities for children well. Almost 
10 million children under age five die each year – more 
than 26,000 a day – nearly all in developing countries and 
mostly of common illnesses preventable by cheap interven-
tions such as vaccines, sugar/salt solutions, and insecticide-
treated mosquito nets.13 
Given that governments have allowed this to continue 
year after year, it is hard to imagine sacrifice for future 
generations we cannot see and know. The literature on eth-
ics and climate change also suggests – almost always im-
plicitly – that heroically strong and capable leadership will 
be required to overcome the climate challenge, leadership 
of the sort that led to the founding of the United Nations or 
the European Union. And as the next chapter makes clear, 
in terms of adaptation much of that strong leadership must 
be local. 
Given the complexity of the climate change challenge and 
the lack of motivation for any single generation to decrease 
emissions, serious mitigation may not occur until the planet 
runs short of carbon-based energy. This possibility puts 
even more pressure on the adaptation side of the equation. 
13 www.unicef.org. 
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He was a huge, weathered New Zealander who had lived in 
Samoa 15 years and did not want to give his name because 
he sometimes had problems with the authorities. He ran a 
sports fishing boat, and there were occasional issues about 
his clients catching something they should not or his putting 
over the side something he should not. 
Asked if he had noticed climate change, he exclaimed: 
“My god! It has been horrible for the past four years – com-
pletely unpredictable. Storms when they are not expected. 
Big seas when there are no storms, crazy currents. I can 
hardly make a living.” 
Told there was a climate change conference involving 
all South Pacific nations in progress in Samoa and even a 
course to teach journalists how to write about it, he re-
sponded: “Bloody environmental propagandists!” 
One Samoan taxi driver said that he had not seen any 
sign of climate change and did not even believe in it. He 
lives in the central hills of the main island. Another taxi 
driver said climate change was trying to kill him and his 
family and every year recently he had to build back part of 
his house. He lives on the beach. 
Response to climate change is mixed in the South Pacific, 
even though the region, with its isolated nations of tiny, 
low-lying atolls, is often billed as the global front line of 
climate adaptation. Spreading the word is hard over the 
vast distances; many people experience climate change 
daily but have not heard of it. 
The region’s governments are working at both ends of 
the climate political spectrum. They have devised a Pacific 
Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change 2006 –
2015; they are active and aggressive in global climate nego-
tiations, and they are trying to get information on climate 
change throughout the Pacific.
Much governance in the island nations takes place at 
village level, and there are strong traditions of self-organi-
zation along the lines of church, women’s, youth, and fish-
ers’ groups. International nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) like WWF and the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies are also focusing on cli-
mate change. 
For example, Tuvalu is a nation of nine islands stretch-
ing over 1,000 kilometers from north to south but with only 
26 square kilometers of land mass. It has 11,000 inhabitants 
(4,000 of whom live in the capital), a population density 
greater than Japan’s, and no land higher than 4.5 meters 
above sea level. It is at risk of rising seas, cyclones, tsunamis, 
house fires, drought, and flooding due to high tides and 
storm surges. 
The Tuvalu Red Cross is connecting outer islands with 
satellite phones, spreading courses in sea survival skills 
throughout the islands, and developing information material 
– difficult because the Tuvaluan language is not standard 
throughout the islands. It is also involving youth groups in 
the effort, seeing them as powerful agents of change. 
Samoa
Photo: riccardo SPiLLa
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3. The Focus Gap: The Human Dimension14
All politics is local.
attriButed to “tiP” o’NeiLL, 
LoNGtiMe sPeaKer oF the us house oF rePreseNtatiVes 
So much discussion of climate change is from the global 
perspective: sea-level rise, temperature increase, negotia-
tions, and policies. Even discussions of adaptation focus on 
global costs and large-scale modeling. Although they may 
be extensive and severe, the effects of climate change will 
be felt locally, however: by individuals, families, villages, 
and neighborhoods. 
The Commission finds that most adaptation will also 
happen at the local level, in ways that are usually unnoticed, 
uncoordinated, and unaided by national governments or 
international agencies. 
The diversity of climate change effects and of how indi-
viduals, households, businesses, governments, and civil so-
ciety deal with them are best understood through analysis 
of their local circumstances. Even so, what determines vul-
nerability, impact, and capacity to respond is usually em-
bedded in broader social, cultural, political, and economic 
structures. But only if we focus on the local dimensions of 
adaptation can we tell whether human vulnerability is 
being reduced.
This chapter starts with people and the complex mix of 
climate and other risks they face. Learning from past expe-
rience with development cooperation, this chapter shows 
that effective climate change adaptation requires integrat-
ing risk analysis in development, supporting social protec-
tion, and promoting locally owned capacity development 
processes. 
Unpacking climate risks
Poor people manage a complex mix of changes and risks on a 
daily basis. Food and energy insecurity, scarcity of fresh water, 
changing markets for crops, and labor are on their daily agenda. 
Climate change just adds an extra layer of risk. (See Box.) 
14 This chapter builds on a 2009 background paper to the Commission 
by I. Christoplos, S. Anderson, M. Arnold, V. Galaz, M. Hedger,  
R. Klein, and K. Le Goulven, “The Human Dimension of Climate  
Adaptation: Local and Institutional Issues”, available at  
www.ccdcommission.org. The paper was edited for the purposes of 
the Commission’s report.
How climate change risks are tangled up 
with other risks
climate change plays a role in declining food security, though there is 
controversy over its importance in the extraordinary rise in food prices 
in 2008. the fact that poor people have less to eat is rarely due to de-
clining national food stocks but is usually due to changes in local and 
global markets and their inability to afford available food. old assump-
tions about the poor being “peasants” or “subsistence” farmers must 
be replaced with an awareness of how urbanization, market integration, 
multifunctional rural livelihoods, and other factors affect food-climate 
connections. 
climate change affects ecosystems and the ways in which people 
manage them and use their services, but shifts in land use patterns 
also affect ecosystems. ecosystem services – such as purification of 
air and water, erosion control, and food production – are fundamental 
for human well-being. they support livelihoods and are the foundation 
for food security, health, and economic development. ecosystems can 
also mitigate the impacts of natural hazards such as landslides and hur-
ricanes and provide an important asset in the aftermath of a disaster. 
climate change creates new health risks such as increased mor-
tality due to heat waves, increased malaria and diarrheal disease oc-
currence, malnutrition due to local food insecurity, and injuries due to 
violent weather. Most of these risks can affect entire communities, but 
individual health risks tend to affect the poor disproportionately and 
to have long-term effects on their well-being and ability to accumulate 
assets. Poor workers may be disabled by excessive heat or affected by 
re-emerging infectious diseases such as yellow fever and dengue. 
source: see appendixes for more details and references.
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Risk literature distinguishes between general categories 
of risk to describe its frequency and intensity and how it is 
distributed among individuals and groups. It differentiates 
in particular between idiosyncratic shocks, which are those 
that affect the individual or household (e.g., death, injury, 
or unemployment), and covariate shocks, those that affect 
localities or nations (e.g., epidemics, disasters, or war). 
Climate change affects all of these risk categories by:
▶ Increasing idiosyncratic risk (e.g., increased mortality 
due to heat waves, increased malaria and diarrheal dis-
ease occurrence, increased small-scale hazard events);
▶ Increasing covariate risk (e.g., increasing frequency of 
large-scale disasters); and
▶ Making idiosyncratic risk covariate (e.g., increasing 
severity of disasters or small, localized hazard events 
becoming larger disasters).
But because climate change is not a linear process, it 
also brings something new and different to the existing risk 
landscape: gradual changes may build up until some tipping 
point is reached. Glaciers melt gradually, and then sudden-
ly are no more.
Moreover, climate change brings surprises, having at 
least three dimensions: the event in itself may be unexpect-
ed, the speed of change may be unexpected, and the geo-
graphical scale of change may be unexpected. 
Adaptation discussions tend to focus on increasing lev-
els of dramatic covariate risk expressed as weather-related 
catastrophes. The Commission stresses the obvious need to 
“harmonize” disaster risk management and climate change 
adaptation and to develop the capacities of national and 
local governments in these areas. There is learning on ad-
aptation in the disaster risk management community that 
should inform current policy formation related to climate 
change. 
However, adaptation to idiosyncratic risks is at least as 
important, for two main reasons. First, the increase in small-
er idiosyncratic risks is having a larger impact on poverty. 
The accumulated impacts of small and medium-size disas-
ters equal or exceed those of large disasters. These events 
are recurrent, and their impacts are felt locally. Small dis-
ease outbreaks, local flash floods, and land degradation are 
usually invisible to the media and often to policy makers 
as well. Repeated disaster shocks have cumulative effects, 
as when drought reoccurs with such frequency that people 
have no time to recover between events, leading to deep-
ening poverty and chronic food insecurity. Also, exposure 
to one type of risk can increase vulnerability to other risk 
factors, such as when crop failure leads to malnutrition, 
which increases the risk of common illnesses. Over the 
past few years, the number of smaller disaster events that 
do not trigger international disaster response but that are 
responded to locally or nationally has increased. (See Box, 
p. 16, and Figure 3, p. 15.) Thus the most important capaci-
ties for addressing idiosyncratic risk are within societies 
and local organizations. 
Second, the Commission has noticed that households 
and societies that are more resilient to idiosyncratic shocks 
are less vulnerable to covariate shocks. Different risks can 
compound one another and increase a household’s overall 
risk level. However, developing capacity for community 
resilience and self-reliance bolsters capacity to manage co-
variate risk.
Adaptation must provide space for surprises, for unex-
pected change in the form of novel or re-emerging epidem-
ics, invasive species, unforeseen and rapid negative ecosys-
tem changes, and other occurrences. 
Compartmentalized structures create a double problem. 
Development actors tend to ignore both sudden and gradual 
onset catastrophes, as they see them as interruptions to de-
velopment rather than indications that it is time to consider 
the risks inherent in development itself. Countries that ex-
perience recurrent drought often fail to coordinate relief 
and development efforts, creating parallel structures to ad-
dress emergency needs that contribute little to addressing 
the underlying causes of vulnerability to drought.15  
Humanitarian actors, on the other hand, tend to focus 
on disasters, forgetting idiosyncratic risks. And both devel-
opment and humanitarian actors have demonstrated their 
inability to come to terms with surprises. They need to 
come to grips with this. 
15 ProVention Consortium and ALNAP, “Slow-Onset Disasters: Drought 
and Food and Livelihoods Insecurity,” Briefing Paper, 2008.
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the weather related disasters in ecuador resulting in less than 50 deaths or 500 houses destroyed during 1970-2007. 
source: 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (Geneva: 2009).
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We know which areas are prone to droughts, hurricanes, and 
certain diseases; we can make surprises less surprising and 
more manageable and we can better control the conditions 
that cause them. Investments in knowledge management 
can bring together information often dispersed in different 
organizations. This will help local societies decide what 
they perceive to be an acceptable level of risk. Otherwise, 
repeated surprising events will challenge local and national 
adaptive capacity, escalating social tensions and hindering 
human development. 
Climate change thus makes evident the need to recog-
nize the risk inherent in development. The Commission 
believes that it is not about “mainstreaming risk” into 
development, but rather recognizing that a successful 
development process manages risk. It is about unpacking 
that risk, making it visible and transparent, and ensuring 
that households and societies have sufficient information 
to take decisions on how much risk they will accept and 
how they will manage it.
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Unpacking adaptive capacity
To manage risks requires appropriate adaptive capacity. 
As laid out in Chapter 1, this report acknowledges the con-
vergence of adaptive capacity with human development. In 
this chapter we take the analysis one step further to look 
at the adaptive capacity of businesses and ecosystems and 
their interactions, complementarities, and competition with 
people’s adaptive capacity. 
Markets for adaptation goods and services
The components of adaptive capacity – assets, health, knowl- 
edge, and governance – are as relevant for businesses as for 
people. To adapt effectively and efficiently, businesses need 
sufficient assets and capital to invest in adaptive behavior. 
They need a predictable investment climate with solid reg-
ulations and transparent institutions, as well as cash flows 
and market intelligence. They need access to information 
on how climate change impacts and social and ecological 
change will affect their trading. Businesses need to be in 
markets that allow adaptive behavior to be easily planned 
and executed. Fundación PROFIN in Bolivia illustrates how 
private actors – in this case, small farms – can benefit from 
a process that allows adaptive responses to an increasing 
likelihood of extreme weather events. (See Box, p. 17.)
Businesses must adapt to and try to exert some control 
over customers, suppliers, lenders, and regulators, as well 
as to the various climate change effects. They must adapt 
to and exert some control over markets, while the markets 
themselves operate within the sphere of higher scales of 
influences and regulations and depend on these for their 
adaptive capacity. 
The Commission recognizes that much adaptation takes 
place in the private sector – choices, investments, and ac-
tions taken by individuals, households, and businesses. 
To the extent that businesses trade relevant goods and serv-
ices to individuals and households, there is an adaptation 
market. Access is determined largely by price mechanisms, 
but state interventions can help break down problems of 
market segmentation and inaccessibility for the poor. 
Perhaps the most obvious adaptation-relevant commod-
ity is information about climate variability and change. 
People and businesses will invest in getting access to infor-
mation to help reduce the unpredictability of climate events 
and trends. Governments can and do provide such infor-
mation. Similarly, expertise on adaptation options and re-
sources can be marketed to improve the way people adapt. 
Hard technology will find a market when people perceive 
adaptation as a necessary or advantageous avenue. 
Adaptation can also be facilitated by a range of other 
goods and services supplied by the private sector, such as 
banking systems, agricultural risk insurance, and drip ir-
rigation.
However, the products most useful for adaptation by the 
poor are often not provided in forms they can afford or ob-
tain. This differential access to insurance, credit, and tech-
nologies accentuates the “adaptation gap” between the poor 
and the better off. In some cases products are widely avail-
 What is happening to global disaster risk? 
the 2009 Global Assessment Report (Gar) – a biennial report on 
governments’ progress in implementing the disaster reduction policy 
framework established in Kobe, Japan, in 2005 – gives cause for great 
concern. 
Mortality risk is highly concentrated in a few large events. Just 23 of 
the 8,866 registered disaster events that killed 2.3 million people be-
tween 1970 and 2008 caused 78% of the deaths. But under the surface 
of these mega-disasters, a different picture emerges. the frequency 
of small disasters has increased steadily since the early 1990s in what 
seems to be a global trend. they are closely linked to the expansion of 
cities and slums and the expansion of farmland into less populated are-
as. each event may result in only a few casualties and damaged homes, 
but they are increasing in frequency, with more people exposed, and 
primarily take their toll among the poor. some 92% of these local events 
are weather-related – floods, storms, and landslides. Places where cli-
mate change will result in more and heavier rains and where there is no 
infrastructure to deal with more surface runoff are now even more in the 
danger zone. 
disaster risk is not being reduced, according to the Gar. although 
many governments report progress in establishing new institutions and 
legal frameworks and raising awareness, the drivers of vulnerability and 
risk are unrelenting. Key drivers include weak urban governance, frag-
ile rural livelihoods, declining ecosystems, and the absence of social 
protection. the Gar forcefully explains how disaster risk reduction and 
poverty alleviation must go hand in hand.
source: 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (Geneva: 
2009). 
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Fondo de Mitigación del Riesgo Agrícola Bolivia
Fundación ProFiN has developed an innovative, index-based insurance 
scheme being piloted in four provinces in Bolivia. it combines incen-
tives for risk reduction and a flexible, people-centered index mecha-
nism. in this scheme, the trigger is based on the production levels of 
reference farming plots in areas that are geographically similar in terms 
of temperature, precipitation, humidity, and type of soil.
Farmers identified as good practitioners by their peers farm the ref-
erence plots. the scheme is based on the fact that these farmers have 
established reputations within their communities for their skills and 
knowledge and that the yields on their plots can serve as reliable indi-
cators of whether production levels have been adversely affected by 
environmental factors (thus triggering an insurance payout) or by other 
factors within a farmer’s control. this reduces the moral hazard in the 
scheme, and the reference farmers also serve as technical assistance 
agents to promote ideas for increasing yields and reducing disaster 
risks and impacts.
the system encourages other farmers to match the reference farm-
ers in implementing efforts to reduce the effects of drought, excess 
rains, hailstorms, and frost, because those farmers run the risk that 
their own plots will be significantly affected while the reference farmers’ 
plots will be less affected.
source: Fondo de Mitigación del riesgo agrícola, at
www.fundacion-profin.org/fmra.html.
able but need to be tailored to the specific needs and limited 
means of the poor. This could mean a major redesign of 
both the products and their markets. In other cases, new 
products to support the poorest may need to be developed. 
Adaptation through ecosystem protection
Ecological systems do not respond to change in a smooth 
fashion. Tipping points occur when the cumulative effects 
of both slow and fast environmental changes and distur-
bances reach thresholds that result in dramatic and often 
rapid negative changes in ecological systems. Small events 
such as droughts, floods, or pest outbreaks might trigger 
ecological changes that are difficult or even impossible to 
reverse. This phenomenon has been observed in ecosys-
tems such as coral reefs, fresh water, coastal seas, forests, 
savannah, and grasslands. Accumulated stresses may lead 
to catastrophic shifts like the loss of coral reefs and the 
services they bring. Fast-onset surprises, such as invasive 
species and emerging infectious diseases, could become 
more common.
Climate change is likely to change ecosystems that have 
co-evolved with the previous climate. If these changes 
bring rapid losses of ecosystem services, human adaptation 
options shrink.
The Commission stresses that people can be helped to 
protect and improve their local ecosystems in ways that 
also support their livelihoods and adaptive capacities.
Highlighting the role of ecosystems in adaptation sug-
gests a number of possible win-win options. These are 
related to increasing the flow of ecosystems services and 
helping disadvantaged groups deal with future impacts of 
climate change. These strategies can lead to risk reduction 
and can also contribute to attempts to promote a transition 
to sustainable poverty alleviation in rural communities. In 
Tigray province in northern Ethiopia, for example, col-
laboration between local farmers and experts on a farm-
ing-with-nature project – using compost to increase yields, 
selecting a diversity of wild plant species to decrease the 
need for fertilizers, making trench bunds to hold water and 
reduce soil erosion – led to higher yields and groundwater 
levels while increasing household income and livelihood 
opportunities for women.16  
The “win-win” relationship between investments in 
ecosystem services and improved livelihoods of the poor 
should, however, not be assumed to be cheap, quick, easy, 
or inevitable. The better-off can capture the benefits of these 
efforts, and in some cases the outcomes have not lived up 
to expectations.17 
Coping strategies can also create “lose-lose” situations. 
Those in poverty and vulnerable to climate change, perhaps 
unable to grow their traditional crops, may be forced to 
overharvest ecosystems for food, fiber, and fuelwood, ac-
celerating ecosystem degradation and the sort of qualita-
16 J. Lundberg and F. Moberg, Ecological in Ethiopia – Farming with 
Nature Increases Profitability and Reduces Vulnerability (Stockholm: 
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, 2008).
17 H. Munk Ravnborg, M. Gervin Damsgaard and K. Raben, Payments 
for Ecosystem Services – Issues and Pro-poor Opportunities for De-
velopment Assistance, Danish Institute for International Studies (Co-
penhagen: 2007).
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tive ecosystem change that will leave them worse off. In 
addition, the indirect impacts of climate change can lead 
to acts that rapidly undermine the resource base of local 
communities. Examples include extraction of nonrenew-
able fossil groundwater, rapid land use change as a result of 
investments in biofuels, or increased fishing pressure as a 
response to changing market prices. 
Efforts to conserve ecosystems and to adapt to climate 
change often involve trade-offs, as highlighted by research 
at the World Resources Institute.18 Managing those trade-
offs and effectively using adaptation strategies to realize 
both livelihood and ecosystem objectives remain difficult 
challenges, requiring an understanding of factors that un-
dermine resilience – such as biodiversity loss and habitat 
fragmentation – and a range of management and govern-
ance issues. Social sources of resilience – diverse and ef-
fective institutions, social capital, ecological understand-
ing – are all critical assets in dealing with crisis. 
Adaptation through social protection
Social protection refers to a broad set of policies and pro-
grams to reduce poverty and vulnerability by diminishing 
people’s exposure to risks, encouraging effective labor 
markets, and building people’s capacity to protect them-
selves against hazards and loss of income. Some develop-
ment agencies and national governments now see social 
transfers – direct and predictable transfers of resources to 
the poor – as a way to improve access to services and ad-
dress the underlying causes of inequalities in well-being. 
One problem is that social transfer policies tend to ignore 
the long-term risks associated with climate change. Also, 
much of the current social protection agenda is designed 
and financed by external actors – bilateral and multilateral 
donors, international NGOs, academics, and consultants – 
and not enough by domestic constituencies, national gov-
ernments, local civil society, and citizens.19 
Despite these flaws, a review of impacts of social transfer 
schemes in Mexico, Brazil, and Ethiopia found that state-
managed social transfer programs do improve the adaptive 
capacity of the poor.20 Social transfers are used to scale up 
access to and demand for equitable health and education 
services. New aid flows for poverty reduction and adapta-
tion should use this channel to support the poor. 
However, social transfers require significant amounts of 
additional revenue, and the transfers must be long-term and 
predictable. Incremental approaches to introducing and 
then scaling up social transfer programs have proved the 
most effective. 
The Commission stresses that governments and donors 
need to assure policy coherence between social transfer 
programs, wider service sector initiatives, and climate ad-
aptation plans within and among sectors (health, education, 
social welfare, agriculture). Managing social transfers to 
improve climate adaptive capacity will require institutional 
strengthening that may necessitate a parallel technical as-
sistance program.
From adaptive capacity to capacity
development
Adaptation does not happen in a vacuum. It is shaped by in-
stitutions at local, national, and international levels. Adap-
tive capacity at the local scale depends on the capacity for 
planned adaptation at wider scales. 
Three main institutional ingredients are necessary to 
improve people’s adaptive capacity: capacity development, 
inclusive governance, and ownership. 
Capacity development
Many countries, provinces, districts, and municipalities 
facing the most serious adaptation challenges have meager 
capacity and poor governance and thus need help with ca-
pacity development. 
This goes well beyond the technical cooperation and 
training approaches that have been associated with “capac-
ity building” in the past. The stock of human capital and the 
supply of general and technical skills are important. How-
ever, a country’s ability to use skilled personnel to good ef-
fect depends on the incentives generated by organizations 
18 McGray, Hammill, and Bradley, op. cit. note 6.
19 M. Davies, J. Leavy, T. Mitchell, and T. Tanner, “Social Protection  
and Climate Change Adaptation,” Policy brief prepared by Institute 
for Development Studies for the Commission on Climate Change and  
Development, 2008.
20 T. Geoghegan, J. Ayers, and S. Anderson, “An Assessment of Chan-
nels to Support Climate Adaptation by the Poorest,” Working Paper 
(London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 
forthcoming). 
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and the overall environment. It is an endogenous process 
that cannot be imported from the outside.21
Evidence has shown that public, private, and civil soci-
ety organizations will never become sustainable or respon-
sive to their members, staff, or clients if they are created 
solely to implement a project. Stand-alone training projects 
and indeed projects in general have had little discernable 
or sustainable impact on capacity development. Disaster 
management in particular has been locked into short-term 
projects, not least due to the boom-bust cycles that are in-
herent in the humanitarian funding approaches upon which 
they rely. 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was in part 
a response to top-down “capacity building” efforts of the 
past, being an attempt to move away from trying to trans-
fer the “right answers” to instead stressing that a nationally 
and locally owned capacity development process must be 
at the core of any sustainable change effort. This lesson has 
not been reflected in most recommendations for climate 
change adaptation.
Inclusive governance
The uncertainties of climate change make ongoing access 
to information crucial. Democracy relies on people having 
the information and resources they need to make their own 
informed decisions. 
A main tool of adaptation is inclusive governance, es-
pecially as it can help reduce vulnerability through efforts 
to alleviate poverty. Vulnerability reduction depends on 
capacities to provide leadership, engage actively as part of 
civil society, get access to services (especially those related 
to information, technology, and capital), and mobilize a 
dynamic business environment that creates opportunities 
to pursue less risk-prone livelihoods. 
National policies and commitments to reducing vulner-
ability are important, but they cannot simply be transferred 
to the local level. 
As a result of decentralization, local government is be-
ing overwhelmed by massive responsibilities. The Commis- 
sion saw this firsthand in field visits in countries as differ-
ent as Bolivia, Cambodia, and Mali. The responsibilities 
of local governments are rising without increases in human 
or financial resources. Efforts to decentralize responsibili-
ties for adaptation need to reflect inevitable human resource 
gaps, lags in organizational and institutional reform, and 
unfulfilled promises of financial devolution.
The principle of subsidiarity is essential, in that local ac-
tors and local governance are the most important basis for 
action informed by existing conditions. At the same time, 
factors related to covariate risk mean that local govern- 
ment (particularly poorer municipalities and districts) have 
had little chance of managing these risks or obtaining re-
sources to develop their capacities. 
Aid can help overcome some of these obstacles and has 
been effective in producing risk maps, initiating participa-
tory planning, and building basic human resources. The 
greater challenge is in creating effective links between 
national climate change efforts and the municipalities, dis-
tricts, and provinces that must move from words to actions. 
The Commission believes that this challenge must be met.
In many countries there are capacity and communica-
tion gaps between those holding the financial resources and 
managing the international networks at ministerial levels 
and the local government actors who lack the skills, aware-
ness, and time to explore ways to get these resources. Fi-
nancial pipelines become blocked where lean environmen-
tal ministries cannot even send their staff out of the capitals 
and where rural municipal authorities are too busy with 
other tasks to figure out how to respond to climate change. 
One obvious way to overcome this is to involve the minis-
tries and public authorities that have a greater local pres-
ence (e.g., those dealing with water, energy, spatial plan-
ning, and agriculture) in adaptation efforts.
Adaptation efforts must therefore be based on the op-
portunities and constraints facing local governments and 
their relations with line ministries. The need for a deeper 
understanding of how climate change adaptation could be 
better managed through decentralized structures suggests 
new priorities for research, evaluation, and public admin-
istration reform. 
Civil society organizations are helping set the rules for 
climate change adaptation, acting as a watchdog to see that 
the rules are enforced and also mobilizing populations to 
21 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), “The Challenge of Capacity 
Development: Working Towards Good Practice,” DAC Guidelines and 
Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2006).
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act accordingly. Some organizations are taking on sig-
nificant roles in service provision, helping to fill the gaps 
where local government and business are weak or absent. 
Local-national-global networks of civil society organiza-
tions can help address the gaps between national and lo-
cal governments by creating multistakeholder platforms for 
debate about how to manage climate risks. 
The Commission finds that business is an engine for 
development by providing jobs, tax revenues, and technol-
ogy; it is the biggest investor in areas such as technology 
transfer, and it is businesses, not governments, that usually 
own the technology. Business makes many of the most im-
portant decisions that affect how risk is managed. Private 
sector investments constitute up to 86% of investment and 
financial flows and are thus a critical point of leverage for 
reducing climate and disaster risks.22
Firms’ adaptation efforts have often focused on climate-
proofing their factories, stores, and field operations. When 
a farmer chooses a different seed variety or when a shop-
keeper installs a stronger roof, these private sector actors 
are also investing in their own risk reduction. Larger com-
panies have been focusing more on adaptation and risk re-
duction as they realize that they cannot succeed in societies 
that are failing due to lack of adaptation. Corporate social 
responsibility is a growing channel for working with local 
neighborhoods or even entire nations to help manage water 
resources, mobility, and communications. 
For all these reasons, the Commission believes that it is 
critical to engage the private sector as a stakeholder and key 
resource in adaptation. The business community must be 
present in forums for planning and decision making for 
proactive risk management. However, the question must al-
ways be asked, Whose risk are we talking about, and who is 
benefiting? A number of proposals have been put forth that 
incorporate public-private partnerships and the provision 
of micro-insurance and other forms of risk financing in 
support of adaptation. The challenge is to find schemes that 
are relevant for the poor and that they can get and afford, 
be the approaches market–based or public. So far, micro-
insurance has mainly been in the form of small-scale pi-
lot schemes. To contribute to the adaptive strategies of the 
poor, micro-insurance needs to be scaled up, flexible, pay 
quickly to cover losses, and include incentives for invest-
ments in risk reduction. 
Ownership
Good governance for adaptation is ultimately manifested 
in the ownership of policy objectives. In recent years the 
drive for ownership in an aid context has been promoted 
through efforts to implement the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness by aligning aid with national strategies and 
harmonizing donor approaches. 
This ownership relies on coherence among formal regu-
latory frameworks, central investment strategies (and, in-
deed, among international and donor agencies), and local 
plans and processes. As mentioned earlier, the task of 
bridging the local-national divide must not be underesti-
mated. There are well-justified fears that the emerging cli-
mate change adaptation agenda is a top-down effort that 
will reduce the space available for local actors to determine 
their own strategies and control their own futures. The 
struggle to react to climate change as a “crisis” diminishes 
opportunities for local people to take ownership of their 
own climate change agenda and integrate it into their own 
development strategies. 
There is a disconnect between short political cycles and 
the need for investments in long-term risk reduction. The 
search for short-term political gain is rarely conducive to 
appropriate adaptive policy action. If vulnerable people are 
going to benefit from investments in climate change, it will 
be because their political institutions help them toward bet-
ter protection from risk than they have today. 
The Commission reiterates that ownership is a precondi-
tion for long-term sustainability, but it is not a guarantee. 
Bringing together ownership and sustainability may be 
more complicated than it seems. The design of National Ad-
aptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) by least-developed 
countries illustrates this. NAPAs are nationally owned, but 
they are rarely integrated into national planning and budg-
etary processes. They have not received significant levels 
of financing because they are seen as exemplifying the 
kind of “projectization” that the Paris Declaration seeks to 
eliminate and replace with programmatic approaches. Fur-
22 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Invest-
ment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change: An Update, 
Technical Paper (Geneva: 2008).
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thermore, the little funding they have received has largely 
been outside of the mainstream aid process, which also 
contributes to limited integration. (See Box on NAPAs in 
Chapter 5.)
This leads to a conundrum. The NAPAs and many other 
small adaptation and disaster risk reduction initiatives, par-
ticularly those promoted by civil society, are a first step to-
ward local learning about how to manage climate change. 
They can create concrete, on-the-ground examples of ac-
tions to address what is widely seen as a rather abstract set 
of hazards. Ultimately, the NAPAs are more about capacity 
development than they are about furthering adaptation. 
Without this first step, there will be great difficulties in 
taking a far larger second step, since the modest levels of 
ownership that they represent will be extinguished. Sup-
port for initiatives such as the NAPAs must then be situated 
within a much more comprehensive dialogue on adaptation. 
This means that although these “pilot projects” may not ac-
tually be scaled up, they should be used as capacity devel-
opment exercises and as a platform for establishing a broad 
dialogue about what climate change adaptation implies.
The climate agenda must be aligned with the Paris Dec-
laration, and action must respect and promote adaptive 
capacity through subnational actors. Harmonization and 
alignment processes have sometimes disenfranchised the 
civil society actors who must be part of sustainable devel-
opment. 
The development community tends to see their climate 
change colleagues as being too focused on macro-level tech-
nical models to relate to on-the-ground realities. If those 
implementing climate change initiatives are to be held ac-
countable for the quality and effectiveness of their work, 
and if they are to learn about impacts, they must devise and 
use monitoring and evaluation techniques on a much larger 
scale than thus far. 
Climate change initiatives frequently include mecha-
nisms for monitoring whether people are managing the en-
vironment in prescribed ways. Adaptation requires more 
of a learning approach, combined with systems by which 
affected populations can begin to hold their political lead-
ership (and aid donors) to account for whether vulnerability 
has been reduced. Three principles should guide monitor-
ing and evaluation of adaptation efforts: impartiality/inde-
pendence, credibility, and usefulness.23
23 OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation, “Evaluating  
Development Cooperation: Summary of Key Norms and Standards” 
(Paris: 2008).
▶ Impartiality/independence is needed to ensure that 
assessment is free from vested interests and bias. The 
desire to support urgent and decisive action and to jus-
tify increased investments in climate change activities 
has meant that independent judgment has at times been 
lacking. 
▶ Credibility will emerge from increased independence 
and field-level analysis of the results of new investments, 
approaches, and policy changes. Theories of change are 
not enough. Credibility is an outcome of providing veri-
fiable and reliable evidence of the results of adaptation 
efforts.
▶ Usefulness can only be achieved by identifying forms 
of information that are relevant to the target group. 
Creating a more constructive dialogue will require un-
derstanding how decisions are made at different scales 
and designing monitoring and evaluation instruments 
that relate to these specific processes.
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rain the ground does not stay moist as long as it used to, 
adding to the uncertainty of farming. 
The extremes of climate change are the weather-related 
disasters at one end and the slow rise in temperatures and 
sea level at the other. But in the middle is the greatly in-
creased unpredictability that makes farming – and many 
other human activities – so much more difficult. 
“We cannot farm. We try to grow cotton to pay for ferti-
lizer, but we get into debt buying fertilizer, and we lose our 
dignity in debt,” said Tiéni Synayoko, the head of another 
clan. “We are trying everything: to diversify into other cash 
crops, to garden during the dry season with irrigation, to 
compost.” 
There is a lively Wednesday market in Bougoula, but the 
city folks from Bamako come out in big trucks and have 
huge bargaining power because the villagers have no trans-
port to manage the treacherous dirt roads, and most of their 
produce will spoil if not sold quickly. 
Mali
A score of elders sat on mats under an awning; older wom-
en stood in the background; children ran around and young 
women pounded corn (maize) in big wooden mortars. There 
were virtually no young men left in the village of Bougoula, 
40 kilometers outside of Bamako, Mali’s capital. 
Out of a clan of 110, 60 had left the village to find jobs: 
some in Bamako, some in the cotton and rice-growing parts 
of the country, some in more prosperous African states to 
the west, and some in Europe. 
One young man – a rare sight in the area – standing in 
his millet field, said: “The old weather signs are gone. We 
used to plant when the storks came from Europe. We knew 
it would rain soon after. Or when that tree blossomed. Now 
we cannot tell. We get advice from the meteorological office 
over the radio, but it is not always right.” 
There has been less rain in Bougoula. Its small river 
ran year-round in the 1970s but now is dry for some three 
months every year. And there is more heat, so when it does 
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Bougoula, like many villages in Mali and in the develop-
ing world, is having responsibilities devolved to it by the 
central government, so it must run its schools and health 
clinics and manage water resources and environmental 
protection. But funds are not being decentralized as fast as 
responsibilities. Many of the local people are poor and ex-
empt from taxes, so there in only a tiny local tax base. 
The Sinsibere Cooperative (mainly women) makes quali-
ty shea butter and soap for sale, harvests and stores peanuts 
in hopes of better prices, tills collective fields, and partici-
pates in microcredit schemes. The profits go to the mem-
bers but also to help pay for the village school. 
The main outside organization reaching the people of 
Bougoula is the Malian NGO Mali-Folkecenter, which 
helps with environmental protection, provision of clean en-
ergy services, drinking water supply, technology transfer 
and the training of local technicians, and the delivery of 
enterprise development services for rural companies.
The Commission met with representatives from UN 
organizations such as the UN Development Programme, 
national aid bodies such as the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency, and regional bodies 
such as the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought 
Control in the Sahel. The representatives were proud of their 
ability to meet among themselves and to meet regularly 
with the government but also frustrated at their inability to 
accomplish much in the ways of practical help due to their 
own and the national government’s scarcity of resources. 
In Bougoula, Synayoko sits in the small hut that is his 
blacksmith shop. He spent six years in Libya working and 
sending money home. He has a brother in Spain, one in Côte 
d’Ivoire, and one in western Mali. 
“I used to be a full-time blacksmith, making and repair-
ing all the farming tools for the village. Now with fewer 
men here and less farming, I have to farm myself, to eat, and 
I barter; there is no money.”
Bougoula is already suffering the water shortages and 
declining yields that the IPCC predicts for much of Africa 
in 2020, and these are degrading the entire village economy. 
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4. Governance Gaps
A new generation of governance is required that not only satisfies the interest of the parts  
– nations – but also meets the legitimacy of every citizen’s interest that the whole of the Earth system 
and the economy work with a high degree of stability, efficiency, predictability and security.
the täLLBerG ProVocatioN
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Climate change aside, governance approaches and institu-
tions need reform. 
In today’s world, markets, money, knowledge, commu-
nications, ambitions, and microbes are global. Yet global 
governance structures remain based on approaches devised 
by the few victors of World War Two, when it was possi-
ble and perhaps even desirable for a few powerful nations 
and economies to run the globe. Such an arrangement is no 
longer desirable or even possible. Reforming global gov-
ernance is a necessity to deal with the issues of our time 
but also to restore trust between the rich and the poor so 
that they can better share management of the planet they 
share.25 
At the time we write our report, we are on the cusp of a 
broader understanding than ever before of the importance 
of global public policy. The financial crisis has offered les-
sons about the importance of the interplay between the 
public and private sectors, including an efficient and well-
functioning regulatory and enabling framework for the 
private sector, and about the need for prudent yet proac-
tive international cooperation. We also better understand 
the need for reconfiguration and major shifts in the way 
we manage our planet – whether that involves its economy, 
its energy, its food security, its ecology, or the connections 
among these.26 
Climate change makes the need for reform more urgent. 
Mitigation will require unparalleled international coopera-
tion – cooperation that sets standards and rules that reach 
into the daily lives of billions. Adaptation will require new 
forms of coordinated cooperation between rich and poor 
nations but also forms of governance that reach seamlessly 
up and down among local, national, regional, and interna-
tional levels to accelerate resilient development. 
International, regional, national, and local institutions all 
help to organize and coordinate adaption at the local level. 
Chapter 3 looked at the need to focus on the local level and 
organize adaptation from the bottom up. This chapter focuses 
on how institutional architecture must be organized to best 
serve local needs and best make the connections needed. 
The functions of institutions include: 
▶ Financing (mobilization, transfer, allocation, disburse-
ment);
▶ Policy and strategy formulation (including roles and re-
sponsibilities of national and local governments);
▶ Knowledge and information management (including 
exchange of information and experience, monitoring, 
dissemination of research findings, assessment of trends 
over time, advocacy);  
▶ Manifesting accountability and embodying norms; and 
▶ Implementation (getting the adaptation actions done). 
Examples exist of systems that stretch across these inter- 
faces; all are flawed but all suggest ways forward. (See Box, 
p. 25.)
 The application of the subsidiarity principle, mentioned 
in Chapter 3, will help distinguish between local, national, 
regional, and international responsibilities. 
24 B. Ekman, J. Rockström, and A. Wijkman, Grasping the Climate  
Crisis. A Provocation from the Tällberg Foundation (Stockholm: 
Tällberg Foundation, 2008). 
 
25 International Task Force on Global Public Goods, Meeting Global 
Challenges: International Cooperation in the National Interest, Final 
Report (Stockholm: 2006.)
26 L.- G. Engfeldt, From Stockholm to Johannesburg and Beyond  
– The Evolution of the International System for Sustainable Develop-
ment Governance and its Implications (Stockholm: Svensk Informa-
tion, 2009).
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Local level 
The previous chapter emphasized the need to adapt at the 
family, village, and city level. In the developing world, re- 
sources and capacity are often in short supply at the local 
level, so such adaptation will require assistance from higher 
institutional levels. 
Yet in the small nations of the South Pacific, there is a 
long tradition of strong governance at the village and clan 
level, supported by church, women’s, and youth groups and 
other forms of NGOs. The national governments and inter-
national organizations such as the Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent Societies and WWF are working to use these groups 
to disseminate lessons on such things as marine safety as 
well as hardware such as satellite radios. Governments and 
NGOs are also working together to develop Internet portals 
providing region-wide information on climate change. In 
this region, there is a more obvious connection between the 
issues of disaster risk reduction and adaptation. 
Cities highlight the need for effective local governance. 
(See Appendix 8.) They have received much less attention 
than rural areas in adaptation literature and practice, but 
– particularly in the developing world – they contain grow-
ing numbers of vulnerable people. Many live in informal 
settlements – slums or shantytowns that may have been 
developed outside city plans or that ignore such building 
codes that may exist. These have been developed on what-
ever ground was available: dangerous, near seashores, in 
river basins and their floodplains, on steep hillsides prone 
to landslides. 
City governments often ignore such settlements be-
cause they are, from their point of view, outside the law. 
And while informal settlements may have strong internal 
governance, they cannot be expected to adapt effectively 
to climate change until they can fit effectively in with the 
adaptive planning of the rest of the city. 
National governments and international organizations 
have often found it hard to aid and cooperate with even le-
gitimate city governments – something they will have to 
do if adaptation is to succeed. Partnerships between formal 
and informal, public and private actors should be supported 
for effective adaptation in villages and cities. (See Box, p. 
26.) This is in line with the call for inclusive democracy 
made in Chapter 3.
 The call for inclusive and participatory democracy is 
nothing new. The Brundtland Report noted in 1987 that 
sustainable development cannot happen without effective 
participatory democracy. And in the 1992 Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, 178 governments pledg-
ed to open environmental decision making to public input 
and examination. 
While adaptation goes far beyond environmental deci-
sion making, it requires the same rights of public access 
to information, to public participation in decision making, 
and to justice. In many countries, laws guaranteeing such 
rights have been passed, but often action on such laws, 
Managing interfaces between local, 
national, and international levels
responding to earlier criticism that global programs hurt 
national and local capacities by imposing heavy trans- 
action costs on existing structures, the Global Fund to Fight 
aids, tuberculosis and Malaria has stretched from the inter-
national level down into villages, helping to reform national 
and regional health systems and, while doing so, to integrate 
its work into national health plans and Poverty reduction 
Plans. 
the international network of the consultative Group on 
international agricultural research works on various crops to 
develop new varieties, while combinations of governments, 
farmers’ organizations, and NGo efforts get these seeds 
and training to remote farmers. Many systems of agricultural 
extension in various parts of the world have degraded over 
the years and must be revived to produce and disseminate 
crop varieties, agricultural inputs, and advice suitable for 
new climate conditions. in many cases, effective adaptation 
will involve strengthening institutions that already exist. 
the red cross and red crescent, in its various forms, is 
a movement reaching from the local to the global level and is 
working effectively on the Pacific island atolls and elsewhere 
to improve village resilience in the face of the effects of cli-
mate change. 
the private sector and markets also offer examples. the 
uK-based company Vodafone has been developing mobile 
phone systems in east africa that allow people to make vari-
ous transactions over their telephones, greatly lowering the 
transaction costs of microfinance and increasing family and 
individual resilience. 
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both by governments and the civil society organizations 
meant to make use of them, lags behind. 
Citizens groups must put pressure on governments to 
make sure that the necessary access laws are in place and 
that governments cooperate with the public in setting policy. 
Then those groups themselves must participate. 
Local institutions know their communities and should 
have the main responsibility for identifying the poor and 
vulnerable and supporting them in building safe rural and 
urban settlements. These institutions should ensure that dis- 
semination of climate information reaches the poorest and 
most vulnerable through appropriate extension services.
 The issue of access to information, decision making, 
and justice is one that unites the various levels, from local 
to national to international. 
National level 
“Governments’ general response to the speed and scale of 
global changes has been a reluctance to recognize sufficient- 
ly the need to change themselves,” the Brundtland Com-
mission wrote more than 20 years ago.
Adaptation covers virtually all elements of national 
government activity: finance, planning, agriculture, water 
management, health, safety, disasters, infrastructure, food 
security, and so on. Effective action requires coordination 
between these sectors, something that will only be achieved 
if all areas of government dealing with adaptation are led 
and coordinated from the highest political and organiza-
tional level. This is true for industrial as well as developing 
countries. 
Developing-country governments in particular need to 
blend and coordinate development, environment, poverty 
reduction, and disaster risk reduction activities, such as the 
national platforms for disaster reduction initiated through 
the Hyogo Framework for Action; the institutions and ef-
forts of the Rio Conventions on Climate Change, Biodiver-
sity, and Desertification; and the national efforts aligned to 
all of these, such as the NAPAs. 
Yet governments cannot be both the implementers of 
action and the judges of the success of that action. There-
fore the monitoring, evaluation, and reporting on imple-
mentation activities should be transparent and involve civil 
society organizations, using the access rights described 
earlier. 
The Commission believes that national governments 
must strive to overcome the policy incoherence that exists 
both nationally and internationally by systematically pro-
moting mutually reinforcing policy actions across govern-
ment departments and agencies, creating synergies to help 
achieve defined objectives. 
In that national governments govern and fund interna-
tional organizations, national policy incoherence encour-
ages international policy incoherence. Thus, assuring a co- 
herent national view would help ensure more coordinated 
views and actions at the global level. Efforts in this direction 
are evident in some donor countries’ development strate-
gies. They consist mainly of establishing an interministe-
rial/interagency process to screen policies and decisions on 
any specific issue, with a lead agency in charge of deliver-
ing concrete and coordinated policy results. 
Partnerships for urban governance
the 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction pro-
vides many examples of successful partnerships among civil society 
groups, companies, and city governments that have facilitated urban 
development in a resilient way. in india, the ahmedabad Municipal cor-
poration partnered with a textile company, an NGo, and a slum com-
munity to improve basic infrastructure and provide water and sanita-
tion to households. the project was one of the many activities financed 
through the issuance of municipal bonds. in Namibia, the government 
teamed up with the shack dwellers Federation of Namibia (an organi-
zation of savings groups formed mostly by low-income women) and 
overturned conventional approaches to urban land use and infrastruc-
ture standards, making housing sites more affordable to low-income 
households. 
after hurricane Katrina savaged the city of New orleans, the us 
congress funded a community and regional resilience initiative, 
originally tested in three vulnerable cities, that brings together all gov-
ernment agencies with responsibilities for managing disasters, before 
and after, to plan and implement measures to increase resilience. the 
program goes beyond government bodies to include businesses and 
civil society organizations. it is a low-tech approach that could be rep-
licated in other countries, rich or poor. 
source: 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (Geneva: 
2009).
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Examples include the creation of Interministerial Com-
missions on Sustainable Development and International 
Development in France and in the United Kingdom and the 
Policy Coordination Committees in the United States. Oth-
er initiatives include Sweden’s Policy for Global Develop-
ment, which integrates all Swedish policy areas into one 
coherent and all-encompassing country policy for global 
development.
As for adaptation strategies, we note in Chapter 5 that 
the least developed countries (LDCs) may have developed 
their NAPAs under one ministry (usually environmental) 
and their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers under another 
(often financial or planning), while various ministries coor-
dinated other related strategies, such as that for meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
These nations will need to rapidly coordinate action 
among these plans and strategies, creating a coherence that 
should save resources over time. This will involve going 
beyond issue and policy silos to coordinate linked activities 
and goals. 
It is instructive that countries with the most experience 
of weather-related disasters, and a keen understanding of 
their vulnerabilities to them, are striving most systemati-
cally for adaptation policy coherence. Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
and Tunisia are some of the first movers toward increased 
coherence. (See Box, p. 28, and Figure 4.) They also illus-
trate the fact that when national adaptation plans are set up 
with national funding hubs or trust funds, the need for ef-
fective coordination becomes even greater.
All governments have a responsibility to protect their 
source: Ministry for the environment and Water, Bolivia
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poorest and most vulnerable citizens. Climate consequences 
will affect growing numbers of vulnerable people. There- 
fore governments need to be ready with the appropriate 
social safety nets. In developing countries, external techni-
cal support is needed to strengthen institutions responsible 
for such systems, and national and international organiza-
tions should cooperate in this effort.
Leadership for coordinating and improving governance 
will be hardest to find in fragile states and areas where for-
mal institutions are weak or non-existent, and there must 
be increased support for building and strengthening gov-
ernance in these areas. International organizations and bi-
lateral donors have a special responsibility to support and 
channel resources to communities via traditional and infor-
mal organizations. 
In terms of climate change, national governments must 
deal with multiple assistance agencies, all of which are try- 
ing to prove to their constituencies that they are taking 
effective action. Responding to climate change makes the 
principles embedded in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effec-
tiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action – ownership, 
alignment, use of country systems, division of labor – even 
more relevant. 
National governments also have the responsibility to 
provide the institutional environment that makes adapta-
tion possible for people at the local level. 
As described in previous chapters, adaptation varies 
with varying conditions: different for desert nations than 
for island nations, different for the rich than for the poor. 
But a set of principles can be defined for adaptation efforts 
in terms of management, planning, and service delivery.27 
This effort is not meant to prescribe action but to identify 
a set of fundamental functions that countries need to per-
form to adapt effectively. With agreement on the capacities 
needed to perform key adaptation functions, governments 
and organizations at all levels can discuss and plan adaptive 
strategies using the same vocabulary and checklist. This is 
not so much governance as a tool for governance. This 
should also improve communication on adaptation among 
the various levels, from the local to the international. 
Some areas where more investment is needed in every 
country are climate and meteorological information, bio-
physical monitoring, and early warning. Countries should 
also integrate such data in their national planning. 
Regional level 
Coordination at the regional level is probably the most 
appropriate step toward international cooperation in that 
countries usually feel a greater ownership of and loyalty to-
ward regional organizations. The case for regional coordi- 
nation is strongest for producing and managing regional 
public goods issues. 
There is a need to address climate change at the level 
of river basins and agro-ecological zones, making regional 
agencies more important. These should become more in-
no-vative in helping countries produce regional climate 
information and knowledge, design common early warn-
ing systems for extreme weather conditions, manage shared 
27 H. McGray et al., “The Bellagio Framework” (Washington, DC: 
World Resources Institute, forthcoming).
National initiatives for better adaptation 
policy coherence
Bangladesh, which has suffered a succession of cyclones, storms, and 
floods, has developed a national action plan uniting the areas of agri-
culture, health, livelihoods, disasters management, environment, and 
development – including 50 subsectors of those areas. a trust fund has 
also been established to receive and allocate funding between sectors.
Bolivia developed a National Mechanism for climate change adap-
tation covering five sectoral programs (water resources, food security, 
health, human settlement and risk management, and ecosystems) and 
three cross-sectoral programs (scientific research, capacity building 
and education, and anthropologic aspects and traditional knowledge). 
this mechanism is based on preliminary vulnerability assessments with 
different climate change scenarios, participatory consultations, and 
evaluation of adaptation needs. it is incorporated into the 2006–2010 
National development Plan. 
after four years of severe droughts (1999–2002), tunisia gathered 
national and regional climate data, studied the potential effects of 
climate change on the nation, reoriented away from short-term crisis 
management to a long-term adaptation strategy, and established an 
intersectoral climate council that brought together the ministries of 
agriculture, environment, and cooperation. it is setting up an informa-
tion system on agriculture, water, environment, tourism, and health. 
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water resources, control regional infectious diseases, and 
develop and create various agricultural and ecosystem man-
agement systems. 
A number of regional organizations are beginning to 
play or are capable of playing important roles in adaptation 
(see Box); the goal is to encourage them to improve their 
adaptation abilities.
Regional organizations can also play an important role 
in building and sharing experience and capacity. It is also 
at the regional level that many South-South partnerships 
share best practices in terms of adaptation. Regional or-
ganizations should identify added value, analyze lessons 
learned, and ensure the provision of information on experi-
ences and ongoing activities.
Efforts must be made to encourage regional organiza-
tions to play dynamic and effective roles in helping their re-
gions adapt to climate change. The European Union (EU) 
Commission is developing a white paper on climate change 
adaptation that proposes a regional workplan. Policy priori-
ties are identified on the basis of three principles: the princi-
ple of subsidiarity, the principle of solidarity between mem-
ber states, and a focus on sectors that are integrated at the EU 
level through the common market and common policies. 
International level 
In many instances, the international system has proved suc-
cessful in making life better for all by reducing the number 
of internal wars, lifting millions out of poverty, eradicating 
important diseases such as smallpox, preventing further 
depletion of the ozone layer, and designing international 
standards for telecommunication, aviation, and so on. 
But this same system has long needed serious reform, 
and it needs it without any consideration of climate change. 
Multilateral bureaucracies are often huge, inefficient, and 
slow to react and change. Mandates overlap and compete 
with one another. Cooperation and coordination between 
multilateral organizations is often lumbering and ineffec-
tive. The multilateral system consists of a proliferation of or-
ganizations, funds, and agreements; decision making with-
in it is highly compartmentalized; it focuses on concerns 
about legitimacy, accountability, and results; and interac-
tions between different levels of governance leave much to 
be desired. The uncoordinated international system reflects 
national policy inconsistencies and the contradictory ways 
that governments exercise their roles internationally. 
 “The challenges are both interdependent and integrated, 
requiring comprehensive approaches and popular partici-
pation. Yet most of the institutions facing these challenges 
tend to be independent, fragmented, working to relatively 
narrow mandates with closed decision processes,” noted 
the Brundtland Report. 
Climate change, which is global, cross-cutting, and hap-
pening faster than expected, throws these faults into sharp 
relief. It will require institutions to be global in vision, 
cross-cutting in agenda setting, and nimble and responsive. 
Regional organizations and adaptation
the international centre for integrated Mountain development serves 
the eight countries of the hindu Kush–himalayas, providing them with 
a center for knowledge on adaptation, particularly local adaptation. ice 
covers 17% of the high himalayas and inner mountain ranges of south 
asia, and snow and glacier melt are the source of the 10 largest rivers 
in asia, whose basins are home to 1.3 billion people. as these glaciers 
melt and disappear, floods will give way to water shortages, and both 
will challenge agriculture and livelihoods throughout the region. 
the Mekong river commission, formed in 1995 by an agreement 
between the governments of cambodia, Laos, thailand, and Viet Nam, 
has been slow to get into adaptation to climate change, but it is well 
positioned to do so. 
the Pacific island countries and territories (Picts) contain much 
land that is low-lying, narrow atolls – in some cases, accounting for the 
entire territory of the Pict. their people make their livings largely off 
natural resources: fishing, farming, forestry, tourism. they are the coun-
tries most vulnerable to climate change and most in need of developing 
adaptation measures. 
the Picts have created the Pacific islands Framework for action 
on climate change (2006 – 2015). they held their first Pacific islands 
climate change roundtable in 2005 and their second in 2008 (on a 
basketball court in samoa), and they plan to make it an annual event. 
these bring together not only government officials from the region but 
also civil society organizations working on climate change and the im-
portant donor governments of australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the 
united states. the focuses for adaptation are food security and agri-
culture, health, coastal areas, and infrastructure and water resources. 
the main effort at the samoa roundtable was to develop a single inter-
net portal that could provide virtually all the information available about 
climate change and adaptation in the region. 
 30  |  Commission on Climate Change and Development 
Many multilateral institutions suffer from chronic un-
derfunding, which prevents them from carrying out their 
mandates. This is particularly true of institutions dealing 
with so-called environmental issues, which are more often 
the environmental effects of economic, social, and political 
issues. In some cases this reflects free-rider issues. In others 
it reflects divergent country interests. But in many cases it 
reflects distrust about the effectiveness and accountability 
of management, in part because of the lack of independent 
evaluation capacity and other concerns about governance. 
Adaptation to climate change is an odd issue in that it 
tends to be the responsibility of the weaker institutional 
sectors: environment, development, and disaster risk reduc-
tion. These include environmental agencies and ministries, 
most of which tend to be underfunded and overshadowed 
by the bodies responsible for such activities as agriculture, 
finance, infrastructure, manufacturing, and transport – the 
sources of so much environmental degradation. 
Adaptation is also a concern of international develop-
ment organizations such as the UN Development Programme 
and the World Bank, which have a tough challenge reach-
ing the poorest and marginalized. The national official de-
velopment assistance agencies and ministries also act on 
the international adaptation stage, many bilaterally. How-
ever, they are not always focusing on the development of 
the most vulnerable. The reasons may range from domes-
tic, geopolitical, and commercial considerations to the fact 
that governments of the recipient nations may not always 
favor those most in need. 
This cascade of priorities demonstrates why develop-
ment assistance has struggled to be effective in assisting 
development and why national aid agencies have found it 
so difficult to cooperate and coordinate activities, which 
effective adaptation actions will require. This historic inef-
fectiveness is why the Paris Declaration on Aid Effective-
ness: Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results and 
Mutual Accountability of 2005 was necessary. The min-
isters and heads of multilateral and bilateral development 
institutions who signed it resolved “to take far-reaching 
and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and 
manage aid.” In a conference to follow up the Paris Decla-
ration in Accra in 2008, an action plan for implementation 
was unanimously endorsed.
Humanitarian assistance institutions also have their 
weaknesses. Donor behavior has in the past been dysfunc-
tional, irrational, and sometimes arrogant.28 Some crises 
have received more resources than seemed to be required, 
while others, particularly those that linger year after year, 
received a pittance. In some crises donors and international 
agencies competed for operational space, while in others they 
were very few and far between – if found at all. This sort of 
analysis led humanitarian donors to initiate reform, which 
resulted in the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, 
including the establishment of a peer-review mechanism 
under the OECD Development Assistance Committee. 
Further steps have then been taken in a UN-led humanitar-
ian reform process.
So adaptation is not getting enough attention on the 
world stage, and the attention it is getting is from three sec-
tors that have been historically challenged to be effective. 
Yet work is being done to enhance coordination of the 
international scene. (See Box, p. 31.) 
But many governance initiatives seem to respond to a 
crisis in a reactive manner and with little or no delivery of 
concrete changes. The recent food and financial crises exem-
plifies this. They have pushed governments to take a step be-
yond merely calling for reform. Governments have gathered 
urgently to discuss how to best respond to the crises collec- 
tively. This is commendable, but it must be followed up by 
action. Must the world wait for the next crisis to start acting? 
Or will governments now decide to be truly proactive?
The Commission believes that governments should act 
now to design an international system that will enable cur-
rent and future generations to deal with crises, including 
the climate change crisis. Twenty-first century challenges 
require twenty-first century institutions. Today’s organiza-
tions must be able to manage public goods, bringing in the 
private sector. They must be stakeholder-driven, efficiently 
moving resources from global to local levels. They must be 
problem solvers, valuing ecosystems when dealing with 
climate change.
28 J. Schaar, “The Birth of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative,” 
 in Development Assistance Research Associates, The Humanitarian 
Response Index 2007 (Madrid: 2008).
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The Commission believes that in the short term, we 
can use and modify existing institutions to better manage 
knowledge and services for climate change adaptation. In 
the longer term, as funding increases and agendas expand, 
new institutions might be needed. 
The international arena provides great opportunities 
for major actions such as carbon markets and technology 
transfer. Carbon markets offer a potential for developing 
countries to receive additional finance and technology to 
help them achieve low carbon growth. To date, LDCs have 
not been able to gain access to carbon markets to any great 
degree. A long-term and ambitious post-Kyoto target of 
emissions reductions will be required, and this will need 
to be complemented by a scaled-up, professional, and po-
litically independent regulatory system that provides confi-
dence to investor and recipient country alike. 
As far as adaptation is concerned, and given that it is based 
mainly on local actions, international organizations must 
become more adept at reaching the local level directly and 
through national governments and regional organizations. 
Adaptation and mitigation both require an improved 
knowledge network, with much greater investment in gener-
ating, disseminating, and exchanging knowledge. The Com- 
mission believes that it is particularly important to build sci-
entific knowledge and capacity for climate change research 
in low-income countries. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change should continue its four-yearly reports but 
should focus also on the rapid turnaround and dissemina-
tion of peer-reviewed research findings, especially to low-
income countries. The World Meteorological Organization 
should be equipped to service these new requests of the 
IPCC. 
The IPCC should engage more actively with other 
existing institutions (such as UNEP, the World Bank, UN 
specialized agencies, academia, civil society, and think 
tanks) to ensure that climate change knowledge and infor-
mation reach users in a timely way, particularly in low-in-
come countries. 
The UNFCCC secretariat should focus on intergovern-
mental debate and policy setting, not on regulatory, finan-
cial, or operational functions. As carbon markets could ex-
pand exponentially, it is timely to consider separating the 
roles of providing services for the convention and perform-
ing regulatory functions. Regulatory services, the scaling 
up of carbon trading, and the provision of global corporate 
guidance (as distinct from political guidance) could be en-
trusted to a new regulatory institution that would also ef-
fectively provide LDCs with access to carbon markets. 
The knowledge gap for adaptation is vast, but a grow-
ing knowledge network is being developed. The UN should 
provide a focal point for UN-related climate change knowl-
edge, “delivering as one” within developing countries, pro-
viding advice on issues from water and crop management 
to insurance and disaster risk reduction. 
The United Nations, international organizations (includ-
ing civil society), and governments should work together 
to quickly and drastically scale up the national, regional, 
and international systems for disaster response and pre-
paredness. The new system should have a standby finan-
cial mechanism that would be triggered automatically by 
a major event, assuring rapid response. It should facilitate 
recovery through a focus on vulnerability reduction; pro-
mote risk transfer, including social transfers and insurance 
UN system-wide coherence
Following the 2005 World summit, the uN secretary-General (sG) put 
together a high Level Panel on united Nations system-wide coherence 
in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance, and the environ-
ment. its final report made recommendations for decreasing fragmen-
tation in the uN system and delivering on the Millennium development 
Goals. these called for multiyear funding (providing predictability), 
a pilot program of one united Nations at the country level, an independ-
ent task force to clarify roles and responsibilities within the uN system, 
the appointment of a development coordinator to ensure performance 
and accountability in uN development activities, and the establishment 
of a sustainable development Board to report to ecosoc. 
on the issues of environment, the panel recommended that inter-
national environmental governance be strengthened and that an in-
dependent assessment be undertaken, that the uN environment Pro-
gramme (uNeP) be upgraded and given real authority, that the Global 
environment Facility (GeF) receive more support and be strengthened, 
and that the united Nations cooperate more on thematic partnerships.
source: high-level Panel on united Nations system-wide coherence 
in the area of development, humanitarian assistance and the environ-
ment, Delivering as One (New York: united Nations, 2006).
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products; and invest in staff with the creativity and capacity 
to handle surprises. It should strengthen national and re-
gional capacities.
UN agencies are not effectively coordinating their re-
sponses to climate change. Governments should support the 
efforts of the UN Secretary-General to strengthen coordi-
nation among UN agencies, funds, and programs. We urge 
the SG to continue to keep climate change issues at the top 
of government and governance agendas, encouraging and 
maintaining political will. The SG should bring in stake-
holders and set priorities throughout the UN system. 
The Commission recognizes the leadership of the SG 
and urges the SG to convene, in cooperation with interna-
tional financial institutions, an independent high-level task 
force to articulate a vision for development that achieves 
the multiple goals of mitigation, adaptation, and meeting 
human needs. High on its agenda should be the connections 
between the different global crises and the adequacy of 
global public policy and global governance in dealing with 
them simultaneously.
 
Cambodia
Simso Pahna is not typical of the people around him in 
the remote village of Thlok in Cambodia’s Kampong 
Chhnang province. He had some education in Russia 
and then spent six years as a Cambodian army journal-
ist after the Pol Pot era. Yet despite this sophisticated 
background, he elected to return to Thlok, one of four 
villages in the Chronouk Commune. 
The commune is just south of Lake Tonle Sap, which 
for much of the year covers about 2,700 square kilo- 
meters. During the rains, the Mekong River, which joins 
the Tonle Sap River, carries so much water that it causes 
the latter to reverse its flow and increase the area of 
the lake to 16,000 square kilometers and its depth from 
one to nine meters, flooding nearby fields and forests. 
The flooded area is full of nutrients for fish, and the 
lake becomes one of the most productive inland fish-
eries in the world, providing 60% of the protein for 
a nation that survives mainly on rice and fish paste. 
The sediment in the floodplain provides nutrients for 
the rice crop planted when the floods recede, and the 
ground has traditionally remained damp. 
Pahna says: “I fish, mainly to eat. I have only one 
child but I have set up a little house for 14 orphans, and 
they must eat. I sell some of the fish for gas for an ir-
rigation pump so I can grow dry-season rice.” 
He sees changes in the local climate: “The last two 
or three years have been very hot. So the land dries up 
quickly when the rainy season stops, which is why I 
need to irrigate. Wells fail, and springs dry up.”
The fishing is getting harder, too, but this may have 
little to do with climate change: “The government is 
giving more areas over to commercial fishing compa-
nies. They are using electricity, explosives, nets with 
very small meshes catching too many small fish,” he 
explains. Catches by ordinary people have declined by 
40% over the last few years, while the cost of fish has 
increased by 70%. Pahna is a “key fisherman” for the 
NGO Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT), with 
which he is setting up a fish conservation area. 
Much of the village migrates 8 kilometers nearer the 
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lake in the dry season to fish and plant dry-season rice, but 
yields of both are falling. So Pahna is part of a communal 
effort to get the government to build a dike near the village 
that would trap water in the wet season that could be re-
leased slowly for rice farming and might even recharge the 
local groundwater and the wells and springs it supports.
The appeal for project funding has gone off to a govern-
ment that has drawn up a National Adaptation Program of 
Action containing 39 “no regrets” projects, many of which 
are similar to the one being proposed by the Chronouk 
Commune. Only one of the projects – not one given high-
est priority by the government – has found an interested 
donor.
A Ministry of Environment official advised the Com-
mission that the NAPA would remain largely a theoreti-
cal exercise without donor funding. Yet adaptation is not 
on donor agendas. There are many other different plans – 
poverty, Millennium Development Goals, donor-country 
strategies – but none mentions adaptation, according to the 
official. Donor interest is mainly in potential Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) projects that are about emis-
sions (offsetting industrial-world emissions), and donors 
fund development activities on a project-by-project basis. 
An official for the Council for the Development of Cam-
bodia, responsible for national aid coordination, wondered 
how development resources could be effectively coordinat-
ed when there were 19 technical working groups and 2,000 
bilateral aid projects, a figure that leaves out the roughly 
1,000 projects managed by NGOs. “Under the leadership of 
the Ministry of the Environment, all ministries and agen-
cies are required to integrate priority activities,” the Com-
mission was told, but in Cambodia, as in other countries, 
the environment ministry has little power over other min-
istries. 
In Chronouk Commune, Pahna said that during the hot-
ter dry seasons the cattle, pigs, and chickens get sick and 
die. The people develop diarrhea, get rheumatism and 
heart palpitations, and are exhausted no matter how light 
the work. Asked about coping strategies, Pahna smiled and 
said, “We eat less.” It is hard to plant food substitutes like 
vegetables because of the quick drying of the soil and the 
lack of water.
Pahna, 48, knows about climate change and its effects 
and even does environmental cartoons for FACT. He intro-
duced the Commission to a 44-year-old woman named Kui 
Bo, who has nine children and a husband crippled by war-
fare. They have no land; her husband sells noodles and she 
farms rice on some of her sister’s land. Asked about the cli-
mate she said, “Oh, I see no change – but it is much hotter.” 
She said she did not have time to think about such things. 
 
Photo: Str
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5. Financing Gaps
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II  
shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse  
effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.
uN FraMeWorK coNVeNtioN oN cLiMate chaNGe
Resources are essential, but getting adaptation right is not 
only about money. As demonstrated in previous chapters, 
implementing a new approach to development and fixing 
our institutions will provide the kind of incentives needed 
for more adaptive actions. The transition to a low-carbon 
global economy can help support the global recovery by 
creating new jobs across a wide range of industries, but it 
will also secure ecosystem services on which the world de-
pends, especially the poorest. 
Money is needed now, and more will be needed in the 
future to help developing countries adapt. Official develop-
ment assistance must reflect climate change realities. But 
funding for adaptation must go far beyond ODA. A first, 
confidence-building step would be for all donors to honor 
their ODA commitments of 0.7% of GNI. But more will be 
needed under different terms than “traditional ODA.” 
Four main issues need to be managed to get adapta-
tion financing right: costs of adaptation, mobilization of 
resources, management of resources, and allocation of re-
sources. 
Costs of adaptation 
The Commission did not attempt to come up with a new 
cost number for adaptation needs. The argument developed 
in this section is based on existing estimates, which vary 
widely. The Commission emphasizes this uncertainty and 
the need for more work to refine estimates,29 while agree-
ing that costs will be high and much beyond present ODA 
levels. Moreover, based on the methodological limitations 
of existing costing exercises, the Commission cautions 
against basing policy on available estimates as if they were 
final numbers. A way forward might be for countries to de-
velop their own national “Stern reports.”30
The variation in estimates is due to the uncertainty of 
climate impacts at national and subnational levels and the 
difficulty of undertaking cost-benefit analyses for low-
probability but catastrophic damage events. It is also due to 
what is captured under “adaptive actions.” As we empha-
sized earlier, adaptation actions range broadly, from invest-
ments in human development in order to build resilience to 
very specific interventions that would not have been neces-
sary without climate change. 
Hence, adaptation financing must cut across many dif-
ferent sectors, such as health, agriculture, and infrastruc-
ture. And this financing will involve many types of actors: 
households, governments, and businesses at different lev-
els and within different time frames. Such a span makes it 
challenging to assess the costs of adaptation. It also makes 
it complex to find appropriate financing mechanisms for 
identified actions. 
Estimates of adaptation costs have tended to focus on 
the costs of adaptive measures – the “concrete” – rather 
than the costs of immaterial but crucial activities to build 
adaptive capacity, such as access to assets, education, a 
supporting institutional environment, and enabling poli-
cies, standards, and regulations, the costs of which are all 
hard to quantify but which can be highly cost-effective. 
(See Chapter 3 for a discussion of adaptive capacity.) Even 
the studies of the concrete elements of the various sectors 
most affected by climate change are incomplete. Much 
work has been done in examining coastal zones and agri-
29 One important initiative in this regard is the study on the economics 
of adaptation conducted by the World Bank and supported by the gov-
ernments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
 
30 See, for instance, R. Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) for Australia.
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▶ As per World Bank study but includes
– Revised “climate proofing” estimates
– Costs of adapting poverty reduction strategies to   
– climate change
– Costs of strengthening disaster responses
▶ As per World Bank study but scaled to include
– Scaling up of costs of NGO community-based projects
– Immediate adaptation needs of developing countries
– Other costs that WB ignored (e.g., cost of global public 
▌goods, building organisational capacity etc.)
▶ Examination of investment and financial flows for 
▌▌adaptation in five sectors:
– Infrastructure
– Agriculture, forestry and fisheries
– Water supply
– Human health
– Coastal zones
▶ Analysis of current financial flows (ODA, FDI, GDI)
▶ Estimates exposure of each group of flows to climate risk 
▌ – “climate sensitive” (40%, 10% and 2–10% respectively)
▶ Estimates cost of “climate-proofing” those exposed flows 
▌ 10–20%)
▶ As per World Bank study but with updated exposure and
▌▌climate-proofing cost estimates 
▶ Specifically, assumes less ODA at risk (20% vs. 40%) and 
▌▌a lower costto “climate-proof” flows (5–20% range)
Time frame
2015
Present
2030
Present
Present
UNDP
(2007)
Oxfam
(2007)
UNFCCC
(2007)
UNFCCC
LDCs estimate
(2007)
World Bank
(2006)
Stern review
(2006)
Source:  Project Catalyst, Adaptation to Climate Change: Potential Costs and Choices for a Global Agreement, Report of the Adaptation Working Group (The ClimateWorks Foundation, 2009). 
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Primary research
culture, but studies of the energy sector are limited mostly 
to North America, while little has been done in the areas of 
health or tourism.31
Six assessments of global adaptation costs were pub-
lished over 2006 –2008. Their estimates vary widely and 
range from $3 billion to $135 billion per year. (See Figure 5.)
According to a 2008 updated UNFCCC paper on invest-
ment and financial flows to address climate change, “esti-
mated overall additional investment and financial flows 
needed for adaptation in 2030 amounted to several tens, 
and possibly hundreds, of billions of United States dollars, 
with a significant share needed in developing countries.”32 
(The UNFCCC adds that while these sums “are significant, 
the value of the adverse impacts that these expenditures 
could avoid may be larger.”)
These estimates have also been broken down to differ-
entiate between short-term (2010) and medium-term costs 
(2030).33 The short term covers initial investments in global 
31 S. Agrawala and S. Fankhauser, Economic Aspects of Adaptation to  
Climate Change (Paris: OECD, 2008).
32 UNFCCC, op. cit. note 22.
33 Project Catalyst. Adaptation to Climate Change: Potential Costs and 
Choices for a Global Agreement, Report of the Adaptation Working 
Group (The ClimateWorks Foundation, 2009). 
Six estimates of costs of adaption
Figure 5. 
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public goods (e.g., better information technology and early 
warning systems), implementation of NAPA priorities, and 
the establishment of global and regional response schemes 
(e.g., extreme weather insurance programs). 
Medium-term costs would cover further investments 
in global public goods and in global and regional response 
schemes but would go beyond NAPAs and finance specific 
projects to support implementation of broad, strategic, and 
long-term adaptation planning. Short-term costs are esti-
mated at between $6 billion and $11 billion per year and 
medium-term costs between $12 billion and $29 billion per 
year. 
The main messages of this report are that adaptation 
will be very expensive (even with many cost-effective in-
vestments) and that costs will rise for decades or centuries 
(even if ambitious mitigation regimes were put in place im-
mediately) and will accelerate with continuing failure to 
mitigate. Since external funds will never be sufficient to 
cover all costs involved, given their magnitude and the un-
certainty that surrounds them, it will be of utmost impor-
tance that ways are found to mobilize domestic as well as 
international resources from all possible sources.
Mobilizing resources
Before looking at how new funds can be raised, it is worth 
examining the inadequacy of present funds and funding 
mechanisms. (See Box.)34
Funds destined for adaptation are proliferating but are 
not providing much extra money. Governments and organi-
zations are pledging far too little and depositing what funds 
there are in separate and growing numbers of initiatives 
in separate organizations with different, often complex, 
rules. 
This syndrome threatens to drastically raise transaction 
costs, which the poorest countries most in need of funding 
can ill afford. Several of these countries also lack the hu-
man capacity to negotiate the difficulties of gaining access 
to such funds. 
As of today there is not much money available compared 
with the range of costs identified earlier. One reason for 
this is that the UNFCCC does not have specific targets for 
donations. In addition, the system of funding is not very 
predictable. Most mechanisms are funded by voluntary 
contributions pledged in an ad hoc manner. 
Major international funding mechanisms 
and amounts 
the GeF allocated $50 million in 2003 to a strategic Prior-
ity on adaptation to pilot adaptation actions in developing 
countries. By late 2008, that amount had been allocated to 
22 projects. 
uNFccc parties established two special funds for ad-
aptation: the special climate change Fund (sccF) and the 
Least developed countries Fund (LdcF), operated by the 
GeF. By late 2008, 15 projects had been approved to receive 
funding from the sccF, totaling $67.52 million. the LdcF was 
established to support the Ldc work program, including the 
preparation and implementation of NaPas. By late 2008 a 
number of submitted projects had been approved as being 
consistent with fund eligibility criteria. 
the adaptation Fund was established to finance adap-
tation projects and programs in developing countries, pri-
marily from the proceeds of the 2% levy on certified emis-
sions reduction transactions under the cdM. the uNFccc 
estimates that it could receive $80 – 300 million per year in 
2008 –12. as of late 2008, it had received funds but made 
no dispersals. 
the World Bank’s Pilot Program for climate resilience 
(PPcr) is part of its climate investment Funds (ciFs) that 
are being set up with the regional development banks. the 
PPcr seeks to mobilize new and additional financing for ac-
tivities and investments that demonstrate how financial and 
other incentives can be scaled up to support adaptation. of 
the pledged $6.34 billion, $240 million has so far been allo-
cated to the PPcr. all funds and programs under the ciFs 
are of limited duration so as not to prejudice deliberations 
regarding the future of the climate change regime.
source: K. Le Goulven, “Financing Mechanisms for adap-
tation,” Background paper for the commission on climate 
change and development, 2008; uNFccc 2008.
34 There are also a number of national funding efforts, such as the Japa-
nese Cool Earth Partnership and Germany’s International Climate In-
itiative.
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Official development assistance
ODA represents a much larger sum of money. In 2007, ODA 
totaled $104 billion, and an estimate by OECD suggests 
that more than 60% of ODA could be considered as relat-
ing to adaptation. Obviously, increasing ODA would both 
provide funds for climate-proofing development assistance 
and increase funding for adaptation. The appropriate role 
of ODA in supporting climate adaptation needs to be ar-
ticulated. Two opposing arguments are summarized here. 
Some argue that if climate change adaptation is about 
development, then financial transfers and institutions with 
the objective of enhancing development could be used for 
adaptation. That would be ODA and development agencies. 
After all, experience gained through decades of develop-
ment cooperation could inform new efforts to adapt to cli-
mate change. And steps taken to harmonize aid flows and 
align them with national priorities could also guide finan-
cial transfers for adaptation. To date, most climate finance 
from donors is channelled through international and bilat-
eral development agencies. And most of it is ODA-eligible. 
Some react strongly against this position. They argue that 
climate adaptation finance follows a different rationale than 
ODA: financial transfers for adaptation are compensation – 
or restitution35 – from rich and polluting countries to poor 
countries. The parties to the climate convention acknowl-
edged this responsibility by calling for new and additional 
resources to finance climate adaptation. Thus many see de-
veloping a financial architecture for adaptation outside of 
this framework as violating an international legally bind-
ing agreement. An additional concern is the possible diver-
sion of one form of finance for the other objective and the 
possibility of double-counting resources. Hence develop-
ing countries strongly oppose mixing climate finance with 
ODA.36  
One way to bridge these conflicting positions is to in-
crease financial transparency. How can this be done?
First, the Commission postulates that “additional” 
means additional to the commitment of paying 0.7% of 
GNI as ODA. 
Second, the Commission stresses that the concept of ad-
ditionality applies to raising funds but does not prescribe 
how the extra funds must be spent. Hence, adaptation ac-
tion should be integrated into developing countries’ plans 
and budgets. The rationale is that integration of finance into 
one planning and budgeting process will provide greater 
efficiency in funds spent. The Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of OECD is working on guidelines to 
facilitate this integration. (See Box.) 
Third, the Commission emphasizes the importance of 
transparency in funding and therefore urges OECD-DAC 
35 For a better understanding of this wording, see B. Müller, “Inter- 
national Adaptation Finance: The Need for an Innovative and Strate-
gic Approach,” IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental  
Science 6 (2009) 112008.
36 See, for instance, South Centre, “Developed Country Climate Financ-
ing Initiatives Weaken the UNFCCC,” Analytical Note (Geneva: 2009).
OECD policy guidance on integrating adaptation 
to climate change into development cooperation
the oecd has recently developed policy guidance to help integrate 
adaptation within development processes. its objectives are to pro-
mote understanding of the implications of climate change on develop-
ment practice and the need to mainstream adaptation in development 
cooperation agencies and partner countries, to identify appropriate ap-
proaches for integrating climate adaptation into development policies, 
and to identify practical ways for donors to help developing countries 
reduce their vulnerability. 
integrating adaptation will require an analysis of the governance 
architecture and the policy cycle to identify entry points where climate 
change adaptation could be incorporated. at the national level, typical 
entry points could include various stages in the formulation of national 
policies, long-term and multiyear development plans, sectoral budget-
ary allocation, and regulatory processes. Entry points would be very 
different for on-the-ground projects, where adaptation considerations 
might need to be factored within specific elements of the project cycle. 
central to the oecd policy guidance is the notion of a climate lens, 
which involves examining four key factors: the extent to which a policy, 
plan, or project could be vulnerable to risks arising from climate varia-
bility and change; the extent to which climate change risks have already 
been taken into consideration; the extent to which the policy, plan, or 
project could inadvertently lead to increased vulnerability or miss im-
portant opportunities arising from climate change; and, for pre-existing 
policies and plans that are being revised, what amendments might be 
warranted in order to address climate risks and opportunities. 
source: oecd, OECD Policy Guidance on Integrating Adaptation to 
Climate Change into Development Co-operation (Paris: 2009).
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to suggest an appropriate marker for adaptation finance 
that donors will use when reporting their financial contri-
butions. This will allow tracking of additional resources for 
adaptation.
Generating adaptation finance
Options currently being discussed under the UNFCCC 
for generating more funding can be clustered into three 
groups:37 
▶ National budgetary allocations: Proposals have been 
made to define donation targets that could match esti-
mated costs. Targets would be defined as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) or according to a formula 
based on GHG emissions, population, and GDP. 
▶ National market-based levies: Proposals include the de-
sign of levies on carbon markets (under a cap-and-trade 
climate policy), on aviation, or on shipping. 
▶ International market-based levies: The Adaptation Fund 
created under the Kyoto Protocol and financed by a 2% 
levy on CDM activities is the main international instru-
ment. Proposals to increase resources include increasing 
the levy on the CDM or extending the levy on the other 
flexibility mechanisms defined under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Joint Implementation and Emission Trading). 
Appropriate adaptation funding mechanisms will pro-
vide large amounts of additional resources that are ade-
quate for the tasks at hand in tranches over time that could 
be more predictable.38 Funding mechanisms must be po-
litically feasible and equitable in terms of all donors and 
recipients (and in terms of the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility).39 
Many fund mobilization proposals are being floated; 
two at the forefront are: 
▶ The Norwegian proposal that a small portion of carbon 
emission quotas (an assigned amount unit) be withheld 
from national quota allocation and auctioned by an inter-
national institution. The resulting funds could be used 
for adaptation. The UNFCCC reckons that auctioning 
2% of these assets would raise annual funds of $15 – 25 
billion. 
▶ The International Air Travel Adaptation Levy could raise 
$4 –10 billion annually through a flat charge on air travel 
or airline fuel and is similar to the International Maritime 
Emission Reduction Scheme for taxing bunker fuel. 
The Commission acknowledges that the generation of 
resources through these mechanisms will take at least as 
much time as setting up the institutions that support them. 
Hence, it is important that donor countries quickly honor 
their ODA commitments and deliver additional public fi-
nance for adaptation until other financial instruments be-
come functional. 
In addition to setting these instruments, policies should 
encourage as much private sector funding as possible, such 
as the use of insurance, foreign direct investment, and 
standards. 
Business has been more involved in mitigation than in 
adaptation, but this is changing. However, most adaptation 
by companies focuses on protecting their own infrastruc-
ture. 
The UNFCCC has suggested that it could be helpful to 
develop guidelines for businesses on how to integrate cli-
mate change concerns into their routine risk assessment 
and strategic decision making. For example, vulnerability 
and adaptation assessments could be required as part of en-
vironmental impact assessments. 
There are many investment opportunities in adaptation 
activities, specifically in the fields of water resources, agri-
culture, and environmental services. (See Appendixes 1, 2, 
and 3.) These include irrigation, fertilizer, water purifica-
tion, and weather forecasting. 
Insurance schemes (see Appendix 6) could not only pro-
vide relief during and after disasters but also encourage 
people to reduce their vulnerability.
37 See M. Bapna and H. McGray, “Financing Adaptation: Opportunities 
for Innovation and Experimentation,” in L. Brainard, A. Jones, and 
N. Purvis, eds., Climate Change and Global Poverty: A Billion Lives 
in the Balance? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 
2009).
38 The recent financial crisis has taught us that market-based financ-
ing instruments are not as predictable as theory might suggest. As of 
February 2009, the value of certified emissions reductions suffered a 
drop of 20% from the previous year – meaning fewer resources for the 
Adaptation Fund. 
39 Principles and the following discussion based on Müller, op. cit. note 35. 
5. Financing Gaps
Commission on Climate Change and Development  | 39  
Management of resources
As with mobilizing funding, many ideas for managing 
funds have been put forward. “Parties have suggested a 
need for adaptation funding to be structured and governed 
under an umbrella financing mechanism of the Conven-
tion,” wrote the UNFCCC Secretariat. “Parties have recom-
mended that the financial architecture of a future post-2012 
climate agreement facilitates collaboration and synergy be-
tween activities under the Convention and related national 
and international efforts in climate change adaptation. For 
example, the European Union has proposed a Framework 
for Action on Adaptation to serve as a guide for the finan-
cial mechanism operating within the context of the Conven-
tion but also to be considered by bilateral and multilateral 
organizations in their adaptation and resilience-building 
activities.”40
However, the UNFCCC Secretariat added that while 
some parties have called for making use of and improving 
existing institutions, such as the Adaptation Fund or the GEF, 
in order to avoid a proliferation of institutions, others have 
suggested creating new institutions. Some parties, includ-
ing Australia, the European Union, and New Zealand, see 
an opportunity for the climate change community to take 
on board many of the lessons learned in the development 
community and recognized in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. 
The Group of 77, China, and the Alliance of Small Island 
States have proposed a Climate Change Fund under the 
Convention, in accordance with its Article 11 (not the Kyoto 
Protocol, as at present). It would be run by a board appoint-
ed by the Conference of the Parties, with equitable and 
balanced representation by all parties within a transparent 
and efficient system of governance. 
The Commission finds the proliferation of funds for ad-
aptation problematic; it creates a coherence problem and 
puts pressure on the management capacity of developing 
countries. No further vertical funds should be created for 
adaptation.
The management of any mechanism for funding ad-
aptation should learn from weaknesses of the current aid 
system, and its functioning should go beyond traditional 
donor-recipient relationships. In particular, it should be 
governed through a representative and equitable arrange-
ment, with agreed roles, functions, accountability, and 
replenishment mechanisms. On principles in general, the 
Commission believes that we must always secure transpar-
ent and results-based management in any discussion and 
any outcome.
Existing funding mechanisms should be effective, effi-
cient, well coordinated, and accessible for actors at differ-
ent levels. They should meet the following criteria:41 
▶ Transparent and balanced governance. It is important 
to have a balanced representation of industrial and de-
veloping countries. 
▶ Demand-driven. The mechanism for funding adaptation 
should be demand-driven and enable access to funding by 
recipient governments and nongovernmental entities at 
different levels. It should ensure recipients’ involvement 
during identification, definition, and implementation of 
programs, rendering it truly demand-driven. Monitoring 
and auditing functions should build on existing and ac-
cepted multilateral mechanisms.
▶ Allocation and disbursement functions. So as not to 
slide into micromanagement, the mechanism would fa-
cilitate the allocation and disbursement of funds via dif-
ferent agencies for adaptation activities in their various 
fields of expertise, such as disaster reduction through 
the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction, relief ef- 
forts by the Central Emergency Response Fund, or spe-
cific national or regional funding hubs. Allocation and 
disbursement criteria need to be sufficiently flexible to 
allow for the wide range of adaptation actions necessary.
▶ National funding hubs. In view of the principle of sub-
sidiarity, the management of climate adaptation finance 
should be devolved to the lowest level of effective gov-
ernance. This means that the international level pro-
vides the general policy framework, but allocation de-
cisions are taken at the relevant national or subnational 
level, within the agreed framework. Given the diversity 
of national circumstances and the specificity of national 
adaptation needs, funding hubs could take different for-
mats. They could be national or regional, or they could 
40 UNFCCC, op. cit. note 22.
 
41 This builds on B. Müller and L. Gomez-Echeverri, “Reform of the 
UNFCCC Financing Mechanism: Architecture and Governance,” 
Ecbi Policy Brief (2009).
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be part of the national budget or established as an off-
budget trust fund. This could be relevant if the affected 
country does not have the fiduciary and other standards 
necessary for the effective and efficient management of 
resources.
▶ Independent evaluation and oversight. Independent 
oversight and evaluation are critical to increase account-
ability and transparency, ensure support by all parties, 
and maintain financial f lows. The evaluation system 
should be fully independent from the management of the 
financing mechanism. 
Allocation of resources 
How should funds be allocated? So far, the approach by 
the international funds has been on a project-by-project ba-
sis. As the funding grows, micromanagement will be both 
undesirable and impossible, as will a focus on immediate 
projects rather than long-term strategies. 
Before getting access to funds, each nation should un-
derstand its adaptation needs. Thus each country (industri-
al and developing, but here the focus is on the latter) should 
elaborate an integrated and strategic approach to adaptation 
and should mainstream adaptation in development plans, 
budgets, and – for poor countries – poverty reduction strat-
egies. Focal areas will include but not be limited to water, 
energy, agriculture, forests, capacity development, and the 
rapid build-up of knowledge. This is a precursor to seeking 
adaptation funding. 
LDCs have been developing NAPAs, a process estab-
lished by the UNFCCC when it was negotiating new adap-
tation funds. The NAPAs provide project-level information 
on adaptation costs, cover urgent rather than medium- or 
long-term needs, and are meant to be created through a 
bottom-up survey process. 
The Commission recognizes NAPAs as the point of de-
parture for strategic and long-term adaptation planning for 
LDCs. (See Box.) The Commission urges industrial coun-
tries to quickly provide financial support for the implemen-
tation of NAPAs. 
As noted in Chapter 4, Bangladesh has established a help-
ful model of the National Adaptation Strategy and Action 
Plan, which looks at medium- and long-term needs through 
strategic planning, intends to consider climate change risks 
in all development activities, and offers technical and ad-
ministrative ways of doing this. Other LDCs are moving 
toward national adaptation plans that are longer-term. With 
many countries, the realities of repeated disasters act as a 
strong incentive to such strategic planning. 
In response to this effort by recipient nations, donors 
should coordinate and agree on the division of labor in pro-
viding support in accordance with the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness, and they should also work to increase 
the absorptive capacities of recipient countries. 
Beyond the urgency of NAPA funding, how should ad-
aptation funding be channeled and monitored? 
In view of the discussion on the human dimension of 
climate change and the importance of the local level, the 
Commission argues that adaptation funding should be ac-
Do NAPAs matter?
By late 2008, 38 out of 48 Ldcs had concluded the NaPa 
process, identifying a total of 430 urgent projects. Preparing 
these programs cost nearly $10 million. 
implementation of the identified projects is estimated 
at about $2 billion. Yet to date only one of these “urgent” 
projects has been funded, partly due to the confusion over 
funding mechanisms, but also partly a reflection of a his-
torical syndrome whereby poor countries are asked to (and 
often funded to) carry out studies to identify needs – and 
receive little funding to meet these needs. 
donors’ reluctance to provide funding partly rests on the 
fact that they feel that NaPas are little different from devel-
opment plans in general. NaPas have also been criticized 
for their project approach and their failure to involve major 
ministries and decision makers in their countries. 
two workshops organized by the World development 
report team in 2008 found that those involved in preparing 
the NaPas feel differently. they followed the guidance pro-
vided by uN agencies and identified urgent and high-priority 
adaptation projects to implement. they also feel that NaPas 
have been instrumental in increasing awareness of climate 
change in Ldcs and have increased capacity for planning 
for adaptation. 
source: adapted from a. agrawal, “the National adaptation 
Programmes of action,” on development in a changing cli-
mate, Wdr2010 blog, 2008.
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cessible for national as well as local governmental and non-
governmental organizations. 
There is a fear that prioritization of adaptation funding is 
now focusing on countries that have developed administra-
tive and management capacity rather than on those without 
such capacity but where resources are most needed. The 
Commission calls for strong support for the latter but also 
for building the necessary capacity to manage funds. 
Allocation should take into account climate change vul-
nerability and in the early stage should make use of exist-
ing channels to implement high-priority items in NAPAs, 
as identified by countries. The aim should be to integrate 
adaptation activities into the normal planning and budget-
ing processes of countries. There will still be a need for 
pilot projects for trial and experimental purposes, but they 
can be identified within a program context.
The Commission argues that adaptation action ranges 
from resilience building among the most vulnerable commu-
nities in the form of assets, health, education, and so on to 
highly specific climate-related measures, such as protection 
against sea-level rise or glacial lake outburst floods. 
This poses a dilemma when it comes to monitoring 
and assessing outcomes of resilience-building investments, 
whether through mechanisms under the UNFCCC or as 
bilateral and multilateral ODA. Investments in resilience 
will have benefits not only with regard to specific climate 
change impacts. And it will not be possible to attribute re-
silience only to adaptation funding when resources of dif- 
ferent origin become blended in an integrated resource al-
location process. Furthermore, resilience is an outcome that 
may not be easy to measure. And activities that enhance 
resilience may be different in different contexts. 
Still, governments receiving financial resources through 
convention mechanisms are accountable to convention par-
ties in ensuring that resources are used to achieve intended 
adaptation outcomes and impacts. And to the extent that 
ODA is used, donors must make sure that their contribu-
tions can be traced and results measured. 
If adaptation activities are narrowly defined to satisfy 
administrative needs of easy tracking and monitoring, buil-
ding basic resilience may become neglected and instead 
only specific adaptation measures supported. Practitioners 
must therefore look at monitoring and evaluation arrange-
ments that use proxy indicators for desired resilience out-
comes and that give meaningful answers as to the effect of 
individual contributions when attribution is difficult. 
The system defined to monitor adaptation investments 
should be used to learn about and then refine funding prac-
tices. 
A two-step approach
Because the creation of new mechanisms might delay 
essential action, the Commission finds that a two-step ap-
proach to mobilizing “new and additional” funds for adap-
tation in developing countries would be appropriate. This 
stepwise approach aims to narrow the trust gap between 
industrial and developing countries. It provides immedi-
ate help to the poorest people as progress is made toward a 
long-term approach to adaptation funding within the con-
text of a new agreement on climate change. 
As a first step, donor countries should mobilize $1–2 bil-
lion (although not at the expense of current ODA-financed 
programs) to assist the vulnerable, low-income countries 
(especially in Africa) and selected small island states 
(below a certain GDP), which are already suffering from 
climate impacts. The second step is an effective funding 
mechanism for adaptation that would be created through 
climate negotiations. 
ODA and other public funds are unlikely to provide the 
full resources required to finance the adaptation efforts of 
all developing countries in the long term. There is a wide 
range of estimates of the needs. Although more work is 
required to refine these estimates, there are promising op-
tions proposed to raise funds. Some could bring between 
$5 billion and $15 billion in additional funds a year – which 
is in the lower range of estimated needs. 
Governments should urgently adopt those mechanisms 
that provide additional and predictable resources and are 
politically feasible, equitable in terms of all donors and re-
cipients, and respectful of the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities.
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Antonio Mamani has a small farm to the west of La Paz 
near Lake Titicaca. Both he and the Bolivian capital are 
struggling to survive the apparent effects of climate change. 
Bolivia has the lowest GDP per capita in Latin America.
Mamani, 50, has a hectare of potatoes and garden crops, 
a few cows, and eight children. His potatoes were shriveling 
in the ground due to too little rain. Weeds were taking over, 
but if he weeded, all the potatoes would come up with the 
unwanted plants. 
With some 300 potato varieties available on the Alti-
plano, he and his fellow farmers are seeking those that 
grow fast to avoid variable weather. But they cannot get ac-
cess to such varieties. 
Some farmers in the Altiplano plains above La Paz are 
better off than Mamani in that they irrigate, and irrigation 
water is plentiful. That is because all the glaciers along 
the Cordillera Real mountain range near La Paz are melt-
ing. These had acted as both reservoirs and dams, holding 
fresh water in place and releasing it slowly during warmer 
weather, providing drinking water, irrigation water, and 
hydropower. 
El Alto, a “dormitory” suburb of the capital that is home 
of over 1 million people, is the fastest-growing city in 
Bolivia and will face water shortages with the shrinking 
glaciers. But before that, disastrous meltwater floods could 
do great damage in the capital, which is encased in a vast 
canyon. 
Warmer weather keeps the glaciers from replenishing, 
as does the fact that the rains come in the austral summer, 
when it is generally too warm anyway for it to turn to ice. 
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The rains will continue, but all of the water infrastructure – 
drinking, irrigation, hydro – will have to be rebuilt to be in 
sync with rainfall rather than glacier melt. The government 
envisions a great many small dams. 
One of the most famous of the nearby glaciers was Cha-
caltaya, which encyclopedias still describe as among South 
America’s highest glaciers (5,421 meters) – 18,000 years old 
and containing the world’s highest ski resort served by a 
lift. Yet when the Commission visited Chacaltaya in March 
2009, there was virtually no glacier, no snow, and only the 
empty shell of a ski resort, which had been functioning un-
til 10 years ago. Piles of skis, Alpine posters, and a lift mo-
tor are all still in place. 
As in so many other poor countries, it is neither the grad-
ual climate change nor major disasters that are affecting 
Bolivia – yet. It is the year-to-year uncertainty and the many 
small, local disasters too small for the international media. 
Mamani had five “normal” years, then most crops were 
wiped out by floods last year and by a local drought in 2009.
Juan Pablo Ramos, vice minister for environment, bio-
diversity, and climate change, told the Commission that cli-
mate change had decreased the nation’s GDP by 4% a year 
over the past two years due to floods, droughts, and – in 
Bolivia’s eastern, Amazonian region – major forest fires. 
Climate change is blamed for causing a major reinfesta-
tion of the Aedes aegypti mosquito, which carries dengue 
fever, and there was a dengue epidemic in the economi-
cally important lowland city of Santa Cruz in March 2009. 
Mosquitoes were also moving higher up the mountains than 
ever before, and primary cases of malaria had been found 
at 3,100 meters above sea level. 
The government is trying to factor climate change into all 
development planning, including the work of the health and 
education ministers. Ordinary people must be taught about 
the new threats of dengue and malaria, but so must their 
doctors, who may never have seen these diseases before. 
The government is systematically seeking to build adap-
tive capacity by, among other measures, tapping the indig-
enous knowledge of the nation’s 36 different ethnic groups. 
That includes farmers like Mamani, a member of the 
Aymara people of the high plains. 
But Mamani hopes to tap the government for new potato 
varieties, crop insurance, weather forecasting, early warn-
ing systems, garbage collection, and protection from the 
malarial mosquitoes moving into his area for the first time 
in living memory.
 
 44  |  Commission on Climate Change and Development 
 CCRIF caribbean catastrophic risk insurance Facility
 CDM clean development Mechanism
 CFA comprehensive Framework for action
 CIF climate investment Fund
 COPD chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
 CPRC chronic Poverty research centre
 DAC development assistance committee
 DfID department for international development
 DRR disaster risk reduction
 EU european union
 FACT Fisheries action coalition team
 FAO Food and agriculture organization
 GAR Global assessment report
 GDP gross domestic product
 GEF Global environment Facility
 GHG greenhouse gas
 GNI gross national income
 HFA hyogo Framework for action
 IFPRI international Food Policy research institute
 IPCC intergovernmental Panel on climate change
 ISDR international strategy for disaster reduction
 IWRM integrated water resources management
 LDC least developed country
 LDCF Least developed countries Fund
 LPG liquefied petroleum gas
 MDG Millennium development Goal
 NAPA National adaptation Program of action
 NGO nongovernmental organization
 NRECA National rural electric cooperative association
 ODA official development assistance
 OECD organisation for economic co-operation and development
 PICTs Pacific island countries and territories
 PPCR Pilot Program for climate resilience
 PPP polluter pays principle
 REDD reducing emissions from deforestation and Forest degradation
 SCCF special climate change Fund
 SG secretary-General
 TFD the Forest dialogue
 UNEP uN environment Programme
 UNFCCC uN Framework convention on climate change
 WFP World Food Programme
 WHO World health organization
Acronyms
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Appendixes
and complex economies were recognized as a more appro-
priate starting point in preventing hunger than a narrow 
food production perspective.
Recent events have swung the pendulum partially back 
toward food security and increasing yields. Skyrocketing 
food prices in 2008 emphasized that the bottom line in the 
livelihoods of the poor is being able to afford enough to eat. 
Climate change is seen as a major (but not the only) factor 
in determining whether the livelihoods of the poor are vi-
able in terms of preventing famine. 
Food security considerations have four main dimen-
sions: food availability, access to food, stability of supply, 
and safe and healthy use of food.43 The situation is deterio-
rating for the chronically poor in all four dimensions, due 
in part to climate change:
▶ Availability of food is decreasing due to scarcity aris-
ing from global population increase, worsening climatic 
conditions, changing food demands (for meat and dairy 
rather than grain), and shifts from food to biofuel pro-
duction.
▶ Poor people’s access (entitlements) to food is declin-
ing due to worsening terms of trade between wages and 
food costs.
▶ Stability is threatened due to increasing prevalence of 
disasters, uncertainty regarding food prices, and nation-
al protectionism.
▶ Safe and healthy use of food is deteriorating as the poor 
switch to more monotonous diets, which lack essential 
micronutrients, and as hazards such as flooding increase 
the prevalence of diarrheal diseases and malaria, which 
in turn affects food use.
42 This appendix is based on a 2009 background paper to the Com- 
mission by Ian Christoplos, researcher and consultant with  
Glemminge Development Research, “Food Security: A Strategy  
Interface in the Human Dimension of Climate Change,” available at 
www.ccdcommission.org.
43 M. J. Cohen, C. Tirado, N-L. Aberman, and B. Thompson, Impact of 
Climate Change and Bioenergy on Nutrition (Washington, DC, and 
Rome: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2008).
The following appendixes are the result of the Commis-
sion’s work with a number of different experts and organi-
zations, and in some cases of work done by Commissioners 
and members of the secretariat. Their different origins have 
resulted in different styles and approaches. However, each 
was edited by the Commission, which takes sole responsi-
bility for any errors. 
1. FooD SeCurity42
Ensuring food security in the context of climate change 
and growing disaster risks is one of the greatest adaptation 
challenges. It provides a useful illustration of what the up-
side-down approach means for policy choices. 
The issue of food security attracted considerable atten-
tion during the late 1980s due to the impacts of droughts 
in Africa and concerns about the nature of famine. At that 
time, food availability and consumption were being com-
promised by many of the factors that may have been early 
forms of climate change. 
Yet at the same time, the focus was shifting away from 
increasing crop yields to understanding the complex nature 
of hunger and famines. Researchers such as Nobel laure-
ate Amartya Sen and Alex de Waal pointed out that famine 
resulted not from a lack of food in a given region but rather 
from political decisions that led to a lack of “entitlements” 
by marginalized populations to gain access to the food they 
need.
Such entitlements could consist of income, access to 
social protection, or smallholder production. Sen famously 
showed that food exports always increase from famine- 
affected areas, largely because poor people cannot afford to 
buy the food available. So increasing global food supply is 
not a panacea for avoiding famines. The broader “freedom” 
to buy food, as influenced by local/national/international 
policies, markets and trends, was recognized as more im-
portant than household or even national production levels. 
Partly as an outcome of these new perspectives, during 
the 1990s the broader concept of livelihoods came to large-
ly displace earlier attention to food security. The complex 
struggles of poor people to survive in increasingly diverse 
 46  |  Commission on Climate Change and Development 
Markets: the livelihoods and food security link
Despite huge growth in the global economy and significant 
progress in poverty reduction, food security has deteriorat-
ed since 1995. Even before the recent increases in the price 
of food, increasing yields had not diminished high levels of 
hunger in much of the world.44 This implies a failure in the 
local, national, and international market institutions that 
govern food entitlements. Food prices are volatile; 50–80% 
of the wages of the poor go to purchasing food, but in many 
cases this is not enough.45 
Furthermore, a dynamic agricultural economy is a pre-
condition for dynamic rural development, upon which even 
the landless poor depend for their livelihoods and food se-
curity. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, climate change 
will increasingly limit such dynamism over the next few 
decades. Due to climate change, the window of opportunity 
to use agriculture as the driving force to overcome rural pov-
erty, and thereby improve food security, is closing fast.46
Higher oil prices have made fertilizer and irrigation even 
more expensive (though they were already unaffordable for 
most poor farmers).47 The rush to take advantage of higher 
commodity prices has multiplied inflationary pressures on 
fertilizer, creating an even greater gap between those who 
can and cannot afford it. Meanwhile, climate change is in-
creasing dependence on more capital-intensive production 
due to climate variability’s effects on traditional rainfed 
production and other low external input farming. 
The shift from food to biofuel production is also affect-
ing food prices. Food security is thus related to energy secu-
rity, but at national and local levels it has proved difficult to 
overcome institutional approaches that make food and en-
ergy security two entirely separate issues. The inclination 
to define climate change as an “environmental issue” also 
tends to put it in a sort of institutional ghetto removed from 
the institutions managing agriculture, energy, and finance.48 
Local, national, and international agencies active in envi-
ronmental issues are often perceived as ignorant about the 
drivers behind market trends.
The extent to which increasing global food prices have 
affected local food prices varies enormously,49 but one mes-
sage is clear: food prices are the greatest determinant of 
whether people can sustain food security. 
Most of the chronically poor are landless or near land-
less, and an increasing proportion live in cities, the latter 
being a new focus of attention with regard to food security.50 
The chronically poor generally rely on day labor (often on 
the farms of their wealthier neighbors), petty commercial 
enterprises, and social protection. Food scarcity affects 
their food security, but mainly indirectly, in the form of 
higher prices and social conflict. Given that they rely on 
efficient markets for food and labor, infrastructural invest-
ment is one of the most important factors in ensuring food 
security in the face of climatic variability, since roads al-
low food to be transported from surplus to deficit areas and 
reduce the costs of travel to jobs.51 
Poor people in rural areas use a variety of commercial 
and subsistence production activities to obtain food. Main-
taining agro-biodiversity and ecosystem services are not 
new climate change adaptation tools. Farmers have long 
understood the importance of planting a range of different 
varieties and crops to protect themselves against climatic 
variability. Efforts to maintain biodiversity can prevent 
land degradation, since planting trees and other perennial 
crops are ways of dealing with erratic rainfall. Trees can 
prevent wind damage.
Managing ecosystems and biodiversity – for agriculture 
and other purposes – can create synergies between climate 
change adaptation and mitigation measures.
44 J. von Braun, “High Food Prices: The What, Who and How of Pro-
posed Policy Actions,” Policy Brief (Washington, DC: IFPRI, May 
2008).
  
45 Oxfam, “The Time is Now: How World Leaders Should Respond to 
the Food Price Crisis,” Oxfam Briefing Note (Oxford: June 2008).
  
46 Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC), Chronic Poverty Report 
2008–2009: Escaping Poverty Traps (Manchester: 2008).
  
47 A. Evans, The Feeding of the Nine Billion: Global Food Security for 
the 21st Century, A Chatham House Report (London: Chatham House, 
2009).
  
48 A. Evans, “Rising Food Prices: Implications for Development,” 
Chatham House Briefing Paper (London: Chatham House Food Sup-
ply Project, April 2008).
  
49 Von Braun, op. cit. note 44.
  
50 Evans, op. cit. note 48.
  
51 CPRC, op. cit. note 46.
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Social protection as a solution  
to market failures 
Safety nets, in the form of risk transfer products, social 
protection, or other publicly supported mechanisms, will 
be required if an acceptable level of food security is to be 
maintained. These are needed both to stabilize consump-
tion levels and to keep small farmers from having to sell 
off productive assets such as plows or oxen. Such sales can 
turn acute food security crises into longer-term, chronic 
declines in food security and livelihood prospects.52 
For many years the solution to market failures leading to 
acute food insecurity was food aid. In recent years this has 
been questioned. Cash-based responses are a more flexible 
and cheaper alternative and can provide positive incentives 
for local food production since they put money – rather than 
imported food – into the pockets of the poor.53 Imported 
food can damage markets for local food.
However, the food crisis and the rapidly diminishing 
value of cash for food purchases have drawn attention to 
food aid again. More efforts are now being made to purchase 
food locally, since there is less pressure to dispose of North-
ern grain surpluses, and the procurement efforts of an agen-
cy like the World Food Programme (WFP) may be able to 
contribute to smoothing and stimulating demand as well as 
calming markets.54  
While food for work, school lunch programs, and simi-
lar initiatives are still important in managing chronic food 
security needs in some countries, the range and scope of 
these and other social protection programs must increase 
as part of climate change adaptation. The need for social 
protection already far outstrips supply and access. Even in 
countries with relatively well established and organized so-
cial protection systems, such as Ethiopia and Bangladesh, 
only a small minority of the chronically poor has access to 
social protection.55 
Reaching the hungry
Food security is a topic that sits poorly within the architec-
ture of international institutions. Coordination among the 
three UN food-related agencies in Rome has long been poor, 
with WFP integrated into the humanitarian system and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization and International Fund 
for Agricultural Development having a significant degree 
of independence as “specialized agencies” with a focus on 
production rather than consumption. In addition, UNICEF 
devotes a significant proportion of its work to nutrition. The 
UN Development Programme and World Health Organiza-
tion also have food security elements. 
The World Bank is by far the largest investor in agri-
culture and is rapidly expanding its portfolio, but given its 
orientation toward economic growth, in the past it paid rela-
tively little attention to food security. This may be changing 
with Bank President Robert Zoellick’s calls for a “new deal 
for global food policy.” Yet the World Development Report 
2008, on agriculture and development, makes virtually no 
mention of links between climate change and food security. 
The ambiguities in the links between agriculture and 
food security objectives may be changing. The UN Secre-
tary-General’s Task Force on the Food Security Crisis and 
its Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) constitute 
new structures for a joined-up response within and beyond 
the UN system. If the task force can mobilize the intended 
broad buy-in from different actors, it could catalyze and 
coordinate actions that have been fragmented in the past. 
The CFA is designed to address both policy and operational 
factors and echoes many of the intentions embodied in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. A strong link with 
the new climate change mitigation and adaptation architec-
ture, which is emerging simultaneously, will be essential. 
Coordination challenges are in many respects mirrored 
at national and local levels, where responsibility for nutri-
tion is usually placed with ministries of health, food with 
ministries of agriculture, and social protection with min-
istries of social welfare. Emergency response institutions 
manage acute food insecurity, but other organizations deal 
52 C. B. Barrett, B. J. Barnett, M. R. Carter, S. Chantarat, J. W. Hansen, 
A. G. Mude, D. E. Osgood, J. R. Skees, C. G. Turvey, and M. Neil Ward, 
“Poverty Traps and Climate Risk: Limitations and Opportunities of 
Index-Based Risk Financing,” prepared for the Policy Roundtable on 
Climate Risk, Poverty Traps and Index-Based Financing, International 
Research Institute for Climate and Society, Columbia University, 19 
October 2007.
 
53 FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 2006: Food Aid for Food  
Security? (Rome: 2006).
 
54 World Food Programme, Purchase for Progress: Innovations to Con-
nect Low-income African Farmers to Markets (Rome: 2008).
 
55 Von Braun, op. cit. note 44.
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with chronic insecurity. Food security is too often the re-
sponsibility of everyone and no one. 
Meanwhile, climate change is mainly the reserve of en-
vironmental authorities, with little contact and less influ-
ence on any of the institutions dealing with food security. 
Civil society organizations advocate for action among all 
these parties, but they can do little to bring them together. 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may themselves 
be struggling with internal conflicts between humanitarian 
and development divisions.
The 2008 food crisis could act as a wake-up call to bring 
different organizations together at international, national, 
and local levels to address the link between food security 
and climate change. Declarations have been made to this 
effect and financing is being sought, but as yet it is too early 
to determine whether a “new” food security agenda is going 
to be put into place among those who need to act in order 
to reach the food-insecure and, if so, whether this agenda 
will reflect the new range of risks stemming from climate 
change.  
What is to be done?
Doing more of the same: Most of the actions required to 
ensure food security and to promote sustainable livelihoods 
in the face of climate change are not new. The main task 
is to better apply what is known about availability, access, 
supply stability, and use of food within the development 
agenda in a more coherent manner at local, national, and 
international levels. Climate change is primarily a multipli-
er of known risk factors that have in the past rarely received 
sufficient attention or funding because they have fallen into 
the gap between relief and development. Climate change 
adaptation for enhanced food security is above all a matter 
of addressing this gap.
Doing some things differently: The uncertainty inher-
ent in climatic variability suggests that support to agricul-
ture and livelihoods must provide a menu of options rather 
than set packages for increasing food production or liveli-
hood support. Territorial development programs and post-
disaster agricultural rehabilitation efforts have been impor-
tant vehicles to promote food security, but they have often 
been driven by assumptions that played down the extent to 
which uncertainty about weather and markets is at the core 
of how chronically poor and vulnerable populations main-
tain their livelihoods. Risk must become a core aspect of 
how these programs are designed and implemented.
Being more cautious in pursuing some development 
objectives: The CFA presents a powerful call for renewed 
attention to agricultural production. However, it is im-
portant to ensure that the poor and food-insecure are the 
ones who benefit from increased production under climate 
change adaptation programs. A range of services is needed 
to make the link between greater food production and the 
entitlements upon which food security depends. The impor-
tance of entitlements is understood, but this understanding 
has not always been applied in the rush to increase overall 
food supplies. Promotion of a limited range of seed varie-
ties may help some and may increase national food sup-
plies, but it can also increase risk and have a negative im-
pact on agro-biodiversity.
Doing new things: Promotion of agro-ecosystem serv-
ices does not fall within the standard food production tool-
box. There is therefore a need to think out of the box to find 
ways to recognize and build on the value of the ecosystem 
services that are provided in new agricultural programs. 
Similarly, those working with ecosystem services are not 
always accustomed to reflecting empirically and critically 
on the wider impacts of their schemes on the nutritional 
status of affected populations, especially those (such as the 
landless) who may not be direct beneficiaries of payments 
for these services. 
Doing things that people want: Food-insecure people 
are the most concerned about having enough to eat. One 
driving factor in locally owned climate change adaptation 
is therefore likely to be addressing risks to food security. 
Awareness of this overarching concern can provide a foun-
dation for a joint dialogue at the interface among national 
and international actors and local populations about priori-
ties for climate change adaptation. 
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2. WAter56 
Water is not only a necessity for life but also a critical input 
in nearly every type of economic activity, from farming to 
industry to energy production. 
Yet despite its importance, it is often badly managed. It 
is a set of contradictions in that it is scarce (in some places), 
cheap (for some), and wasted in large quantities. Given its 
very unequal distribution across the globe, water manage-
ment needs to address the specific situation in each region.
The primary use of managed water is agriculture, which 
takes 70% of water withdrawn from rivers and groundwa-
ter and an even higher percentage of consumptive water 
use. Other uses include manufacturing and power-gener-
ating operations (22%) as well as direct use by households 
and businesses (8%).57 Its management is buffeted by de-
mographic changes, economic development, urbanization, 
changing consumption patterns and diets, changing politi-
cal priorities, environmental degradation, disasters, con-
flict, climate change, and demand for biofuels. 
Projections simulating the interplay of these stresses are 
alarming. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment estimat-
ed that up to 25% of global freshwater use exceeds long-
term accessible supplies and is maintained only through 
engineered water transfers or overabstraction of ground-
water sources. However, there is little information about 
the effects of water scarcity on ecosystems and the services 
they provide. The 2006 Human Development Report esti-
mated that by 2025 up to 3 billion people will live in water-
stressed countries. Today up to one-third of world popula-
tion is subject to water scarcity, depending on the definition 
of water scarcity.
Climate change impacts on water resources
Climate change often exacerbates water problems; it can 
have a multiplier effect on other factors affecting water re-
sources, as when climate change causes desertification in 
the Sahel, which causes overgrazing in some areas, which 
then suffer rapid runoff and flooding. The melting of gla-
ciers in the Andes and Himalayas will first cause increased 
volumes in rivers and flooding and then seriously decreased 
flows. Climate change effects can be classified according to 
their impacts on the following:58 
▶ Rainfall, runoff, stream flow, groundwater recharge, 
water availability from changes in annual averages;
▶ Variability and extremes, floods and droughts, more in-
tense and more frequent storms; 
▶ Temperature – resulting in aridity, increasing evapora-
tion and irrigation water demand, glacier and snow melt, 
loss of storage, change in water quality;
▶ Sea level changes – resulting in impacts on estuaries, 
deltas, and seawater intrusion into groundwater aquifers; 
and
▶ Plant water use efficiency from changes in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration.
These impacts affect mainly the poor in the poorest 
countries and will continue to do so at an accelerating rate. 
Hence it is not surprising that water resources management 
is the second highest priority in the list of urgent and imme-
diate needs identified by least developed countries (LDCs) 
in the National Communications and National Adaptation 
Programs of Action prepared in the context of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
While water management presents many technical and 
scientific challenges, the social and political are perhaps the 
most difficult. The main challenge in water resource man-
agement is allocation: who gets how much, how and when 
delivered, and of what quality.
Water is probably the world’s most intensely contested 
natural resource. Even in reasonably water-abundant places, 
the poor tend to get less than their share – and less than 
they need – in terms of quantity, quality, and reliability. 
When resources diminish, the most powerful user groups 
make sure that their share is not diminished, less power-
ful groups may have to settle for less, and the poor get the 
worst deal of all. 
The rural poor can be catastrophically affected by re-
duced availability of irrigation water (or if rainfed agricul-
ture ceases to be viable, by the lack of an irrigation alter-
56 We would like to thank Tighe Geoghegan and Holger Hoff for valu-
able inputs and comments on this section. 
57 N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge, UK:  
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
58 R. Lenton, “Integrated Water Resources Management and Climate 
Adaptation,” presented at International Conference on Climate 
Change Adaptation for Land and Water Management, Copenhagen, 
12 November 2008.
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native). Reductions in water quantity and quality can have 
enormous health impacts on the urban poor. 
The issue of power has been associated with water since 
the beginning of civilization, which began with water man-
agement. Hegemonial relationships in transboundary riv-
ers lead to unequal and inefficient water sharing and alloca-
tions. It will become an increasingly important issue as the 
effects of climate change increase. 
Managing water resources in a changing climate
History can no longer guide future water management, 
given the severe effects projected under climate change.59
Water management has long been addressed as a sectoral 
issue at the state level through the creation of national wa-
ter management agencies. Over the past two decades, this 
approach has been replaced in theory by a more decentral-
ized and participatory approach in which the concept of in-
tegrated water resources management (IWRM) is central. 
The principles of this paradigm were proposed at the 1992 
International Conference on Water and the Environment in 
Dublin and later agreed at the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development in Rio. 
The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
called for all countries to develop IWRM and water effi-
ciency plans by 2005. To date only about 25% of countries 
have prepared plans, indicating little political buy-in.60
Three main lessons seem to emerge from experience 
with water sector reforms and IWRM plans (and similar 
integrated approaches for watershed and coastal zone man-
agement):61  
▶ Irrespective of climate change consideration, water sec-
tors remain weak in most developing countries.62 
▶ Focus on national plans and targets should be shifted to 
focus on processes that link local practices to national 
and international institutions and policies, an extremely 
complex undertaking. 
▶ Engineering solutions – infrastructure for water storage 
and transfers as well as desalinization – must be conceiv-
ed to include the maintenance of ecosystem services.
An overriding problem with IWRM has been its failure 
to robustly incorporate equity and sustainability objec-
tives. Because of the power issues around water and the 
centrality of water access to the livelihoods of the poor, this 
is a fundamental flaw in the concept. Privatization and the 
introduction of cost-based approaches to water manage-
ment have had severe impacts on the poor in many parts 
of the world. As scarcity drives the cost of water up, the 
consequences grow worse, especially when the needs of the 
poor (equity) and the environmental services they depend 
on (sustainability) are not part of the equation and begin to 
conflict with one another. 
IWRM makes great sense as an overall ideal, but its 
elaboration has reveled its technocratic complexity, which 
has made it all but impossible to implement in most of the 
developing world. Even South Africa, committed to IWRM 
and possessing enormous water management technical 
capacity, has been overwhelmed by its demands. Thus, few 
countries have completed IWRM plans, and virtually none 
has implemented one to a significant degree. 
A key priority for sustainable development and effective 
climate adaptation is increasing equity in water laws and 
their implementation. Unless that is in place, any efforts to 
improve the management of water in response to climate 
change are likely to simply assure that the share going to 
the most powerful does not change.
Agriculture and coastal zone management are particular-
ly important in managing water resources in light of climate 
change. Experts concur that faulty policies lie behind most 
examples of water scarcity in agriculture: low priorities for 
water policies, inadequate and inadequately targeted in- 
vestment, insufficient human capacity, ineffective institu-
tions, and poor governance. New and innovative water 
management thinking would assure enough water to feed 
59 P. C. D. Milly, J. Betancourt, M. Falkenmark, R. M. Hirsch, Z. W. 
Kundzewicz, D. P. Lettenmaier, and R. J. Stouffer, “Stationarity 
Is Dead: Whither Water Management?” Science. vol. 319. no. 5863 
(2008), pp. 573–74.
60 T. Geoghegan, “Managing Water Resources for Pro-poor Growth in 
a Changing World,” DfID Water Resources Policy Background Paper 
(London: Department for International Development, 2008). 
61 Integrated watershed development and management and integrated 
coastal zone management are conceptually close to integrated water 
resources management. 
62 For example, a severely water-scarce country such as Niger has a 
water law that only covers water from a drinking water perspective. 
See G. Björklund, “Freshwater in NAPAs and Climate Adaptation in 
Freshwater Planning,” prepared for the UN Development Programme 
Water Governance Facility (Stockholm: 2009). 
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the world now and in the future. However, it should also 
be recognized that several countries, in particular those lo-
cated in Central and Western Asia and North Africa, are 
reaching the threshold of absolute water scarcity so that 
domestic water resources cannot produce enough food for 
their populations.63 Climate change in those regions will 
accelerate this process.
Such new thinking should take climate change into ac-
count, recognize and exploit the potential of green water (soil 
moisture, as opposed to blue water, which refers to lakes, 
rivers, and aquifers), consider rainwater as the key resource, 
acknowledge that irrigation will not be the magic bullet 
solution, and invest in the protection of ecosystem services. 
Coastal zones are the areas most vulnerable to sea-lev-
el rise triggered by climate change. The direct impacts of 
sea-level rise include inundation, exacerbation of flood-
ing, beach erosion, and saltwater intrusion into rivers and 
groundwater aquifers. Adaptive measures in coastal zones 
include increased height of infrastructure, land use plan-
ning, change in livelihoods, and resettlement. 
Adaptive water management from local  
to global level
Water resources management can be seen as the thread that 
runs up and down different levels from the local to the global.64 
At the community level, the main issue is how to support local-
ized water resources approaches that are adapting to climate 
variability and change. Concrete actions would include:65  
▶ Development of rainfed agricultural systems that are 
easy to operate and maintain locally;
▶ Improved management of soil moisture in rainfed areas;
▶ Increased investment in water harvesting, small storage, 
and supplementary irrigation schemes;
▶ Small community-based irrigation schemes;
▶ Development of water supply to meet the needs of multi-
ple and diverse water users;
▶ Improved water access for livestock in arid and semiarid 
areas; and
▶ Other actions such as demand management, conjunctive 
surface and groundwater management, payments for en-
vironmental services, and so on. 
At the national level, the main challenge is to provide 
the enabling environment that supports local actions, and 
in particular to:66  
▶ Integrate climate variability and climate change in water 
policy frameworks;
▶ Encourage an integrated approach in water management 
planning that cuts across land, agriculture, and mining 
sectors, taking into account water productivities as a 
basis for reallocations;
▶ Diversify economies and incomes;
▶ Support the decentralization of water resources manage-
ment (or focus on catchments and river basins);
▶ Ensure that climate risk information is available and 
used to inform water planning strategies; and
▶ Empower communities to engage with local and national 
governments to help meet their water needs. 
At the regional level, the focus should be on defining 
transboundary water management arrangements. By its 
nature, water resource management is located at the level 
of the basin or catchment area that rarely corresponds with 
political or administrative boundaries. About 40% of peo-
ple live within the basins of international rivers, and about 
90% of people live in countries that share these basins. 
Transboundary water management is costly and resource-
intensive but can yield tremendous benefits (e.g., regional 
peace and stability).
At the international level, the donor community needs 
to reorient its financial assistance toward supporting coun-
tries in water management actions to increase water’s con-
tribution to development in the context of risk and change. 
Key areas include support to development of hydrological 
monitoring systems and public goods that are unlikely to 
appeal to commercial investors, such as infrastructure for 
flood control.67 With changing climate, patterns of crop wa-
ter productivity change, and intra- and interregional virtual 
water trade may become more relevant.
63 J. Rockström, M. Falkenmark, L. Karlberg, H. Hoff, S. Rost, and D. 
Gerten, “Future Water Availability for Global Food Production: The 
Potential of Green Water for Increasing Resilience to Global Change,” 
Water Resources Research, 45 (2009). 
64 Lenton, op. cit. note 58.
65 M. Hedger and J. Cacouris, Separate Streams? Adapting Water Re-
sources Management to Climate Change (Teddington, UK: Tearfund, 
2008). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Geoghegan, op. cit. note 60.
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68 This appendix is based on a 2008 background paper to the  
Commission by V. Galaz, F. Moberg, T. E. Downing, F. Thomalla,  
and K. Warner, “Ecosystem under Pressure,” available at  
www.ccdcommission.org. 
ices and impacts of climate change. More than 90% of the 
people exposed to disasters live in the developing world, 
and more than half of disaster deaths occur in countries 
with a low Human Development Index. Within communi-
ties at risk, some people and social groups are more vulner-
able than others. 
Many poor and marginalized people, such as farm labor-
ers and fishers, depend directly on ecosystem services for 
their livelihoods. They may be subsistence farmers; they 
may fish and sell some of the catch or depend on fish for 
much of their protein; they may hunt and gather in forests 
or common lands; they may work for wealthier farmers, 
and thus floods or droughts would affect their incomes. 
These people are particularly vulnerable to changes in en-
vironmental conditions and factors that may limit their ac-
cess to resources. If the vulnerability of ecosystems to the 
impacts of climate change is not reduced, poverty is likely 
to increase and the likelihood of achieving the MDGs will 
diminish. This raises the issue of trade-offs between the 
adaptive capacities of people and ecosystems. However, it 
is often possible to increase both at once. 
Also, living off the resources provided by ecosystems 
takes certain skills. If climate change, sea-level rise, or 
ecosystem deterioration force people to migrate, they might 
lack the specific local knowledge needed for adaptive man-
agement of resources in their new locations. Such migrants 
might be driven to place further stresses on ecosystems 
through deforestation or overexploitation of water resourc-
es, which could result in secondary environmental crises. 
At the same time their movement would release stress in 
their region of origin, which could become a new green 
area (e.g., the Mossi plateau in Burkina Faso or coastal area 
of Gabon). So migration could reduce burdens on ecosys-
tems in one region and yet increase them in another. (See 
Migration, Appendix 7.)
Vulnerability complexes
The emergence and recombination of stresses at different 
temporal, economic, social, and institutional scales cause 
vulnerability complexes that are the result of interactions be-
tween ecosystem change and human activity. Vulnerability 
complexes threaten human welfare and security in a range 
of ways; for example: 
▶ In the Lesotho highlands, overgrazing and loss of wet-
3. NAturAl reSourCeS, ForeStS, 
 AND treeS68 
Ecosystems provide services that support human beings 
and their complex civilizations, including protecting peo-
ple and their systems from climate-related disasters. 
Mangroves can dampen the effects of storm surges, and 
wetlands can decrease the impacts of floods and droughts. 
Coral reefs underpin local shore protection, fisheries, and 
tourism and are a vital source of food and income in many 
regions of the developing world. 
Ecosystem services include water and air purification, 
flood and erosion control, generation of fertile soils, detoxi-
fication of wastes, regulation of climate, and pollination of 
crops. Thus they contribute a great deal to national econo-
mies, particularly in poor tropical countries, a contribution 
usually underestimated by governments. 
Many of the changes people have wrought on ecosys-
tems, such as converting forests to croplands, have brought 
great benefits to society – including enhancing the capa-
city to adapt to climate change. Yet such changes may have 
gone too far too fast, as today some two-thirds of all ecosys-
tem services are degraded or unsustainable. If unchecked, 
this deterioration – also caused by population growth, 
urbanization, and the global market’s thirst for resources 
– will substantially diminish the benefits that future gen-
erations obtain from ecosystems. 
Yet managing and restoring ecosystems and their serv-
ices can be a powerful tool in both adaptation and mitiga-
tion. Some 20% of carbon emissions come from clearing or 
degrading forests, especially in the tropics. This is roughly 
as much each year as all the CO2 emitted by all the fossil 
energy used in the United States. Keeping forests and other 
natural ecosystems intact can make the lives of the poor 
more resilient while decreasing the release of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs).
Regions facing the greatest challenges in achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) also face the 
greatest potential harm related to loss of ecosystem serv-
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lands, climate change, and human displacement are 
interacting to create feedbacks pushing the human-envi-
ronment system toward increased vulnerability. 
▶ Loss of forest cover, construction of water systems, 
urbanization, and demographic change can intersect 
with climate change to cause diseases spread from ani-
mals to humans, such as severe acute respiratory syn-
drome and the West Nile virus. 
Governments and international agencies need systems 
for monitoring changes in ecosystems – both those caused 
by climate change and those wrought by land use change 
and the withdrawal of water. Properly organized, local peo-
ple can play an important role in this monitoring and re-
porting and can be an effective early warning system. 
Such monitoring would help governments understand 
potential vulnerability complexes and win-win policy syn-
ergies (particularly between ecosystem management and 
climate adaptation and mitigation). 
Especially forests
Appropriate forestry activities in the developing world 
could play an important role in reducing GHG emissions 
cost-effectively, especially over the next 10–20 years. A 
range of estimates indicates that the cost of forest protec-
tion in some parts of the world is far less than the cost per 
ton of more expensive means of reducing CO2 emissions. 
Reducing tropical deforestation would cut GHG emis-
sions, and planting trees sequesters carbon, as growing 
trees soak up CO2. 
However, if policy makers wait 10–20 years before cre-
ating effective incentives for compensating those who pro-
tect tropical forests, the forests and the approximately 300 
billion tons of carbon they hold will be gone.
Tropical forest nations are unlikely to agree to manda-
tory caps on emissions in the near future, so a policy mech-
anism is needed to compensate them for emissions reduc-
tions achieved. A promising approach is to give credits for 
verified emissions reductions against a national baseline, 
credits that could then be used for compliance in cap-and-
trade programs in the European Union (and eventually, 
perhaps, the United States). This proposal, known as Re-
ducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-
dation (REDD), would encourage emissions reductions in 
tropical forest nations while helping to manage the costs of 
compliance in countries that take on economy-wide caps.
At the same time, REDD crediting would help the car-
bon market to create a powerful incentive for the protection 
of tropical forests. Over time, this approach could be sup-
plemented with credits for rigorously verified and meas-
ured sequestration by afforestation and changes in forest 
management.
However, there is a danger that if forests are planted and 
managed only to sequester carbon, they will cease to offer 
to the poor – and the rest of the planet – the many ecosys-
tem services discussed earlier, many of which are crucial in 
providing food and shelter.
In many parts of the world, non-timber forest products 
contribute to varied diets and incomes. Here again, the 
local, national, and international interfaces inherent in 
market forces are a major part of the equation. 
There are increasing demands for non-timber for-
est products (particularly from Asian consumers, such as 
China), and consumers in the West are paying premium 
prices for “bird-friendly coffee,” timber from sustainably 
managed forests, and other products that contribute to bio-
diversity. 
While promising, relatively little is known about who 
wins and who loses from these changing market factors. 
When a traditional product that has been collected for cen-
turies in the forest becomes a commercial commodity, it 
can create new livelihoods and shore up existing survival 
strategies, but it may also reduce local access to traditional 
foods and may lead to overexploitation of common proper-
ty resources. Payments for ecosystem services can provide 
important financial flows to rural areas, but they may also 
promote less labor-intensive farming systems and fewer 
jobs. Ethical climate change mitigation efforts must take 
into account the positive and negative externalities with 
respect to food and livelihood security as ecosystem serv-
ices are increasingly commoditized and managed through 
more-formal systems.
The Forest Dialogue (TFD), a multistakeholder initiative 
with 250 representatives of business, trade unions, forestry 
companies, governments, and local and indigenous peo-
ples, argues that treating forests only as “sticks of carbon” 
will fail, as such treatment does not take into account the 
human dimensions just discussed. However, if based on 
sustainable forest management principles, a REDD mecha-
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nism could have mitigation, adaptation, and development 
benefits. Most important of all is to recognize the impor-
tance of forest governance and secure tenure. 
In October 2008, TFD issued a Statement on Forests and 
Climate Change, aimed primarily at climate change nego-
tiators, saying “forests have a unique ability to simultane-
ously reduce greenhouse gas emissions, capture carbon 
and lessen the vulnerability of people and ecosystems to 
climate change.”69 Their declaration contained six main 
principles: 
▶ Ensure that forest-related action for climate change miti-
gation and adaptation complement and give impetus to 
sustainable development;
▶ Tackle the main drivers of deforestation, which mostly 
lie outside the forest sector;
▶ Recognize and remove barriers to transparent, inclusive, 
and accountable forest governance;
▶ Respect and support local processes that clarify and 
strengthen tenure, property, and carbon rights;
▶ Support balanced approaches to mitigation and adapta-
tion strategies in both forest-rich and forest-poor coun-
tries; and
▶ Provide substantial additional funding to build the 
capacity of countries, communities, and forest manag-
ers and owners to participate in forest-related climate 
change mitigation and adaptation initiatives.
TFD said projects and forestry management should aim 
to curb poverty, strengthen land rights, safeguard indig-
enous peoples, and improve forest management, and that 
these should not be a substitute for deep cuts in industrial 
emissions of greenhouse gases by rich nations.
69 The Forest Dialogue, Beyond REDD: The Role of Forests in Climate 
Change (New Haven, CT: 2008).
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70 This appendix is based on a 2009 background paper to the Commis-
sion by L. Nerlander, health specialist, Red Cross/Red Crescent Cli-
mate Centre, “Health and Climate Change,” available at www.ccd-
commission.org.   
71 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate  
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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Forceful health adaptation strategies are needed to protect 
the world’s most vulnerable people from the effects of cli-
mate change. 
Public health planning and decision making need to 
shift from focusing only on relatively short-term risks to 
the projected long-term impacts of climate change. It will 
be increasingly important to address the links between cli-
mate and health at different timescales. Already today we 
need to be better at dealing with climate variability and its 
related health effects. Improving our capacity to prepare 
and respond – through using, for example, early warning 
systems and seasonal forecasts – will put us in a better po-
sition to address the challenges that climate change will 
bring. Long-term climate projections will be increasingly 
important to ensure that we are prepared for risks chang-
ing over time when planning resource allocation, building 
infrastructure, and ensuring that surveillance systems are 
able to detect changing patterns of disease. 
Health often depends on activities in other sectors. 
To ensure that the health effects of climate change are not 
overlooked, the health sector needs to be involved when 
activities and policies are considered in strategic planning 
in sectors such as water, agriculture, and disaster manage-
ment. This includes ensuring the integration of health con-
cerns into such efforts as National Adaptation Programs of 
Action.
Reducing vulnerabilities and increasing resilience in 
general will help people cope with the health effects of cli-
mate change. This includes strengthening health systems 
and ensuring adequate water and sanitation facilities for all. 
Many needed measures are no-regret options that may 
contribute to better health even without the threat of cli-
mate change. Still, health budgets are finite, and there may 
be greater benefits to investing in prevention of other health 
risks. Not all health risks due to climate change will manifest 
everywhere, and in the interests of prioritization, it is im-
portant to conduct location-specific adaptation assessments. 
Extreme events
Flooding and storms increase the risk of deaths and non-
fatal injuries. Mental health effects such as depression and 
anxiety after extreme events have been reported and may 
result in prolonged impairment.71 Flooding has implica-
tions for other health effects such as the risk of diarrheal 
disease and outbreaks of vector-borne diseases. 
To deal with the health effects of extreme events, the 
health sector must be engaged in disaster preparedness ac-
tivities at all levels: international, regional, national, local, 
and community. 
Better use should be made of existing early warning 
information on all timescales, and new, easily accessible 
tools must be developed. Early warning systems must be 
coupled with plans of action – incorporating both disaster 
management and health expertise. This is an area where na-
tional and local governments, humanitarian organizations, 
and national and regional meteorological institutes should 
all play a role, down to the community level. Short-term 
weather forecasts and seasonal forecasts should be used to 
plan for the coming weeks and the season ahead. This will 
allow for early action in terms of procurement and pre-po-
sitioning of stocks and giving health prevention messages 
to communities. 
Early warning tools should be developed by meteorol-
ogy services with different end-users in mind, including 
local humanitarian agencies. Such systems should ideally 
be developed with the users, with particular attention to de-
veloping and packaging the information in a way that truly 
helps the decision-making process. Specific efforts need to 
be made to “bridge” the knowledge gap between the weath-
er scientists and the operational humanitarian sector. 
It is also important to reduce underlying vulnerabilities 
through measures such as improving water and sanitation 
infrastructure, health systems, and building design, as dis-
cussed in more detail later in this Appendix. 
Direct effects of heat exposure
Climate change is expected to increase average tempera-
tures as well as the number and intensity of heat waves, 
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Diarrheal diseases
High temperatures, water scarcity, and water abundance 
resulting from flooding or heavy precipitation are related to 
diarrheal diseases. After a flood, rates of diarrheal disease, 
including cholera, may increase, especially in areas where 
sanitation facilities are poor. Heavy rainfall, even without 
flooding, may increase rates of diarrheal disease when la-
trines or sewage systems overflow. Increases in soil run-off 
may contaminate water sources. With heavy precipitation 
events expected to become more common, rates of diarrheal 
diseases may increase, and it is likely that the most vulner-
able populations will suffer the greatest burden. 
Water scarcity, on the other hand, is also likely to have 
consequences for public health. A lack of availability of water 
for personal hygiene and food washing may lead to an in-
crease in diarrheal disease and other diseases associated 
with poor hygiene. Cholera outbreaks in the Amazon have 
been linked to low river flows in the dry season, which may 
be due to pathogen concentration in pools.75 A high concen-
tration of pathogens may also overload water treatment 
plants.76
High temperatures are an independent risk factor for 
increased rates of diarrheal diseases, including salmonella 
and cholera.77 Cholera outbreaks in coastal areas of Bang-
ladesh have been linked with sea surface temperature and 
an abundance of plankton, which are thought to be an envi-
ronmental reservoir for the cholera pathogen.78
The better the health care sector is at dealing with cur-
rent climate variability and extremes today, the better pre-
pared it will be for increased variability brought about by 
climate change. 
Ensuring a better baseline level of water and sanitation 
which are associated with increases in morbidity and mor-
tality in the short term, especially in populations who are 
not adapted to extremely hot weather.72 Specific risk groups 
include not only those with respiratory and cardiovascular 
disorders and the elderly, but also physically and mentally 
handicapped and other groups not capable of caring for 
themselves during an extreme event. 
The 2003 summer heat wave in Europe showed that even 
high-income countries are vulnerable to extreme weather 
events, and although many deaths occurred among the eld-
erly and ill, some of the deaths were associated with occu-
pational exposure to heat. In South Asia, heat waves have 
been associated with high mortality in rural populations as 
well as among the elderly and laborers who work out-
doors.73 
Hot working environments also have non-fatal implica-
tions. Heat exposure increases the risk of accidents. Hot 
working environments may decrease the ability to carry out 
physical tasks as well as have implications for doing mental 
tasks. Prolonged heat exposure may lead to heat exhaus-
tion or heatstroke. In addition to the implications for health 
and well-being, climate change may through exposure of 
workers to heat stress have important direct effects on pro-
ductivity.74
Early warning systems for heat waves are in operation in 
many countries, including some in Asia, and these must be 
coupled with concrete action plans with activities through-
out many different sectors. Individuals, the health sector, 
and care homes as well as civil society organizations must 
be made aware of what actions need to be taken, so that 
the protection of the most vulnerable can be safeguarded. 
Strong networks of information distribution and outreach 
in communities will play a vital role in implementing such 
a strategy.
With regards to longer-term planning, the risk of an in-
creased frequency and intensity of heat waves and higher 
average temperatures should be taken into account during 
the design of homes and work environments. Urban areas 
tend to have higher temperatures during hot weather, and 
this urban heat island effect should be taken into account 
for future city planning. The adverse effects of occupation-
al exposure to heat waves and high average temperatures 
may have implications for labor regulations. 
72 R. S. Kovats and K. L. Ebi, “Heatwaves and Public Health in Europe,” 
European Journal of Public Health, vol. 16 (2006), pp. 592–99.
73 IPCC, op. cit. note 71.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
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infrastructure and increasing awareness of the importance 
of hygiene are measures that are key to reducing a com-
munity’s vulnerability to extreme weather events and more 
long-term changes in average water availability or average 
temperatures. The need to improve sanitation and access 
to safe water is a target in one of the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, and efforts to achieve this must take place 
at local, national, and international levels. These are clear 
examples of no-regrets measures. 
Planning for gradual changes in average water availabil-
ity requires many sectors to work together, ensuring that 
health concerns are represented at the table by water man-
agers and city planners. Plans need to be developed to en-
sure water availability throughout the year in areas where 
precipitation is expected to increase in the rainy season 
and decrease in the dry season. Long-term adaptive invest-
ments in infrastructure, in particular the capacity of water 
treatment plants and water run-off structures in urban en-
vironments, are often needed to handle changes in seasonal 
precipitation patterns and extreme water-related events. 
As regards extreme events, the use of early warning systems 
mentioned earlier could allow the health sectors to pre-position 
stocks, enabling water purification, and to provide hygiene edu-
cation to communities at risk. This applies to extremes of rain-
fall in general as well as to flooding in particular. 
Vector-borne diseases
The geographical and temporal distributions as well as the 
incidence of many vector-borne diseases such as malaria 
and dengue are sensitive to temperature and rainfall. Rep-
lication rates of the vectors or pathogens can be sensitive to 
temperature. Changes in precipitation patterns can alter the 
number of breeding sites available or the way people store 
water, creating breeding sites. Climate factors may not be 
equally important determinants of disease rates in all re-
gions. There is still considerable uncertainty with regards 
to how climate change may alter the temporal and spatial 
patterns of many vector-borne diseases.79
The distributions of these diseases are influenced by 
other factors, such as urbanization, land use, socioeconom-
ic development, population movement, and levels of immu-
nity within the population.80
In some areas, drought may reduce the transmission 
of some mosquito-borne diseases, leading to a reduction 
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 J. DaSilva, B. Garanganga, V. Teveredzi, M. Marx, J. Mason, and J. 
Connor, “Improving Epidemic Malaria Planning, Preparedness and 
Response in Southern Africa,” Malaria Journal, vol. 3 (2004), p. 37.
83 IPCC, op. cit. note 71.
84 K. Ebi and I. Burton, “Identifying Practical Adaptation Options: An 
Approach to Address Climate Change-Related Health Risks,” Envi-
ronmental Science and Policy (2008), pp. 359–69.
in the proportion of immune people and therefore a larg-
er amount of susceptible people once the drought breaks. 
After a flood, rates of vector-borne diseases such as malaria 
can increase as mosquitoes breed in stagnant or slow-mov-
ing pools of water. The relationship is complex, however, 
as floods can also wash away breeding sites. Outbreaks of 
various rodent-borne diseases, like leptospirosis, are com-
monly reported in the aftermath of flooding.81
Adapting to climate change means getting better at vec-
tor control, detection, and treatment, paying special atten-
tion to the most vulnerable populations. Particular efforts 
need to be made to improve surveillance systems. 
There are few early warning systems for vector-borne 
diseases in operational use. One example includes southern 
Africa, where malaria is sensitive to rainfall and where an 
early warning system puts together seasonal rainfall fore-
casts with data on population vulnerability and coverage of 
prevention activities.82 An early warning system needs to 
be coupled with an action plan to be effective. 
Even if no early warning system exists, the health sec-
tor still needs to be prepared for the distribution of vector-
borne diseases to change. These changes may occur in 
terms of intensity of transmission, geographical distribu-
tion, or temporal distribution (i.e., the time of year that 
transmission takes place).83 In order for health authorities 
to be aware of these changes, it is crucial that good surveil-
lance systems are in place. To ensure this, a good public 
health infrastructure with access to primary health care 
and adequate laboratory facilities and reporting systems 
are required.84 
Diagnosis and reporting should be standardized, to be 
able to use and compare data between different locations 
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Exposure to high levels of ground-level ozone, for ex-
ample, which is formed from the exhaust of transport ve-
hicles, can exacerbate respiratory diseases such as chronic 
obstructive airways disease and asthma, leading to hospital 
admissions or increased mortality.88 The number of forest 
and bush fires may increase as certain regions face longer 
periods of extreme dry conditions, and such fires can con-
tribute to air pollution. The direction and magnitude of the 
effects of climate change on air pollution levels are, however, 
highly uncertain, and there will be regional variations.89 
National energy policies and transport policies should 
take into account the health effects of air pollution, and ear-
ly warning systems for high levels of air pollution can be 
implemented. Reducing emissions from transport vehicles 
is a win-win solution, contributing both to the improvement 
of health and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Meningitis
The spatial distribution, intensity of transmission, and sea-
sonality of meningococcal meningitis in the semiarid areas 
of sub-Saharan Africa have been linked to climatic factors, 
particularly drought and hot, dry, and dusty conditions, al-
though the causal mechanism is not clear. An early warn-
ing system is under development.
Health systems
Adequate health infrastructure with universal access to 
primary health is crucial to reducing a population’s vulner-
ability to the impacts of changing patterns of diseases due 
to climate change. 
A well-functioning health system not only provides treat- 
ment; together with laboratory services and standardized 
diagnosis and reporting systems, it is a crucial component of 
and over time. Existing surveillance systems should be re-
viewed in order to identify indicators that could be used for 
identifying and assessing climate-related health risks and 
the effectiveness of actions.85 Vector surveillance should 
also be carried out.86 Authorities and humanitarian organi-
zations need to know when diseases re-emerge or emerge 
in new places and when they appear at higher rates or at 
different times of the year. 
Plans must be in place for what to do if patterns are 
changing, such as alerting health services, starting vector 
control measures, and providing education and awareness 
around how to prevent exposure to the vector and when to 
seek care. Many humanitarian groups and NGOs rely on 
government data to plan their activities, which means that 
good surveillance systems will have benefits beyond the 
state sector. 
The above action needs to take place at the national level 
but to be integrated within regional systems, as exemplified 
by the European Centre for Disease Control, as well as in-
ternational systems such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO). These steps of integration will serve, among other 
things, to ensure that early warning is given to neighbor-
ing countries of emerging outbreaks or diseases that can 
be spread by international travel. Still, the building blocks 
of a functioning surveillance system – primary health care, 
laboratories, and reporting systems – need to be found at 
the national level. The implementation of the WHO In-
ternational Health Regulations is expected to improve the 
situation.87
Using the early warning systems for extreme events can 
also help prepare for any increased risk of vector-borne 
diseases after flooding or heavy rainfall. Also, here it is 
important that the health sector works closely with the dis-
aster management sector in planning for and responding to 
disasters. 
Health effects of air quality
The formation of many air pollutants is determined in part 
by climate factors such as temperature and humidity. In ad-
dition, the transport and dispersion of air pollutants away 
from source regions are strongly affected by weather fac-
tors. Climate change may therefore influence pollutant con-
centrations, which in turn may affect health, as air pollu-
tion is related to cardio-respiratory health. 
85 World Health Organization (WHO), “Climate Change and Health:  
Report by the Secretariat,” EB 124/11 (Geneva: 20 November 2008). 
86 K. Ebi, “Public Health Responses to the Risks of Climate Variability 
and Change in the United States,” Journal of Occupational and Envi-
ronmental Medicine, vol. 51, no. 1 (2009), pp. 4–12.
87 IPCC, op. cit. note 71.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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a national surveillance system. Health professionals must be 
better trained to understand the potential impacts of climate 
change on health. One of the main challenges that health 
systems face in many developing countries today is that 
qualified health professionals leave to work abroad.
Improving health systems is another clear no-regrets op-
tion for adaptation, and it should include efforts to extend 
services to the most vulnerable populations. Climate change 
must also be taken into account when designing health sys-
tems, such as, for example, ensuring that health stations are 
built in areas that are accessible even during floods.90
Health effects of adaptation and mitigation
Activities carried out in order to adapt to climate change 
can in some cases lead to additional health risks. 
Examples include the construction of dams for water 
storage, which may provide breeding sites for disease-trans-
mitting mosquitoes. Irrigation of land currently contributes 
to the spread of malaria and schistosomiasis. The practice 
of using wastewater for agricultural irrigation may also be-
come increasingly common in times of water scarcity, leading 
to increased risks of diarrheal diseases and intestinal worms 
for populations living in close proximity to irrigated land.91 
These risks highlight the need for an integrated risk 
assessment during the development of new policies at the 
national or local level, taking into account the possible 
health effects and how to reduce these risks. However, it is 
likely that many such practices will take place informally, 
so that national regulations may not be as effective.
It is very likely that efforts to reduce emissions of green-
house gases will have substantial co-benefits for health in 
terms of reducing pollutants that contribute to cardio-res-
piratory diseases. Transport policies that promote cycling 
and walking could reduce both GHG emissions and air pol-
lution and accident risk, while increasing physical activity. 
Better insulation of houses in cold climates is likely to re-
duce both energy consumption and cold-related morbidity 
and mortality.92 
There are therefore significant win-win options that can 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions as well as contribute to 
better health, and such policies should be favored when 
choosing strategies.93 
Summary
We need to do more of some things we are already doing: 
focusing on building resilience and strengthening public 
health systems at all levels while paying particular atten-
tion to the most vulnerable in society. Some things need to 
be done differently, such as developing more user-friendly 
early warning systems, using information at multiple time-
scales, strengthening the health sector’s involvement in 
planning in other sectors, and looking for win-win solu-
tions that benefit health and reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Overall, there needs to be more focus on how to 
better deal with short-term climate variability, as well as 
planning how to ensure that systems remain resilient and 
adaptable to changing risks in the longer term. 
Climate change does not create new health hazards. 
Instead it acts as a multiplier of existing health problems and 
changes the location of health concerns. Therefore, a cost- 
effective and prompt way of handling climate change adap-
tation is to add the climate dimension into existing interna-
tional or community-based programs and actions. For more 
long-term adaptive strategies, cross-sectoral approaches 
are needed.
Finally, further research is needed on the links between 
climate and health and on projected effects, as well as on 
the most effective adaptation measures. 
90 R. Few, M. Ahern, F. Matthies, and S. Kovats, Floods, Health and  
Climate Change: A Strategic Review, Working Paper 63 (Norwich, UK: 
Tyndall Centre of Climate Change Research. 2004).
91 WHO, “WHO Guidelines for the Safe Use of Wastewater, Excreta and 
Greywater. Wasterwater Use in Agriculture. II” (Geneva: 2006).
92 C. Campbell-Lendrum and C. Corvalán, “Climate Change and Devel-
oping Country Cities: Implications for Environmental Health and  
Equity,” Journal of Urban Health vol. 84, 3 Suppl (2007), pp. i109–17. 
93 IPCC, op. cit. note 71.
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economic development, reductions in energy demand and 
a subsequent decoupling between energy consumption 
and economic growth are achievable. Only a few highly 
industrialized (and smaller) countries such as Denmark 
have demonstrated clear evidence of decoupling, achieved 
through progressive policies to reduce energy consumption 
that generally include significant energy taxes.96 
Even in such cases, the issue of service versus manufac-
turing complicates the question of true decoupling, since 
the energy consumption of imported goods is not included. 
There is no evidence that even moderately industrialized 
countries, much less LDCs, can achieve such decoupling. 
Given the lack of evidence, it is unrealistic and unfair to 
expect LDCs to achieve any kind of decoupling of energy 
from economic growth and development. Aggressive ener-
gy taxation and similar policies are thus rarely appropriate 
in the LDCs due to the importance of energy in supporting 
economic development and the already disproportionate 
share of income that the poor must devote to energy costs. 
The energy access problem is particularly acute in sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia, where rural populations 
often rely exclusively on traditional biomass for their energy 
needs. Four out of five people without electricity live in ru-
ral areas of the developing world, mainly in South Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa.97 Other regions have somewhat lower 
numbers of affected people and/or face different but no 
less important challenges, such as the difficulty of provid-
ing energy access within the complex island geography of 
Indonesia or to the vast reaches of the Amazon rain forest 
in South America.
94 This appendix is based on a 2009 background paper to the Commis-
sion by F. Johnson and F. Lambe, “Energy Access, Climate and Devel-
opment,” available at www.ccdcommission.org. 
95 United Nations Development Programme, World Energy Assessment 
(New York: 2004). 
96 EUROSTAT, Panorama of Energy: Energy Statistics to Support  
EU Policies and Solutions (Brussels: European Commission, 2008). 
97 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (Paris: 2002)  
p. 365.
5. eNergy ACCeSS94  
The transition to a climate-constrained world is happening 
at a time when a large proportion of the world’s population 
lacks reliable access to modern energy services. 
Consequently, the energy transition and climate vulnera-
bility are very closely connected, as the world’s poor strug-
gle over a dwindling resource base that is being further 
degraded by the impacts of climate change. There is a need 
both to improve energy access and to link this more close-
ly to the climate agenda, the revitalization of rural areas, 
and the better management of the urban development that 
has dominated the changing energy landscape of recent 
decades. 
Energy services – the benefits or end-uses of energy 
(as opposed to energy consumption per se) – have a direct 
impact on productivity, health, education, and communica-
tion. An estimated 2 billion people lack access to modern 
energy services.95 They rely on traditional biomass sources 
such as wood, agricultural residues, and animal dung to 
meet their basic energy needs. The use of these traditional 
fuels in open fires or simple stoves is not only less efficient 
and more polluting than modern energy options, it is unre-
liable, not easily controllable, and subject to various supply 
constraints. 
The poor in developing countries therefore pay much 
more than their counterparts in the rest of the world in 
terms of health impacts, collection time, and energy quality 
for the equivalent level of energy services.
Energy is the lifeblood of the modern economy, and no 
country in modern times has substantially reduced poverty 
without a massive increase in its use of commercial energy 
and/or a shift to more-efficient energy sources that provide 
better energy services. The link extends to the capacity to 
adapt to climate change, since those countries and regions 
with lower poverty, greater levels of human development, 
and greater energy access will have more options and 
greater adaptive capacity.
However, there is significant variation in energy con-
sumption for different development levels once countries 
have moved up the energy ladder to modern energy forms 
instead of traditional biomass. Consequently, although de-
veloping countries fall along the sharply upward rising part 
of the curve, industrial countries are spread all along the 
f latter part of the curve. In the later stages of a nation’s 
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Energy services, health, and development in LDCs
In poor households in LDCs, cooking often accounts for 
90% or more of total energy demand. When burned in-
doors on open fires or inefficient stoves, fuels such as 
wood, dung, or crop residues produce levels of indoor air 
pollution many times higher than international ambient 
air quality standards allow for, exposing poor women and 
children to a major public health hazard. There is now con-
sistent evidence that biomass smoke exposure increases the 
risk of childhood acute respiratory infections, particularly 
pneumonia.98  
Women exposed to indoor smoke are three times more 
likely to suffer from chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease (COPD) than women who cook with electricity or 
gas.99  Indoor air smoke was estimated to be responsible for 
1.6 million deaths and 2.7% of the global burden of disease 
in 2000.100 Without systematic changes, household biomass 
use will result in an estimated 8.1 million deaths from lower 
respiratory infection among young children and 1.7 million 
COPD deaths among adult women in sub-Saharan Africa 
alone between 2000 and 2030.101 
The task of gathering fuelwood also falls mainly on 
women and children. The opportunity costs of spending 
several hours per day gathering fuelwood have signifi-
cant socioeconomic impacts. Using that time to engage in 
income-generating and educational activities could con-
tribute to the stability and advancement of households and 
communities. There are also personal safety risks for wom-
en and girls who must travel far by foot alone or in small 
groups. Where fuel is purchased, spending money on large 
quantities of inefficient fuels severely constrains household 
budgets. 
Access to energy for lighting is linked to economic and 
social development, as it enables home study in the eve-
nings, increases security, enables the use of information 
and communications technologies, and allows commercial 
activity to occur after dark. Without modern lighting, many 
community centers cannot be used in the evening, hinder-
ing the social development of villages and communities. 
The tangible benefits of lighting have been documented in 
many case studies; an analysis in Bangladesh found that 
over 90% of recently electrified households reported im-
provements in children’s study time, household security, and 
overall well-being.102 
The productive use of energy is essential for poverty 
reduction. At the local level, access to energy encourages 
economic development by improving productivity and ena-
bling income generation through, for example, improved 
agricultural development (irrigation, crop processing, and 
storage) and non-farm commercial activities such as micro-
enterprise development. By providing additional employ-
ment opportunities, energy services also enable farmers to 
diversify their income sources and thus alleviate the inher-
ent risks of dependence on farming. Access to mechanical 
power can improve the quality of life of women and girls by 
reducing the drudgery of food grinding and threshing, there-
by freeing young girls to pursue more regular schooling. 
In areas with sensitive ecological systems or degraded 
lands, reliance on traditional biomass fuels creates addi- 
tional pressures on the local resource base. There is a grow-
ing body of literature focusing on the potential public health 
and resource co-benefits that can be achieved by incorpo-
rating climate measures as upstream elements of energy 
systems and adaptive response mechanisms.103  
The Japanese Development Agency has formulated a 
comprehensive framework for exploiting co-benefits by 
carefully assessing different elements of projects and pro-
grams so as to combine climate initiatives with environ-
mental management or pollution reduction elements that 
98 N. Bruce, R. Perez, and R. Padilla, The Health Effects of Indoor Air 
Pollution Exposure in Developing Countries (Geneva: WHO, 2002). 
99 WHO, Fuel for Life: Household Energy and Health (Geneva: 2006).
100 WHO, Indoor Air Pollution: National Burden of Disease Estimates 
(Geneva: 2007).
101 R. Bailis, M. Ezzatti, and D. Kammen, “Health and Greenhouse  
Gas Impacts of Biomass and Fossil Fuel Energy Futures in Africa,” 
Boiling Point, no. 54 (2007), pp. 3–8.
102 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) Inter-
national Ltd., Economic and Social Impact Evaluation Study of the 
Rural Electrification Program in Bangladesh, prepared by Human 
Development Research Centre, for NRECA, Partners with the Rural 
Electrification Board of Bangladesh and USAID for the Rural Power 
for Poverty Reduction (RPPR) Program, 2002.
103 J. Patz, D. Campbell-Lendrum, H. Gibbs, and R. Woodruff,  
“Health Impact Assessment of Global Climate Change: Expanding 
on Comparative Risk Assessment Approaches for Policy Making,” 
Annual Review of Public Health, vol. 29 (2008), pp. 27–39.
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104 Overseas Environmental Cooperation Center, “Co-benefits  
Approach to Climate Change and CDM in Developing Countries  
– Towards the Achievement of Co-benefits in Environmental Pollu-
tion Control and Climate Change Mitigation” (Tokyo: 2008).
 105 Ö. Gustafsson, M. Kruså, Z. Zencak, R. J. Sheesley, L. Granat, 
E. Engström, P. S. Praveen, P. S. P. , Rao, C. Leck, and H. Rodhe, 
“Brown Clouds over South Asia: Biomass or Fossil Fuel Combus-
tion?” Science, vol. 323 (2009), pp. 495–98.
106 Y. Sokona, J. Thomas, and O, Toure, “Development and Climate, 
Country Study: Senegal” Environnement et Developpement du Tiers 
Monde (ENDA-TM, 2003), p. 36. 
107 United Nations Development Programme, Energizing the Millen-
nium Developing Goals: A Guide to Energy’s Role in Reducing  
Poverty (New York: 2005). 
108  Gustafsson et al., op. cit. note 105.
In this sense, the energy access issue naturally extends 
beyond household energy use to the issue of energy for tran- 
sport, since improved mobility contributes to adaptive capa- 
city. The availability of locally produced biofuels such as 
ethanol could create a decentralized source of energy for 
household and transportation uses, thereby contributing to 
local energy security as well as to mitigation and adaptation.
In response to the dual problems of energy poverty and 
land degradation, the government of Senegal launched a na- 
tional “butanization” program in 1974 to substitute liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) for biomass cooking fuels, particular-
ly charcoal. Through a series of energy sector reforms and 
fuel subsidies, LPG consumption was raised by an annual 
rate of 12%.106 Moreover, by 2002, it was estimated that 
replacement with LPG meant the avoidance of production 
of 337,500 metric tons of charcoal and 40,500 hectares of 
deforestation.107  
Less reliance on traditional biomass can reduce pres-
sures on the already degraded resource base and improve 
the adaptive capacity of resource-dependent communities. 
Switching from a traditional biomass fuel source (i.e., char-
coal) to a fossil fuel source (i.e., LPG) can often lead to net 
GHG reductions, a counterintuitive result. The reduction is 
due in part to the land use emissions from clearing forests 
to produce charcoal (assuming that the land is used for non-
forestry purposes after being cleared). The reductions in 
GHG emissions are even deeper, however, due to the con-
tribution of soot to the formation of atmospheric aerosols 
and subsequently GHGs.108
bring clear local and regional benefits.104 For developing coun-
tries, depending on traditional solid fuels for cooking and heat-
ing, there appears to be a high degree of co-benefit effectiveness 
for targeted interventions in the household energy sector. 
Climate dimensions and policy synergies
Until recently, there has been a tendency to separate ener-
gy access from climate change issues, both mitigation and 
adaptation. In terms of scientific research about the causes 
of climate change, traditional biomass was not considered 
an important contributor. In the domain of specific energy-
climate projects, even where some mitigation benefits were 
identified, the costs of energy access interventions were 
generally considered high, and the likelihood of success or 
sustainability were often thought to be low. In the inter-
national policy and donor communities, energy access and 
climate change have traditionally involved different actors, 
often at different levels. 
This artificial separation is changing in a number of 
ways. First, data and analysis on traditional energy use and 
its impacts have been improving. With traditional biomass 
estimated to account for almost 10% of global energy use, 
the impacts are more significant and widespread than real-
ized. Second, the complex phenomenon of black carbon has 
been analyzed in more detail, indicating that incomplete 
combustion of traditional biomass and the carbonaceous 
aerosols it produces may be posing a much greater relative 
set of GHG impacts than previously estimated.105 
Third, energy access and adaptation at the policy level 
appear to be much more amenable to exploiting synergies 
than mitigation and adaptation, which tend to involve very 
different institutions and actors. The increasing body of 
policy analysis and the greater political emphasis on ad-
aptation has brought to the fore local and subnational in-
stitutions that could help facilitate synergies in designing 
policies and programs to jointly improve energy access and 
adaptive capacity. Due to the fact that both adaptation and 
energy access have strong local and subregional character-
istics, there are many synergies yet to be exploited. Regions 
that could face more flooding or lower rainfall could build 
improved energy access policies into the same institutions 
that improve preparations for changing climatic conditions 
and could use these policies to strengthen the region’s over-
all energy security. 
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Links to climate and development goals
The head of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), Rajendra Pachauri, has lamented the “glar-
ing neglect” in improving energy access for the world’s 
poor in recent years, noting that “today energy remains the 
missing MDG.”109 Such comments are a reminder of the 
critical need for improving energy access even as energy 
consumption itself is under increased scrutiny for climate 
reasons; there is a danger that goals related to poverty re-
duction, health, and education will not be achieved without 
significant progress in scaling up energy access in LDCs. 
In the absence of specific targets for access to energy 
services stipulated as part of the Millennium Declaration, a 
few initiatives have been taken to set targets for what type 
of energy services are needed to support the achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals. One such initiative 
is the MDG Energy Vision, developed and used as part of 
the Millennium Development Project.110 
The increase in public attention to climate change dur-
ing the past decade has thus sometimes obscured the need 
to increase energy consumption in developing countries in 
order to raise their living standards and thereby improve 
their adaptive capacity. This tendency has been countered 
by the recognition that developing countries and especially 
LDCs have the right to use their emission space in any future 
climate agreement for significant increases in energy con-
sumption while industrial countries rapidly decrease their 
emissions.111 There is also an increasing body of analyses 
aimed at identifying synergies between climate and devel-
opment goals but based on a “development first” approach 
for the LDCs.112
Since most LDCs have resource-dependent economies, 
and given the need to leverage different sources of develop- 
ment assistance and support, there is an urgent need to 
link energy-development strategies to efforts to improve 
adaptive capacity. The impacts of climate change will pose 
particularly difficult challenges for households and com-
munities whose energy supplies are obtained directly from 
the ecosystem. As both agricultural and forest systems face 
greater pressures in a changing climate, local communities 
will need other energy options and alternative livelihoods. 
Supporting development strategies that diversify energy 
sources is therefore an important part of improving adap-
tive capacity in many regions.
In recent years, many developing countries in tropical 
and subtropical regions have sought to take advantage of 
a comparative advantage as modern bioenergy producers. 
Bioenergy is special among all classes of energy resources 
in representing synergies as well as conflicts with respect 
to both mitigation and adaptation goals. 
On the one hand, modern bioenergy offers excellent in- 
come opportunities and more sustainable development paths 
by replacing inefficient traditional biomass or nonrenewable 
petroleum fuels. Some bioenergy crops can even be grown 
on degraded lands unsuitable for food production and can 
improve soil quality and return the lands to productive ca-
pacity, thereby contributing to both mitigation and adapta-
tion efforts. However, when bioenergy crops encroach on 
valuable ecosystems or food crops, or when land clearing 
or transformation is used to obtain quick but unsustainable 
profits, there can be negative consequences for both mitiga-
tion and adaptive capacity. 
LDCs should incorporate domestic uses into their bioen-
ergy strategies so as to avoid the boom-and-bust cycle as-
sociated with high dependence on cash crops for export. 
Nevertheless, those LDCs wishing to significantly expand 
bioenergy and biofuels can greatly benefit from export mar-
kets due to the access to infrastructure and the economies-
of-scale that such markets afford them, in comparison to a 
generally small domestic market.113 
The development-oriented impulse to focus only on do-
mestic markets for biofuels and ignore the export market 
109 Reuters, “Energy Missing Millennium Goal-U.N. Climate Chief,”  
21 January.
110 V. Modi, S. McDade, D. Lallement, and J. Saghir, Energy and the 
Millennium Development Goals, Energy Sector Management As-
sistance Programme, United Nations Development Programme, UN 
Millennium Project, and World Bank (New York: 2006).
111 P. Bauer, T. Athanasiou, and S. Kartha, The Right to Development in 
a Climate Constrained World: The Greenhouse Development Rights 
Framework, Heinrich Böll Stiftung Publication Series on Ecology, 
Volume 1 (2008).
112 O. Davidson, K: Halsnæs, S. Huq, M. Kok, B. Metz, Y. Sokona, and 
J. Verhagen, “The Development and Climate Nexus: The Case of 
Sub-Saharan Africa,” Climate Policy, vol. 3 (2003), pp. 97–113.
113 F. Johnson and E. Matsika, 2006, “Bioenergy Trade and Regional 
Development: The Case of Bio-ethanol in Southern Africa,” Energy 
for Sustainable Development, vol. X no. 1 (March 2006).
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the East African Community, in which the energy access 
goals are incorporated into regional planning processes. 
One clear lesson from the past few decades of energy 
access programs is that electricity is not enough; other alter-
natives will be needed for many decades to come. Despite 
considerable efforts to improve energy services to rural 
populations over the past 30–40 years, about 2 billion 
people remain unserved. Poor, rural populations in devel-
oping countries are often beyond the reach of the national 
grid and do not benefit from large, centralized energy sys-
tems. There is a strong case for alternative, decentralized en-
ergy delivery systems and technologies, as well as new pol-
icy frameworks to provide essential energy services to such 
dispersed populations. These will need to include both re- 
newable options such as solar energy systems and non-
renewable options such as LPG.
Regardless of the delivery method, reaching the energy 
targets needed for achieving the MDGs will require a sub-
stantial scaling up of energy services to the poorest people 
of the world. However, the absolute amount of energy is not 
that large. The total amount of energy required has been 
estimated at 900 TWh annually, comparable to the amount 
of energy Sweden consumes in 18 months.117
The total annual financing needed to achieve the MDG 
Energy Vision  has been estimated at $45 billion. The chal-
lenge will nevertheless be to package energy access programs 
in ways that complement – and in some cases synergize with 
– climate financing for both mitigation and adaptation.
114 R.J.T. Klein, S. Huq, F. Denton, T.E. Downing, R.G. Richels, J.B. 
Robinson, and F.L. Toth, “Inter-relationships between Adaptation 
and Mitigation.” In Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 745–77.
115 H.D. Venema and M. Cisse, Seeing the Light: Adapting to Climate 
Change with Decentralized Renewable Energy in Developing Coun-
tries (Winnipeg, Canada: International Institute for Sustainable De-
velopment, 2004).
116 T. Takama, S. Tsephel, F. Zuzarte, M. Debebe, F. Lambe, and F.X. 
Johnson, “Socio-economic and Product Specific Factors to Promote  
a Clean Cooking Bio-ethanol Stove in Ethiopia: A Discrete Choice 
Model to Understand the Decision Making Factors of Stove Preferences,” 
presented at International Choice Modeling Conference, April 2009.
117 Stockholm Environment Institute, Sustainable Pathways to  
Attaining the Millennium Development Goals: Assessing the Key  
Role of Water, Energy and Sanitation (Stockholm: 2005).
can deny the local industry the chance to get off the ground, 
due to the high costs of small-scale operations in remote 
areas. Some reasonable balance is needed in policy formu-
lation between domestic energy security goals and market 
access, investment, and infrastructure from international 
trade that may be needed to improve competitiveness. In 
any case, detailed analysis is needed to sort out the climate 
and development implications of bioenergy expansion; there 
is no “one-size-fits-all” prescription for bioenergy. 
Implementation Strategies
Responses to the climate-development challenge must ad-
dress the root causes of low development levels and at the 
same time complement development assistance with new 
and improved measures for adapting to economic and envi-
ronmental disruptions. Underdevelopment fundamentally 
constrains adaptive capacity, especially because of a lack of 
resources to hedge against extreme but expected events.114
A number of decentralized renewable energy technolo-
gies, sometimes in combination with each other, can sup-
port energy access as well as mitigation and adaptation 
goals. In addition to improving basic household energy sup- 
plies, these technologies contribute to key village-level 
services such as water pumping for irrigation and refrigera-
tion for vaccines. An example in Bangladesh illustrates how 
some village-level projects address energy access, mitiga-
tion, and adaptation all at the same time: the installation 
of biogas at poultry farms reduced environmental hazards 
and turned them into an energy source, thereby also im-
proving the economic feasibility of the farms in the longer 
term and contributing to cleaner water supply as well as 
reducing GHG emissions from methane.115
Development assistance can only support joint climate-
development strategies for LDCs to the extent that it in-
corporates the energy access challenge. The institutional 
framework and the financing opportunities available 
through development assistance will need to be upgraded 
and increased. The upgrading in content needs to incor-
porate more evidence-based program formulation, such 
as analyzing in more detail some of the product-specific 
attributes associated with the household energy problem at 
a local scale rather than generalizing across socioeconomic 
variables.116 Scaling up could be accomplished regionally in 
some cases, such as the current policy process under way in 
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6. riSk AND iNSurANCe118   
Climate change is greatly increasing risks, and this trend 
will accelerate. Just as people adapt largely by their own 
devices, so too do they manage risks. Many of these ap-
proaches are described in Chapter 3: families and villages 
share resources, family members travel to find work, and 
so on. Just as there is a continuum from the local to the 
international in other forms of adaptation, so too is there a 
continuum in risk management.
Insurance coverage in developing countries is much low-
er than in industrial ones, and because weather-related risks 
are rarely covered by traditional insurance solutions, there 
is often a wide gap between insured losses and economic 
losses when natural disasters strike. Non-life insurance, 
in terms of premiums as a percentage of gross national 
product, amounts to roughly 4% in industrial markets but 
less than 2% in developing markets. 
The complexity of risk and all the ways it can be pooled, 
shared, transferred, and financed cannot be adequately de-
scribed here. The main messages are that much more re-
search and experimentation must be done on novel ways of 
management. And the limits of such approaches, which are 
serious, must also be mapped. 
The Bali Action Plan that emerged from the thirteenth 
Conference of the Parties to the climate convention at the 
end of 2007 called for “enhanced action on adaptation, in-
cluding, inter alia, consideration of risk management and 
risk reduction strategies, including risk sharing and trans-
fer mechanisms such as insurance.” 
A great deal is happening in this field. In the public sec-
tor, the World Bank Group is developing a global facility 
for hedging developing-country risk. In the private sector, 
the reinsurance company Swiss Re (represented with a 
member of this Commission) has established a Climate 
Adaptation Development Programme to build a market for 
innovative financial risk transfer instruments in low-in-
come areas. 
Munich Re initiated the Munich Climate Insurance 
Initiative in April 2005 to provide a forum and gathering 
place for insurance-related expertise applied to climate 
change issues. It includes insurers, climate change and adap-
tation experts, NGOs, and policy researchers intent on find- 
ing solutions to the risks posed by climate change. 
Most of the novel schemes being experimented with now 
are based on indexes that automatically trigger payouts. 
These indexes can cover anything from rainfall (too much 
or too little), soil moisture, hail, wind, temperature, and so 
on. Such an approach eliminates the “old-fashioned” need 
for expensive damage and/or loss assessments. It also de-
creases moral hazards, in that farmers who manage rea-
sonable harvests are still paid. Paying based on an index can 
mean very speedy payouts, but these do not necessarily cover 
losses (as explained below). 
These schemes can work at several levels: the macro (in 
which a national government and perhaps large NGOs are 
the main players), the meso (involving corporations and 
small and medium-size enterprises), and the micro (involv-
ing farmers’ associations, banks, and insurers). 
These efforts are receiving so much attention for a number 
of reasons. While more than half of the planet’s population 
now lives in cities, most of the people in the developing-
world tropics are rural and depend on farming for their 
livelihoods. Many rely on loans to buy seeds and agro-
chemical products, so crop failures send them into deeper, 
more long-lasting debt. Most tropical developing nations 
rely on agriculture for much of their gross domestic prod-
uct, so weather disasters can affect many companies and 
reverberate through the economy. 
Also, relieving disasters after the fact has rarely proved 
efficient or timely, and farm families may have to sell off 
productive equipment trying to survive before help reaches 
them. Protecting rural incomes can decrease poverty.
Such programs usually involve local-international con-
nections. In one macro-level example, the US Agency for 
International Development pays for insurance for the World 
Food Programme in Ethiopia, the program responsible for 
distributing food should harvests fail. The WFP receives 
the insurance money when rainfall drops below a certain 
minimum over time (rainfall index). The ultimate benefi-
ciaries are the small farmers who receive food from WFP 
when harvests fail. 
When governments secure a weather derivative product, 
118 This appendix is based on material and guidance provided by  
Margaret Arnold of the ProVention Consortium and Ivo Menzinger 
of SwissRe. 
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if there is significant drought in the country the government 
will get a payout. The payout level is determined by the 
size of the premium paid and the severity of the drought. 
This payout may be used to help purchase grain to cushion 
supply shortfalls or to distribute grain from strategic grain 
stocks. Unlike traditional indemnity insurance policies 
transacted through an insurance company with a payout 
when a problem is judged to have occurred, weather de-
rivatives are financial contracts based on an agreed weather 
index. 
A program in Malawi works at the micro level in that 
it involves microcredit, with small farmers being the di-
rect beneficiaries. Peanut farmers receive small loans from 
Opportunity International Bank. They transfer some of the 
loan to the Farmers Association to get seeds and some to 
insurance companies to get weather insurance. The Farm-
ers Association guarantees to buy harvests at fixed prices, 
and loans can be paid back either through income from har-
vest or insurance. Here again, a rainfall index provides the 
payment trigger. 
Meso-level schemes usually involve companies such as 
agrochemical providers that are exposed to risk of default-
ing farmers and food-processing companies dependent on 
a certain group of growers; if they fail, the company must 
buy inputs on the international market. 
For example, East African Malt has contract farming ar-
rangements with barley growers. In the first ever indem-
nity-based crop insurance scheme in Kenya, underwritten 
by four local insurance companies, East Africa Malt has 
indemnity cover for production costs due to losses through 
hail, drought, excessive rainfall, pests and disease, or ex-
cessive heat. 
The ingenuity of the deals and combinations seems lim-
itless. Fundación PROFIN in Bolivia developed a scheme 
that combines incentives for risk reduction and a flexible, 
people-centered index mechanism. (See Chapter 3.) The 
trigger is based on the production levels of reference farm-
ing plots in areas that are geographically similar in terms of 
temperature, precipitation, humidity, and type of soil. This 
scheme also provides an example of how to deal with one 
of the biggest constraints of other payout programs: poor 
availability of data from local or regional weather stations.
In another Malawi case, corn (maize) production is es-
timated based on rainfall data. If the rainfall level is above 
a given threshold, there will be no payout. Payout grows as 
the severity of the drought increases and will not depend on 
confirmation that the country or any particular farmer has 
suffered a loss. 
The World Bank treasury acts as intermediary on behalf 
of the government of Malawi to facilitate the country’s ac-
cess to the international weather derivatives market and to 
reduce transaction costs. The UK Department for Interna-
tional Development (DfID) paid the premium of £300,000 
in September 2008. This is a small contract designed to test 
the market, with an expected maximum payout of about 
£3 million if a drought occurs. 
In the event of a drought, the payout will be used to place 
a call-option for corn in the South African Futures Exchange. 
This would guarantee Malawi’s access to up to 200,000 
tons of corn imports at a price agreed six months before the 
corn is actually needed in the country.
DfID support is provided as part of a four-year £20- 
million program designed to increase agricultural produc-
tion and develop the corn, fertilizer, and seed markets. 
The World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management Group 
provides the technical advice needed on weather and corn 
price derivatives.
DfID has also funded the upgrade of the Malawi Met 
Office’s telecommunications infrastructure at a cost of 
£100,000. This upgrade will make it possible for 23 weather 
stations in Malawi to report live data through an automat-
ed process, a prerequisite not only for this national-level 
drought insurance but also for expanding the farmer-level 
insurance pilots that the World Bank is funding.
The Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility 
(CCRIF) is innovative in that it takes a regional approach 
for index insurance (based on loss modeling) to allow fast 
payouts to governments, letting them cover the immediate 
liquidity crunch that follows a severe disaster. This was 
demonstrated in payouts to Dominica and St. Lucia within 
a month after being struck by the November 2007 earth-
quake. 
DfID’s support for CCRIF acts on the Stern Review no-
tion that protection against increasingly severe climatic 
events requires more-effective interaction with financial 
markets. In June 2008, all 16 participating countries in the 
Caribbean renewed their policies and commitments. 
These approaches are promising but need a great deal 
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more work; policy makers need more experience with 
them, particularly during and after major payouts, to un-
derstand their limitations. 
Index-based solutions are not suited to cover the entire 
range of risks faced by developing countries, and they do not 
eliminate the need for good policies and practices, such as land 
zoning, building codes, agronomic practice, and trade policy. 
They do not pay out for any factor that is not reflected 
in the index but causes economic losses anyway, an issue 
known as “basis risk.” An index therefore needs to be de-
signed to correlate as closely as possible with the economic 
losses that should be covered. 
Participating governments must have in place the nec-
essary regulatory structures and systems (financial and 
legal), as well as the human capacity, to make sure that the 
schemes work effectively. 
A more profound concern was raised in a World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, which pointed out that 
insurance modeling tends to be backward-looking, basing 
present approaches on historical trends, while climate 
modeling looks ahead, trying to identify future trends. The 
authors could find no evidence of the two approaches be-
ing put together – for instance, basing index-based drought 
insurance on climate change models.119 
When they did this for the Malawi peanut program, they 
found that “climate change induced stress will likely de-
crease the robustness of the Malawian insurance pool in 
the 10-year period between 2008–2017.” Unless premiums 
were raised, more backup capital would be needed. 
Such schemes also need to be designed to better serve 
the poor. Global and national schemes that provide payouts 
to national governments are important ways to help relieve 
the fiscal burden placed on governments, but the same chal-
lenges of targeting the poorest (elite capture, timeliness, 
and so on) remain if the payments are not going directly to 
the affected communities. Where schemes aim to provide 
direct benefits to affected communities, they should:
▶ Be designed to be affordable to the poor (and the poorest 
of the poor), 
▶ Provide a quick (and adequate) payout to keep the would-
be recipients from selling off assets, and
▶ Provide some incentive for investment in risk reduction. 
Experience with micro-insurance is limited, and such 
approaches have yet to demonstrate their long-term viabil-
ity or their ability to benefit wide segments of the poor. 
Distribution of micro-insurance solutions is often very 
difficult and expensive, as standard insurance distribution 
channels cannot be used to access micro retail clients in de-
veloping countries. Existing schemes considered low-cost 
are often unaffordable to very low-income households that 
must consider trade-offs between insurance and more im-
mediate needs. Families with no culture of insurance are 
especially likely to opt for the more immediate. 
Governments can help by using regulatory frameworks 
to take a pro-poor approach. India passed regulations in 
2002 that require insurance companies to increase their 
coverage in low-income communities. As a result, India has 
the greatest number of micro-insurance schemes for disas-
ter risk. 
119 S. Hochrainer et al., Investigating the Impact of Climate Change  
on the Robustness of Index-Based Microinsurance in Malawi,  
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2008). 
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7. MigrAtioN120  
There has been much concern in the media and even in the 
academic literature that climate change will spark mass 
migration, particularly international movement from de-
veloping to industrial nations. 
The authors of such reports tend to ignore the fact that 
families affected by climate change have many other cop-
ing and adapting strategies besides migration and that mi-
gration is a reasonable and usually orderly form of adapta-
tion that can improve the sustainable development of both 
sending and receiving areas. Historically, large migrations 
have helped to develop many parts of the globe, a process 
that continues today. 
The debate over climate change and its effects on migra-
tion is part of a larger debate concerning the effects of en-
vironmental change on migration. The terms of debate are 
imprecise, and the concept of “environmental migration” 
covers a multitude of activities. It can be a response to vari-
ous kinds of sudden-onset disasters or slow-onset changes 
(usually a combination of both), and it may comprise move-
ments over short distances or long distances and from short 
time periods to “permanent” relocations. 
Judging such migration depends on your point of view. 
Migration from developing to developing countries can 
increase economic growth in both, but it may be hard on 
women left behind. Migration from countryside to cities 
has helped develop most developing countries, but it may 
overwhelm these cities, while perhaps benefiting rural 
families through money sent home. 
There is a continuum of migration decisions, with com-
pletely voluntary movements – seeking better jobs – at one 
end and completely forced movements – perhaps fleeing fam-
ine – at the other. Very few decisions are ever entirely forced 
or voluntary. Decisions to move in response to extreme envi-
ronmental changes, such as food crises arising from droughts 
and floods or large declines in natural capital arising from 
land degradation or deforestation, are more forced than vol-
untary. Decisions to move in response to incremental envi-
ronmental changes, such as declining mean precipitation or 
degradation of coral reefs, may be more voluntary. 
In policy terms, the issue is best framed as maintaining 
people’s right to stay as well as their right to leave, so that 
people are free to choose the response that best suits their 
needs and values. 
There is debate about weighing the various factors in 
migration decisions. For example, farmers in Australia suf-
fering droughts akin to those in Ethiopia tend not to suf-
fer hunger and migrate in the same numbers as do those in 
northern Ethiopia. Thus it could be argued that migrations 
triggered by drought in Ethiopia are driven more by pov-
erty and institutional failures than by climatic variability; 
climate is a trigger, but poverty the cause. 
The social processes that create poverty and marginal-
ity are more important causes of migration than environ-
mental changes. Reducing the likelihood of migration due 
to climate change is therefore in theory within the control 
of governments and policy makers, but this control posits 
vastly improved political and economic structures that re-
duce poverty and marginality.
Disasters do lead to large displacements of people, and 
they do undermine development, but the displacement is 
usually temporary, as most displaced people want to return, 
rebuild, and continue living in familiar ways and places. 
Such displacements are usually over short distances; few 
people displaced by disasters cross an international border. 
The patterns of movement tend to be largely determined 
by social networks, as people move to stay with family and 
friends. 
Sustained migration out of a disaster-prone region can 
reduce vulnerability to disasters by lowering the number of 
people exposed to hazards, and those who leave usually 
send back money.
It is difficult to discern the effects of slow-onset changes 
such as desertification on migration, but there is evidence 
to show that such changes are important in encouraging 
long-term or permanent migration. Ultimately it becomes 
difficult to return to a desert.
Migration in response to slow-onset changes seems most 
often to take the form of a household selecting an individu-
al to move to seek work; this reduces the number of people 
that the household must support, can create an alternative 
120 This appendix is based on a 2009 background paper to the Com- 
mission by J. Barnett and M. Webber, “Accommodating Migration  
to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change,” available at  
www.ccdcommission.org. 
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income stream, and can establish a bridge that may help if 
more family members need to move. 
Where environmental change stimulates permanent mi-
gration, the people who have the financial resources and 
social networks to move long distances may move to an-
other country, and those with sufficient wealth may move 
to an industrial nation. However, in most cases the people 
who move in response to such changes are the lower middle 
classes, who have enough money to move, but not enough 
to move far. 
Although some people fear that migrants may cause en-
vironmental degradation in the areas they move to, there is 
little proof of this. Land tenure and other property systems 
are important determinants of the environmental outcomes 
of influxes of migrants. Where local landowners have some 
security of tenure and are able to develop systems that al-
low migrants access to it, land can be shared, and migrants 
tend to use it sustainably. 
Much also depends on the reception of host communi-
ties and the actions of planners and donors. Where efforts 
to help migrants settle include local communities as well as 
migrants and promote sustainable resource management, 
the combined effects of additional labor and money can en-
hance sustainability. 
Taking into account the likelihood of effective adapta-
tions in many places, the extent of climate-driven migra-
tion in coming decades seems to be overstated and the 
oft-cited estimate of 200 million more people displaced by 
2050 appears to be an upper limit on the numbers perma-
nently displaced by climate change. However, the sum of 
temporary displacements due to extreme events, coupled 
with the number permanently displaced, may well exceed 
this figure. And if climate change accelerates, migrations 
may increase greatly.
Present patterns of movement may offer some guid-
ance on how population movements may be exacerbated 
by climate change. Currently most migrants move within 
their own countries. (There were nearly as many internal 
migrants in China alone – 130 million people – as there are 
international migrants in all countries – about 190 million 
in 2005.) Most internal migrants are “economic migrants” 
moving from rural areas to urban areas in search of work. 
The majority of people uprooted by conflict, ethnic strife, 
and human rights violations are internally displaced peo-
ple, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
which suggests that the routes and intermediaries used by 
migrants fleeing conflicts are similar to those used by eco-
nomic migrants. 
Half of the world’s international migrants come from 20 
countries, with the largest source of migrants (21%) com-
ing from Europe (including Russia and Turkey), followed 
by 11% from South Asia, 6% from Mexico, 5% from East 
Asia, 5% from Central Asia, and slightly less than 4% from 
Africa. 
Moving costs money, so there appears to be an economic 
migration hump, where the rate of migration from a com-
munity increases as incomes rise beyond a level necessary 
to meet subsistence needs, and then net migration decreases 
again as the gap between incomes at the place of origin and 
the main destination closes. Thus the poorest do not tend to 
migrate, or at least not very far. 
Climate change may well have the most severe impacts 
on people’s basic needs in those parts of the world where 
low-income, resource-dependent communities are living 
in environments that are already variable and declining. In 
places such as the Sahel, migration is already a response to 
the combined effects of environmental and economic chang-
es. There is also an association between vulnerability to 
climate change, migration, and existing or recent violent 
conflict. 
In the coming decades climate change is more likely 
to exacerbate existing migration patterns than create new 
flows. This means that present movements provide a crude 
guide to the geography of future movements. 
There is no serious study of the links between climate 
change and conflict that suggests with any certainty that 
climate change will increase the risk of violent conflict. 
This is true for case-based as well as quantitative studies.
The pessimistic literature on climate change and migra-
tion creates a bias against the development of policies to 
harness migration as a strategy to promote adaptation for 
migrants, their communities of origin, and their host com-
munities. There is evidence that framing migration as a 
threat leads to policies that do little to control migration 
but that limit the benefits of migration to migrants and their 
original and destination communities. 
There is also evidence that can be used to inform poli-
cies to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of 
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migration. A growing body of studies shows that in most 
cases migration contributes positively to the capacity of 
households, communities, and countries of origin to adapt 
to climate change. It also most often leads to net gains in 
wealth in receiving areas. However, these findings depend 
heavily on their context. 
Many of the benefits for the communities of origin arise 
through remittances, which globally may be double the vol-
ume of official development assistance (ODA). 
Migration expands the social networks of households and 
communities, which reduces the risks associated with short- 
term displacement in response to crisis. It also boosts in-
centives to pursue education, as this is a determinant of 
success in moving, so migration increases the educational 
attainment of sending populations.
Migrants of all kinds consistently display initiative in 
helping themselves. Labor migrants tend to be hard-work-
ing, seeking to maximize incomes to finance a better life 
for themselves and their children (irrespective of whether 
they are temporary or permanent migrants), to send money 
to families at home, and to help new migrants overcome 
barriers to movement and settlement. 
However, one type of migration that rarely has positive 
results for those moved is involuntary resettlement. People 
who are resettled lose their land, their understanding of the 
local environmental and institutional conditions necessary 
for development, their jobs if they were employed, and their 
trust in social institutions such as government. Their social 
networks are disrupted. The resettlement process creates 
opportunities for corruption. For these reasons, resettlement 
that is anything other than entirely voluntary would not 
constitute an “adaptation” in the sense of an avoided im-
pact from climate change. 
Policies to restrict migration rarely succeed, are often 
self-defeating, and increase costs to migrants, communities 
of origin, and destination communities. There is consider-
able scope for careful and coordinated policies to minimize 
many of the potential costs and maximize many of the po-
tential benefits arising from migration that may be affected 
by climate change. 
In the case of labor migrants, such policies might in-
clude: 
▶ Orient international migration policies to benefit people 
in the most vulnerable regions;
▶ Target training packages to encourage the development 
of skills that are scarce in industrial countries;
▶ Reduce the transaction costs on remittances;
▶ Reduce the barriers to return migration;
▶ Create industrial/developing-country migration agree-
ments that facilitate migration in exchange for agree-
ments to maximize the benefits of that migration to 
communities of origin (for example in the form or dual 
citizenship, protection of rights in both destinations, 
reduced costs of remittance exchanges);
▶ Ensure migrants have the same rights and freedoms as 
local people;
▶ Coordinate aid and migration policies in industrial coun-
tries; 
▶ Build networks among diaspora and encourage them to 
support communities of origin, for example by offering 
matching funding and assistance with visas, shipping, 
and financial transfers;
▶ Develop migration plans and strategies that identify ar-
eas of labor scarcity (skills, workers relative to capital) 
and facilitate voluntary movements; and
▶ Develop regional labor migration agreements to man-
age “brain drain” situations – countries that benefit from 
skilled international migrants may offset this effect by 
investing in skills training in countries of origin, for ex-
ample.
Policy suggestions for people displaced by extreme 
events might include: 
▶ Increase commitments to the UN Central Emergency 
Response Fund; 
▶ Improve the international emergency response system, 
including increasing the number of professional emer-
gency response staff, stockpiles of emergency supplies, 
and logistical capacity for transporting displaced people, 
response staff, and supplies;
▶ Promote awareness of the responsibility of governments 
to protect displaced people;
▶ Develop frameworks between countries with respect to 
mechanisms for triggering an international response to 
an emergency and allowing free passage of refugees in 
times of crisis;
▶ Increase investment in disaster risk reduction (DRR) in 
developing countries;
▶ Develop bilateral and regional disaster response sys-
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tems, including for repatriation of displaced peoples;
▶ Promote awareness of and work to improve implementa-
tion of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights;
▶ After an extreme event, mainstream adaptation into re-
construction activities to reduce vulnerability;
▶ Do not encourage or facilitate movement into conflict 
zones; and
▶ Give people who move en masse the choice of staying in 
camps or moving into settlements, and support them in 
their decisions. 
Suggested policies with respect to people permanently 
displaced might include: 
▶ Facilitate adaptation among communities where liveli-
hoods are now or may in the future be stressed by cli-
mate change, including the poor living in drylands, low-
lying coastal areas, and areas exposed to damage from 
extreme wind and flooding events;
▶ Develop systems to deliver well-timed and effective dis-
aster assistance;
▶ Facilitate secure access to land in places at risk;
▶ Facilitate secure access to land for migrants;
▶ Create short-term jobs to help migrants meet their im-
mediate needs;
▶ Provide microfinance, skills training, health care, and 
agricultural extension to migrants and host communi-
ties alike;
▶ Encourage local hosts to see the benefits of new mi-
grants, and foster cultural awareness;
▶ Ensure migrants have the same rights and freedoms as 
local people;
▶ Plan for developments that can boost employment of 
people in the host community as well as migrants; and
▶ Increase efforts to build and broker peace to avoid civil 
wars. 
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capital may be the only big city and the center of most ad-
ministration and economic activity. Yet many of these capi- 
tals have worn buildings and infrastructure, or no infra-
structure in the case of many informal settlements, and 
99% of households and businesses in low-income nations 
have no disaster insurance. 
As has been emphasized throughout our report, adapta-
tion requires local knowledge, local competence, and local 
capacity within local governments. It needs households and 
community organizations with the knowledge and capa- 
city to act. It also requires a willingness among local gov-
ernments to work with lower-income groups. 
Most well-governed cities should be able to adapt to the 
risks of climate change for the next few decades. They will 
adapt buildings and infrastructure, work with groups and 
settlements most at risk to find solutions, and improve dis-
aster preparedness. 
However, infrastructure that is not there cannot be adapt-
ed. Hundreds of millions of urban dwellers have no all- 
weather roads, no piped water supplies, no drains, and no 
electricity supplies; they live in poor-quality homes on ille-
gally occupied or subdivided land, which inhibits any in-
vestment in more-resilient buildings and often prevents the 
provision of infrastructure and service. 
Many are tenants unable to pay for improved housing, 
and their landlords have no incentive to invest in better 
buildings. Most low-income city people would find it dif-
ficult if not impossible to move to safer sites, both because 
they need to be close to places of work and because they 
cannot afford better areas. 
Worldwide, many of the cities that most need to adapt 
lack the means to do so. Most risks to citizens in these cit-
ies stems from the incapacity of local governments to pro-
vide for infrastructure and for disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness or from their refusal to work with the inhabit-
ants of “illegal settlements.” 
Pro-poor adaptation strategies do not emerge from city 
121 This appendix is based on D. Satterthwaite, S. Huq, M. Pelling,  
H. Reid, and P. Romero Lankao, Adapting to Climate Change  
in Urban Areas (London: International Institute for Environment  
and Development, 2007).
8. CitieS121  
Cities and city dwellers have received too little attention in 
discussions of climate change impacts and adaptation. 
This is perhaps due to irrational, psychological reasons. 
Climate change impacts tend to be thought of as rural: 
floods and droughts in the countrysides affecting crops and 
farmers, afflicted ocean atolls and loss of forests. 
In fact, among the worse risks – to large populations, to 
individuals, and to national economies based largely in big 
cities – may be found in the urban areas of the developing 
world. 
More than a third of the world’s total population lives in 
urban areas in low- and middle-income nations, which now 
have most of the world’s urban population and most of the 
largest cities. Their urban centers will house most of the 
growth in the world’s population over the next few decades. 
How this growth is planned and managed has large impli-
cations for the extent to which adaptation limits the costs of 
climate change and for whether prosperity can be delinked 
from high greenhouse gas emissions. 
Extreme weather events have caused increasing devas-
tation to developing-world urban populations and econo-
mies in recent years. Storms and floods have been the most 
dramatic disasters, but climate change will also bring other 
less dramatic stresses such as heat waves, reductions in 
freshwater availability, and sea-level rise for coastal cities. 
Since 1950, there has been a sevenfold increase in the ur-
ban populations of low- and middle-income nations and an 
increased concentration of people and economic activities 
in low-lying coastal zones or other areas at risk from flood-
ing and extreme weather events. Two-fifths of the people 
of Africa, long considered a rural continent, live in urban 
areas; in fact, the continent has a larger urban population 
than North America does. 
The number of urban dwellers living in poverty and 
lacking basic infrastructure and services that should pro-
tect them from environmental health hazards and disasters 
has greatly increased over the past 50 years. Some 1 billion 
urban dwellers live in poor-quality, overcrowded housing 
in “slums,” shantytowns, or other forms of informal settle-
ments, and a high proportion of these settlements are at risk 
from flooding or landslides. 
National economies depend on well-functioning urban 
centers, particularly in the developing world, where the 
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governments that refuse to work with the poor or that see 
their homes, neighborhoods, and enterprises as “the prob-
lem.” Many nations have weak, ineffective, and unaccount-
able local governments; some also suffer from civil con-
flicts and have little or no economic or political stability. 
The vulnerability of poor urban dwellers to climate 
change is often ascribed to their poverty, but it is far more 
the result of failures or limitations in local government. 
These in turn are linked to the failure of national govern-
ments and international agencies to support urban policies 
and governance systems that ensure needed infrastructure 
is in place, along with preparedness for extreme weather 
and, where needed, sea-level rise. Most international agen-
cies have chosen to avoid investing in urban initiatives. 
Building local capacity
Most national governments and international agencies have 
had little success in supporting local development in cities. 
They need to learn to be more effective in this and in 
supporting good local governance if they are to help build 
adaptive capacity. 
The growing recognition within international develop-
ment assistance agencies of the importance of supporting 
“good governance” rarely focuses on the importance of 
good local governance. Meanwhile, the international agen-
cies leading the discussions on adaptation to climate change 
do not understand the political and institutional con- 
straints on successful local adaptation. There is also a ten-
dency to assume that as long as new funding sources for 
adaptation are identified, adaptation can take place. 
There are clear links between adaptation to climate 
change and most other areas of development and environ-
mental management. Housing and infrastructure policies 
and housing finance systems that support better-quality 
housing and provision for water and sanitation are key 
parts of adaptation that require competent, accountable ur-
ban governments. 
Managing health issues means not only better health care 
available to all (which should include emergency response 
capacity for extreme weather events) but also a reduction 
of environmental health risks, especially those associated 
with climate change. 
Adaptation also has to focus on what is needed to reduce 
the vulnerabilities of particular groups to particular aspects 
of climate change – for instance, the vulnerabilities of in-
fants, their caregivers, and older age groups. 
A large part of city planning should focus on providing 
lower-income groups with safer, legal alternatives to infor-
mal settlements by increasing the supply and reducing the 
cost of land for housing and by supporting infrastructure 
on suitable sites. Land use management should protect and 
enhance natural buffers and defenses for cities and their 
surrounds. Getting the needed collaboration between so 
many different departments within national and local gov-
ernments is difficult. 
Companies have a role to play in urban adaptation, start-
ing with their own premises and extending to the many 
enterprises that can offer goods and services that help in-
dividuals, households, and governments adapt. Providing 
appropriate financial services to lower-income groups can 
help them save and invest in safer homes and better liveli-
hoods, all of which increases adaptive capacity.
The potential of private sector investments and public-
private partnerships to manage urban development issues 
has long been overestimated. An analysis of private invest-
ment flows into urban areas in low- and middle-income 
nations shows their potential to help fund some forms of 
infrastructure improvement and adaptation, but not the in-
frastructure most urgently needed. 
There are innovative urban policies and practices un-
der way that show that adaptation is possible and can be 
built into development plans. These include examples of 
community-based initiatives led by organizations formed 
by the urban poor that greatly reduce their vulnerability 
to storms and floods at very low unit cost. There are also 
good examples of local governments working in partner-
ship with their low-income populations to improve housing 
conditions and infrastructure provision or to develop new 
good-quality settlements. These include many partnerships 
between local governments and federations formed by 
slum and shack dwellers. There are also more post-disaster 
responses that recognize the competence and capacity of 
those displaced to rebuild their lives, including their homes 
and livelihoods, if the organizations that respond to the dis-
aster allow them to do so. 
But these are the exceptions. Few government bodies or 
international agencies recognize the competence and ca-
pacity within the populations they identify as “most at risk.” 
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Such bodies need to consider how local “development + 
adaptation” innovations like those just mentioned can 
be encouraged and supported in many more places. This 
would not be simple replication, because each city needs 
forms of adaptation based on particular local conditions 
and capacities and able to overcome particular local con-
straints. 
Most of the nations in which the competence and ac-
countability of city and municipal governments have in-
creased considerably are middle-income. Even in these it is 
difficult to get much attention to climate change adaptation 
from city governments or from most national ministries 
and agencies within their urban policies and investments. 
Most have more pressing issues, including large backlogs 
in providing infrastructure and services and improving 
housing. They are also under pressure to improve educa-
tion, health care, and security and to expand employment 
and attract new investment. 
Even competent and accountable national and local (city 
and municipal) governments will not engage with adapta-
tion to climate change unless it is seen as supporting and 
enhancing the achievement of development goals. 
What needs to be done?
The key issue is how to build resilience in tens of thou-
sands of cities to the many impacts of climate change – re-
silience that: 
▶ Reduces risks to other environmental hazards, includ-
ing disasters (there are strong complementarities be-
tween reducing risk from climate change, non-climate-
change-related disasters, and most other environmental 
hazards);
▶ Is strongly pro-poor (the majority of those most at risk 
from climate change and from other environmental haz-
ards have low incomes, which limits their autonomous 
adaptive capacity); 
▶ Builds on the knowledge acquired over the last 20 years 
on reducing risks from disasters in urban areas (there 
have been important advances here); 
▶ Is based on and builds a strong local knowledge of cli-
mate variabilities and of the likely local impacts from 
climate change scenarios; 
▶ Encourages and supports actions that reduce risks (and 
vulnerabilities) now while recognizing the importance 
of current measures to begin the needed long-term 
changes – urbanization processes have a momentum and 
drivers that are difficult to change, but at present these 
are mostly increasing risks from climate change and so 
can be considered maladaptation; 
▶ Recognizes that the core of these efforts is building the 
competence, capacity, and accountability at city and 
neighborhood levels of government and changing their 
relationship with those living in informal settlements 
and working in the informal economy – and the im-
portance within this of supporting civil society groups, 
especially representative organizations of the urban 
poor (this is also to avoid the danger of “adaptation” pro-
viding opportunities for powerful groups to evict low-
income residents from land they want to develop); 
▶ Recognizes that government policies must encourage and 
support the contributions to adaptation of individuals, 
households, community organizations, and enterprises;
▶ Recognizes the key complementary roles to be played 
by higher levels of government and international agen-
cies to support this (and that this requires major changes 
in policy for most international agencies that have long 
ignored urban issues and major changes in how adapta-
tion is funded);
▶ Builds resilience and adaptation capacity in rural areas 
– given the dependence of urban centers on rural pro-
duction and ecological services and the importance for 
many urban economies and enterprises of rural demand 
for producer and consumer goods and services; and
▶ Builds into all of this a mitigation framework (if suc-
cessful cities in low- and middle-income nations develop 
without this, global greenhouse gas emissions cannot be 
reduced).
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9. DiSASter riSk reDuCtioN
Whether natural hazards have disastrous impacts in human 
and physical terms depends on the force of the event and on 
the vulnerability of people, infrastructure, and ecosystems. 
A major flood or storm in a country at the low end of the 
Human Development Index consistently leads to devastat-
ing consequences, often remaining for years or even gen-
erations, while a similar event in a country at the other end 
of the scale can be managed without long-lasting impacts. 
The human security impact of disasters is thus a function 
of hazard and vulnerability, with the latter being highly 
context-specific.
The multiple causes of hazards and vulnerability and the 
different elements of disaster risk reduction were addressed 
by governments in the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), 
agreed in early 2005. It identifies five priority areas: 
▶ Ensuring that disaster reduction is a national priority 
with a strong institutional basis,
▶ Identifying disaster risks,
▶ Building a culture of resilience through awareness and 
education,
▶ Reducing underlying risk factors, and
▶ Strengthening preparedness for effective response. 
Governments are encouraged to ensure effective imple-
mentation of HFA through establishing national platforms 
where all relevant government bodies as well as civil soci-
ety and private sector actors can coordinate and exchange 
information.
Current development dynamics and demographic change 
put more people in harm’s way. Rural-urban migration, the 
growth of informal urban neighborhoods, and increasing 
degradation of natural resources and ecosystems increases 
exposure to natural hazards. People live dangerously in 
unplanned housing areas on or close to steep slopes where 
protective vegetative cover has been removed, without sup-
porting infrastructure such as drainage or access to clean 
water and sanitation. Such areas are exposed to the risk of 
landslides triggered by floods and storms and to vector-
borne and infectious disease. 
While more people live in danger, data also show a con-
sistent increase in the number of weather-related disasters 
such as storms and floods over past decades, as well as in 
the number of people affected.122 Disasters have a direct, 
erosive, and cumulative impact on the lives and livelihoods 
of the poor for whom the margins of resilience are small. 
Floods and storms disrupt agriculture and economic activ-
ity and – if they occur again and again – prevent farmers 
and laborers from saving and building assets. Repeatedly 
experiencing the destruction of their property and exhaus-
tion of their coping mechanisms ultimately affects people’s 
ability and motivation to recover.
Statistics show a decreasing trend in the number of peo-
ple killed annually by natural disasters.123 Much of this re- 
duction is because the large-scale droughts and famines of 
the 1980s in sub-Saharan Africa have not been repeated. 
Drought-related deaths have thus been reduced, while 
deaths due to other weather-related disasters remain rela-
tively stable in spite of their increased frequency and inten- 
sity and a growing population. This is likely due to im-
provements in early warning, disaster preparedness, and 
response capacity.124 For example, in Bangladesh the ex-
tensive cyclone shelter program, including improved early 
warning, is thought to have contributed to the drastic re-
duction in the number of people killed in recent cyclones.
Yet economic losses continue to grow, particularly as 
measured in insured and non-insured assets in industrial 
countries. In the early part of the twentieth century, Florida 
in the United States was largely rural, and death tolls in 
hurricanes were high, as people could not be warned or 
evacuated. As the state turned from rural to urban, death 
tolls decreased steadily, but property damage has risen pre-
cipitously. 
Reliable data on economic losses for developing coun-
tries are scarce, partly because only a fraction of these as-
sets is insured. It is likely, however, that there is a strong 
increase in the erosion of livelihoods of the poor along with 
the increase in asset-loss in hazardous events.
Many of the measures reported by countries as disaster 
risk reduction focus on hazard events – preparedness, early 
warning, response – while reduction of vulnerability is not 
deliberately done as part of DRR, if done at all, or at least is 
122 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Annual Dis-
aster Statistical Review: Number and Trends 2007 (Brussels: 2008).
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
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not reported as such.125 In fact, a reduction in vulnerability to 
disasters depends on factors often completely unrelated to 
what is regarded as risk reduction. 
“Changing access to communications, financial sys-
tems, transport, utilities, health services and local to global 
social networks heavily influence where people live, their 
overall mobility and the vulnerability of their livelihood 
systems to disruption during floods, droughts or other cli-
mate related events,” according to Marcus Moench and his 
colleagues.126
The increasing number of small-scale, localized disas-
ters that are largely ignored by international actors have a 
stronger impact on the poor than the dramatic large-scale 
disasters.127 (See Chapter 3.) Local flash floods, landslides, 
or wildfires go unreported but affect poor families and 
cause death, injury, and damage and destroy their pro-per-
ty and assets. 
Disaster risk reduction has obvious links to several as-
pects of human security – food security, water, ecosystems, 
the nature of urban environments, and access to services. 
DRR is therefore not a sector but an approach to develop-
ment with the identification and management of risks at 
its center. Since lead responsibility for DRR in most gov-
ernments still rests mainly with institutions managing 
emergency response, few countries have ensured a more 
comprehensive implementation of actions that reduce the 
vulnerability and build the resilience of the poor.
Reducing disaster risk includes transferring risk. There 
is a wide range of risk transfer instruments, although focus 
and discussion are often limited to insurance products. 
A number of pilot or larger-scale projects to insure gov-
ernments or individuals against weather-induced disasters 
have been launched during recent years. Most have been 
designed for the agricultural sector, with promising results, 
particularly those based on an index directly related to ob-
jective measures of rainfall or wind speed rather than time-
consuming assessments of damage to individual farming 
plots. (See Appendix 6.)
Other forms of risk transfer with a more pronounced 
vulnerability focus are also important. Social protection 
measures that target those with few productive assets and 
the urban poor, or schemes that guarantee temporary em- 
ployment for laborers, clearly belong among disaster risk 
transfer instruments.
Impacts of climate change
Higher temperatures lead to higher evaporation and in-
crease the energy contained in the atmosphere. The growth 
in intensity and frequency of hydro-meteorological disas-
ter events is consistent with predictions made by the IPCC, 
which also finds that weather-related hazard events will 
become more unpredictable with climate change.128 They 
will happen when and where they are not expected, pos-
sibly negating achievements in disaster preparedness and 
response. Small-scale and localized disasters will increase 
drastically, probably combining to have larger-scale and 
more extensive impacts. 
This means that disaster responders are already deal-
ing with the impacts of climate change. Some recent dra-
matic events – such as cyclone Nargis in May 2008 or the 
heatwave in Europe in 2003 – are indicative of the type of 
events that are likely to become more frequent as the globe 
becomes warmer. 
This includes greater weather variability, so that an-
nual rainfall may become concentrated during a shorter 
period than in the past or will occur earlier or later than 
people have been used to. This, in turn, will upset the nor-
mal supply and provision of foodstuffs, which means that 
food security will be undermined. A large portion of poor 
smallholder farmers cannot satisfy the nutritional needs of 
their families on the basis of their own production, but rely 
on markets. If the volume of marketed foods declines and 
prices go up, the poor will be affected in a double sense.
Other risks relate to health impacts of climate change. 
In addition to the direct effects of higher temperatures 
on human well-being and capacity to work, an expanded 
distribution of malaria and other vector-borne diseases is 
likely to lead to large-scale outbreaks of disease in new 
125 International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), Disaster Risk 
Reduction Global Review 2007 (Geneva: United Nations, 2007).
126 M. Moench and Risk to Resilience Study Team, Understanding the 
Costs and Benefits of Disaster Risk Reduction under Changing Cli-
matic Conditions, Working Paper No 9 (Kathmandu, Nepal: ISET-
Nepal and ProVention, 2008).
127 ISDR, op. cit. note 125.
128 IPCC, op. cit. note 71.
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areas. Poor people in growing informal cities without prop-
er water and sanitation will become increasingly exposed.
Consequences for policy and action 
Many of the human security impacts of disasters and cli-
mate change are linked and should therefore be addressed 
in a coordinated fashion. This means mutual learning, 
a common approach to vulnerability reduction with an 
emphasis on livelihood protection, a common institutional 
location, and a preparedness for surprises.
Measures that reduce vulnerability and disaster risk are 
obviously also important for adapting to a more violent cli-
mate. The capacity to respond to emergencies is important 
from an adaptation perspective, but perhaps even more im-
portant are investments in reducing underlying risk factors 
and vulnerability. This could include more efforts such as 
stabilizing and providing infrastructure for informal urban 
settlements, or broadly improving food security by ensur-
ing the supply and entitlements to food during periods of 
flooding or drought, including targeted social protection 
measures for those without productive assets. Moving from 
a focus on saving lives to saving lives and protecting liveli-
hoods must be the new disaster reduction paradigm.
There are hence important overlaps and possibilities 
for learning between the DRR and adaptation agendas, 
although the two are not identical. Countries that develop 
comprehensive adaptation plans and strategies seem to 
incorporate elements from their DRR plans. Many of the 
urgent projects of the National Adaptation Programs of Ac-
tion actually have a strong DRR connotation, such as aim-
ing to stabilize the availability of water for agriculture dur-
ing dry periods or managing increased malaria risk.
These types of measures require clear government pol-
icy and possibly legislation at the national level, as well as 
capacity and resources for identifying and implementing 
appropriate action at the local level. The close connection 
between the DRR and adaptation areas also means that it 
is rational and appropriate that they are led and managed 
from within the same government structure. This needs to 
be located at the highest possible level to ensure leadership 
and the permeation of a risk management and reduction ap-
proach in development planning and budgeting processes. 
National DRR platforms would naturally form part of this 
framework. The same arrangement needs to be replicated 
at lower government levels. 
Communities, countries, and regions will increasingly 
face the unexpected – the sudden and disastrous events that 
have not been prepared for, where there are no plans, no 
experience, and no good practice to rely on.129 Adaptation 
will require a new kind of leadership for dealing with po-
tentially chaotic situations. Surveillance for new and low 
signals, intelligence not dependent on established models 
and procedures, and empowerment of the appropriate level 
for action will be needed. “Not to strive to foresee the un-
foreseeable but to train ourselves to cope with it,” notes 
Patrick Lagadec. “Not to clarify, map and plan for every 
single surprise, but to train to be surprised.”130  
The DRR implications of increasing climate change im-
pacts at the local and national levels require a mirroring 
institutional architecture and governance at regional and 
international levels – not the other way round. In particular, 
the expansion of small-scale but extensive disasters calls 
for close monitoring of events at a different scale than at 
present to enable the international community to provide 
the support needed to fight vulnerability. 
129 P. Lagadec, “A New Cosmology of Risks and Crises – Time for 
a Radical Shift in Paradigm and Practice” (Paris: Departement 
D’Economie, Ecole Polytechnique, 2008).
 
130 Ibid.
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10. CoMMiSSioN’S terMS oF
  reFereNCe 
The Swedish government established the independent 
Commission on Climate Change and Development to focus 
especially on risk reduction and adaptation in developing 
countries and on climate-proofing the development process. 
The main task of the Commission was to make proposals 
on how to climate-proof official development assistance by 
integrating risk reduction and adaptation to climate change 
into the development and poverty reduction plans of poor 
countries and also to present proposals on how to design 
ODA so that it takes account of climate impacts and the 
risk of disasters in developing countries.
Based on how climate change affects the ability of 
developing countries to attain the MDGs, the Commission 
presents concrete proposals on how to integrate adaptation, 
risk reduction, and climate-proofed development effective-
ly into development and poverty reduction plans in devel-
oping countries. The proposals take account of a bottom-up 
perspective and consider local and traditional knowledge in 
order to ensure effective adaptation and are to be socially 
efficient and cost-effective. 
The Commission also presents proposals on how to de-
sign ODA that takes account of climate impacts and disas-
ter risks in developing countries. The Commission builds 
on and links with ongoing initiatives in this area, such as 
the UNFCCC, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, and the European Union, to ensure add-
ed value.
The Commission has concentrated on:
▶ Identifying and analyzing the incentives for and bar-
riers to poor countries undertaking risk reduction and 
climate-proofing measures in their development coop-
eration and also contributing to increased awareness of 
the need to integrate climate-proofing, risk reduction, 
and adaptation measures into development and poverty 
reduction strategies. The focus has been on weather-re-
lated disasters and climate-related impacts on develop-
ment. A comprehensive approach to risk reduction has 
been pursued, including all major disaster risks.
▶ Analyzing how best to combine long-term work on cli-
mate change mitigation with the immediate need to sup-
port adaptation measures in developing countries.
▶ Identifying guidelines for international development co-
operation in the fields of adaptation and risk reduction, 
taking account of local and national perspectives in de-
veloping countries.
▶ Considering how to achieve policy coherence by in-
tegrating concerns for climate change into wider de-
velopment efforts and drafting proposals for methods 
of conducting Integrated Analysis for Climate-Proof 
Development in development cooperation.
The Commission has also:
▶ Assessed the role and importance of ecosystems in dis-
aster prevention and devised strategies to strengthen 
their capacity to meet climate change. 
▶ Given special attention to the dangers that slum dwellers 
are exposed to and identified solutions to reduce their 
vulnerability.
▶ Given priority to slow-onset disasters such as prolonged 
droughts and chronic instability stemming from water 
scarcity. 
▶ Assessed how risk management mechanisms in the in-
surance industry might be used for risk reduction and 
adaptation measures in developing countries. 
The Commission has 13 members, including its chairper-
son. They represent different areas of expert knowledge, have 
a broad geographical base, and are widely acknowledged 
and established as important actors in the area of climate 
and development.
The commission held four meetings for the period of its 
mandate; participated in relevant international conferences 
through workshops, lectures, and so on; and commissioned 
papers by experts. 
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